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PREFACE
There is a g rea t gap in the h istory  of Am erican m onetary 
politics between the years of Jackson’s ’’Bank W ar” and the lengthy 
debate over bonds, Greenbacks, and silver that occupied the energies 
of the nation after the Civil War. While these years w ere chaotic 
and produced little  constructive m onetary legislation, the money 
issue played an im portant ro le. This study is designed to help clarify 
the nature of the issues during this period and the ways in which the 
parties reacted.
The study of these issues has usually been confused by 
assum ptions derived from  a projection of the post-w ar issues into 
the p re-w ar period and by the tendency to view Am erican h istory  in 
term s of a continuous conflict between the party  of conservatism  
and the party  of liberalism . I have rejected  these assum ptions as 
invalid and attem pted to reconstruct the issues of the time as the 
parties involved perceived them. The rejection of these organiza­
tional concepts has forced me to make some conjectures based on 
lim ited  evidence which may ultim ately prove inaccurate. I also have 
no doubt that the situation in other a reas a t different stages of social 
and economic development was different from  that in the Old North­
w est and my conclusions would have to be a ltered  accordingly to 
apply in those a reas . However, I hope that this study makes c lear
i i i
the weakness of in terpreting Am erican history  within the lim ited 
bounds of the liberal*conservative dichotomy which im presses 
ideological continuity on the im m ensely complicated convolutions of 
parties and in te res t groups.
Every student owes debts to countless fellow scholars, 
lib ra rian s, teachers* and friends. The staffs of the Ohio State 
H istorical Society L ibrary , the Indiana State H istorical L ibrary , 
the Illinois State H isto rical L ibrary , the Wisconsin H istorical Society, 
and the Wayne State U niversity L ibrary , were always friendly and 
helpful. In particu lar, I m ust thank Jam es Babcock and his staff a t 
the Burton H istorical Collection in the Detroit Public L ibrary . A 
grant from  the Society of Colonial Dames made possible much of the 
research . M embers of the faculty of Wayne State University have 
been a constant source of encouragement. P ro fesso rs  Edward Lurie 
and Sidney G lazer have read  a ll o r portions of the m anuscript, made 
suggestions, and offered c ritic ism  a t various stages of the project.
My g rea tes t thanks m ust go to P ro fesso r Raymond C. M iller who 
originally  suggested the topic and has guided the d issertation  to com­
pletion. One’s peers a re  always the m ost incisive and devastating of 
c ritic s . I have been fortunate to have such friends as Jam es K. Flack, 
Ron P. Form isano, and Lewis Gould who put aside their own work to 
read, c r itic ise  and improve m ine.
Finally, it  is difficult to adequately thank my wife. Like 
other academ ic wives, she has been called on to perform  the functions
Vof typist, editor, and critic  as well as the m ore mundane of wifely 
chores. Her aid and encouragem ent have been indispensable.
CHAPTER I
BANKS AND POLITICS IN THE ODD NORTHWEST DURING THE 183 G*s
Daring the 1830’s, the Old Northwest faced a dilemma.
Its early  experiences with banks had been unfortunate and dictated 
caution. Yet, the demands for c red it and currency-*the sinews 
of economic development*-grew yearly. In the f i r s t  years of the 
decade old prejudices w ere laid aside, and the easy money sp irit 
was allowed to dominate. The num ber of banks was increased  in 
every state, and there  is little  evidence that "hard money" 
attitudes gained m ore than a lim ited hearing. Before Jackson 's 
veto, there  was little  opposition to the Bank of the United States, 
and between that tim e and 1837, both parties struggled to establish  
state banks in answ er to popular demands. State banking was not 
a party  issue, and the Democracy of the Old Northwest was not a 
"hard  money" party.
Andrew Jackson 's attack on the Bank of the United States 
opened a period of m onetary debate in this country which lasted 
through the Civil War. The language of the veto and Jackson 's 
subsequent m essages struc tu red  this debate by giving to the Demo­
cra tic  party  a sym bolism  which was politically effective, but un* 
rea lis tic  in the face of the exigencies of an expanding economy* 
This was particu la rly  true in the Old Northwest where there was a 
positive need for banks and banking services* At f irs t, the 
Dem ocrats in this a re a  chose to in te rp re t the veto as a m anifesto 
of emancipation for local banks from  domination by the Chestnut 
S treet "Monster"? but gradually, they moved toward acceptance of 
Jackson’s opposition to all banks* By the 1840*s this was the 
orthodox position in the party. This lim ited their action on the
2problem  of providing an adequate currency to the ste rile  negativism  
of ’’hard  money, ” Constructive policy had to come from  their 
opponents, and those of the Democracy willing to break  with party 
orthodoxy. During the three decades of m onetary controversy it 
was the Whigs, Republicans, and their few Democratic allies who 
struggled to implement and perfect free  banking as an answer to 
the economic needs of the Old Northwest.
W estern experience with banks in the decade following the 
Peace of Ghent left an ambiguous legacy. ’’Soft m oney” and ’’hard 
money” men often stood side by sidej and those favoring local 
private banks often opposed those who favored banks owned either 
wholly or in p a rt by the state. The Situation was hardly  ever 
eimply ’’banks” versus ”no banks, ”
For a tim e the m ost pervasive attitude was a d is tru st of
and antipathy toward the Bank of the United States resulting from
the p a rt the Bank played in the Panic of 1819 and the subsequent
depression. This was aggravated by a parochial suspicion of the
distant institution. During the depression which lasted  until 1822,
the ra th e r crusty  doctrines of John Taylor were revived and found
1the ir way into the political ba ttles in the West.
1 This is em phasized in: Charles G. S ellers, J r . , ’’Banking and 
Politics in Jackson 's Tennessee, 1817-1827, ” M ississippi Valley 
H istorical Review, XL! (June* 1954), pp. 61*84; and Lynn 
M arshall, ”The E arly  C areer of Amos Kendall” (Unpublished 
Ph. D. d issertation , U niversity of California, Berkeley, 1962), 
pp. 195-240,
3In the Old Northwest there was a broad vein of d is tru st
of state  banking institutions that was m ore rela ted  to experience
than any environm entally determ ined conservatism . The 1820* a
had seen the economic c ris is  decim ate the Ohio banking system*
Fraud and m is -m anagem ent undermined the experim ents with State
Banks in Indiana and Illinois. Intended for relief, they brought
Zfu rther depreciation and failure.
Yet, while the Panic of 1819 and its afterm ath  left a legacy 
of fear, a  scarc ity  of capital and an inadequate supply of currency  
to conduct day to day transactions made some kind of banking 
necessary . Like any rapidly growing a rea , the West lacked the 
capital necessary  to finance economic growth. The expansionist 
policies of the Bank of the United States after 1829 in the West and 
Southwest dispelled much of the e a r lie r  anim osity toward that 
institution. P articu la rly  in the Old Northwest, little  opposition to
2 Logan E sarey , ‘’State Banking in Indiana, 1814-1873, M Indiana 
fln lversity  Studies, X  (April 13, 1912), pp. 221-2425 George 
W illiam Dowrie, " The Development of Banking in Illinois, 
1817-1863,” University of Illinois Studies In the Social Sciences, 
IX (December* 1913)* pp. 22-48; and C. G. Huntington, ”A 
H istory of Banking and Currency in Ohio Before the Civil War, " 
Ohio Archaeological and H istorical Society Publications, XXIV 
(1915), pp. 233-343.
43the Bank could be found.
A fter 1830* a boom in economic activity spurred  by a wave
of im m igration and rising  land values caused anti-bank feelings to
be subm erged by the desire  for expanded ered it facilities* Between
1830 and 1840 the population of this a re a  nearly  doubled going from
1* 470, 018 to 2, 924, 728, The m ost populous state, Ohio, grew by
nearly  seventy per cent, while Indiana doubled its population and
Illinois trip led  the num ber of its inhabitants. P articu la rly  a fte r the
b rie f recession , known as "Biddle’s Panic, " in 1834, land values
zoomed to unheard of heights, A young Illinois lawyer, Stephen
Douglas wrote one of his clients in early  1836, "I am  happy to inform
you that I can now se ll your Dots a t from  fifty to an hundred per cent
4advance.. .  which by the by is pretty  good interest* "
The growth of this a re a  was so g rea t that even before the 
Jacksonian assau lt on the Bank, that institution could not supply
3 H arlan Scott White, "W estern Banking Ideas and P ractices 
Before 1840, M (Unpublished M. A. Thesis, University of Indiana, 
1942)5 F, Cyril Jam es, The Growth of Chicago Banka (Hew Tork: 
H arper and B ro thers, Publishers, 1938), X, pp. 70-117? and 
Ralph C, H. C atterall, The Second Bank of the United States 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago P re ss , 1903), pp. 132-63.
4 U. S. Bureau of Census, H isto rica l S tatistics of the United 
States, Colonial T im es to 1957 (Washington P. C .» 19601p. 13? 
Thomas Senior B erry , W estern P ric es  Before 1861 (Cambridge, 
M assachusetts: H arvard University P re ss , 1943), pp. 406-4505 
and Robert W. Johannsen, e d ., The L e tte rs  of Stephen A. 
Douglas (Urbana, Illinois: U niversity of Illinois P re ss , 1961), 
pp. 35-36.
5sufficient c red it to answ er the a re a ’s needs and the agitation for 
local banks increased. Experience dictated caution* necessity  de­
manded currency and credit. Such demands effected the entire 
political spectrum* and anti-bank feelings were laid  aside.
The idea of a State Bank based on public cred it gained a 
wide hearing in the capita l-shy  sta tes of the Old Northwest. A 
State Bank was proposed in Ohio in 1829 to estab lish  a sound 
currency, lower the in te res t ra te , and increase available capital.
It was hoped that this would lead to the growth of agriculture* 
com m erce, and m anufacturing. Although the leg islature  responded 
by increasing the capital of two of the s ta te ’s leading banks, a state 
institution was not established a t this tim e. The demand for m ore 
currency  and c red it kept the idea of a  State Bank alive. Such an 
institution was proposed in December, 1832 by Governor Duncan 
M cArthur, an opponent of Jackson, and the following year by 
Jacksonian governor* Robert Ducas, Even though this was now 
favored by the Dem ocratic Central Committee, the combination of 
backers of a national bank and the advocates of local banks was able 
to bring about its defeat. In the place of such an institution, the 
D em ocratic leg isla tu re  chartered  ten new local banks and revived 
two that had suspended business. At this point the leg isla to rs 
balked and no fu rther c h a rte rs  w ere granted, and an attem pt was 
made to repeal the ch arte r of the m illion dollar Ohio Dife Insurance
65and T rust Company.
While the demands for the repeal of the charter of this 
financial giant and the passage of the law prohibiting notes below 
five do llars in 1836, reveal the growing power of the “hard  m oney” 
faction within the Dem ocratic party, the developments of the 
th irtie s  do not lend them selves to a sim ple in terpretation  concerning 
party  position on banks, nationally  the Dem ocrats opposed the Bank 
of the United States, but it was a Dem ocratically controlled leg is­
lature  that chartered  the ten (or twelve) new banks including the 
Ohio Dife Insurance-and T rust Company in 1834* At the same time 
one of the leading Whig editors, who supported the Bank, Charles 
Hammond, urged a conservative state  policy:
Those who reco llect the creation  of banks* from  
eighteen to twenty-four years back, cannot fail to see, 
in the p resen t conditions, a  g rea t probability of 
the evils from  1815 to 1822* in a ll their d istressing  
and destructive vicissitudes* The sam e causes 
m ust produce something like the sam e effects*
Banks a r  put in operation, not by money lenders, 
but by money borrowers* They can have but one 
ca ree r, but one termination* * *
Hammond1 s advice seem s to have been heeded by the newly form ed
Whig party  which following its success in the election of 1884
5 Huntington, ’’Banking and C urrency in Ohio, M pp. 343-363;
Harold E. Davis, “Economic B asis of Ohio Politics, 1820-1840, “ 
The Ohio State Archaeological and H istorical Q uarterly , KIAfll 
(October, 1938), pp. 311-314; and F rancis P. W eisenburger,
The Passing of the F ron tie r 1825-1850, Vol. Ill of The H istory 
of the State of Ohio, ed. Oar I Wittke (6 v o l .; Columbus, Ohio: 
Ohio State Archaeological and H istorical Society, 1941), pp. 
277-285,
7dominated the 1835 leg islature  and refused to charter any additional 
new banks. ^
Sim ilarly, the fight over the repeal of the ‘'monied
m onster, " the Ohio Life Insurance and T rust Company, was an
in tra -p arty  feud ra th e r than an in te r-p arty  battle . The move to
repeal the company's ch arte r was backed by m ost of the Democratic
p ress , and led  in the leg islatu re  by Cincinnati Democrat, Robert
T. Lytle. However, among the d irec to rs  of the company w ere
four of the s ta te 1® leading Dem ocrats! David Disney, Noah Swayne,
M icajah T. W illiams, and Daniel Kilgore. Disney, in particu lar,
led the fight against repeal* He was aided by a sm all group of
Dem ocratic papers headed by the Cincinnati Daily Republican* The
Whig p ress  joined the opposition to repeal hi the leg islatu re  the
7
Whigs voted with the successful defenders of the institution*
In general, no c lear cut dichotomy between the parties  on 
banking issues existed. Economic in te res ts  and personal o r sectional 
ambitions dictated one's position on the bank question* Dem ocrats 
tended to be m ore anti-bank than Whigs j and those m en who harbored 
a dislike fo r banks of any varie ty  w ere usually found within the 
Dem ocratic fold* However, opposition to banks was hardly a test 
of party  orthodoxy. Ardent bank expansionists m arched side by side
6 Cincinnati Cassette, Apr il 14, 1834, quoted in B erry , We ste rn  
P ric e s , p. 422, ftn. 39*
7 W eisenburger, Passing  of the F ron tier, pp. 308-13.
8with "hard  money” re s tric tio n is ts  under the colors of the Democracy.
The Whigs, who advocated cred it expansion through a m oderate
increase  of banking fac ilities, were often caught between the factions
of the Democratic party . Only on the question of sm all b ills was
there a neat party  split, with the Jacks anians favoring prohibition
8and the Whigs opposing it.
The sam e pattern  seen  in Ohio was repeated in Indiana and 
Illinois where the demand for currency  and c red it led to the estab lish ­
m ent of new State Banks. The failure of the f i r s t  State Bank in 
Indiana left the sta te  with a m otley foreign currency in which the 
only stable elem ent was the issue of the Bank of the United States. 
Jackson’s veto of the re c h a rte r  of the Bank led to demands in 
Indiana for a state institution that would regulate the currency in the 
state  and fill the vacuum left by the re tirem en t of the national 
bank’s notes* In 1834 the sta te  leg isla tu re  created  one of the strongest 
and m ost successful State Banks in the country. Some Jacksonian 
journals* such as the W estern Sun, opposed the monopoly features 
of the bank; and Dem ocratic leg isla to rs  attacked the bill as estab lish ­
ing the basis of a political m achine. In the legislature* Jam es 
Raiden opposed the bank# asse rtin g  that the ’’people, ” i. e* fa rm ers
8 A soon to be published study by P ro fesso r H erbert Brshkowitz
of Temple U niversity reveals these tendencies in Ohio. For
sim ila r conflicts over in ternal im provem ents see: H arry  N. 
Scheiber, "Urban R ivalry and Internal Im provem ents in the
Old H orthw est,11 Ohio H istory, LXXI (October, 1962), pp. 227-39.
9arid laborers* did not need banks* However* these views re p re ­
sented only a m inority  of Dem ocratic opinion. The leading organ 
of the Democracy* the Indiana Democrat backed the b ill and attacked 
its opponents as "low politicians11 who either p re fe rred  "wild cat" 
banking or w ere "hard money” men. This combination, which had
blocked such legislation in Ohio, gave way in Indiana to "an over*
9whelming sentim ent. *. in favor of chartering a bank. "
Although the e a r lie r  experience with a State Bank had 
soured m any Elinoisians on such institutions, the sam e forces that 
had been a t work in Ohio and Indiana finally led to the chartering  of 
the Illinois State Bank in 1835* Attem pts in the early  th irties  to 
ch a rte r  a sta te  institution w ere defeated by very narrow  m argins in 
the Dem ocratic legislature* The d is tre ss  of 1834 and general demands 
for extended cred it fac ilities led even .John Reynolds, who had been 
elected in 1830 as an anti-bank candidate, to advocate a new State 
Bank* "By 1838 the Illinois speculator had ju s t reached the point 
where he was demanding the 'accommodation* which could not be had 
without access to a bank plentifully supplied with notes* " Two 
defunct banks w ere revived! and in the leg isla tu re , Whigs and Demo* 
c ra ts  combined to c reate  a  new State Bank* Stephen Douglas 
explained to his friend  Julius G ranger, *’. *. I am  no friend to the
9 E sarey, "State Banking in Indiana, M pp. 243*2 53; and William F.
Harding, "The State Bank of Indiana, " The Journal of Political
Economy, IV (December, 1895), pp. 1-10. The quotation is
from  the Indiana Dem ocrat, June 15, 1833, in E sarey , p. 251.
10
Banking System but on the contrary  am  in favor of rea l B.entonian
Shiners; but under the existing circum stances a  Bank m ay be
10necessa ry  in this State in self-defense. ”
Throughout the West optim ism  greeted this increase  in 
banking fac ilities as the economy continued to sp ira l upwards on the 
wings of extended credit* Although it was not the intention of the 
Jackson administration* the rem oval of the deposits to the pet banks 
and the re tirem en t of the debt neatly coincided with W estern 
expansion and contributed to the speculative mania*
All of these tendencies affected* usually in an accentuated 
way* the newest of these states* Michigan* It was in. Michigan that 
the f ir s t  A m erican free  banking experim ent was attempted* An 
analysis of the political and economic p ressu re s  which produced 
this legislation gives a c lear picture of w estern  needs and attitudes 
toward banks in the 1830* s*
The population of Michigan was growing at a fantastic rate  
as a steady stream  of im m igrants poured into the W est drawn by 
"the prospect of speedy and golden fortunes* ,f The federal surveys 
had opened the lands of Michigan to settlem ent and speculation at 
$1* 25 per acre* To handle the new traffic* land offices w ere opened 
at Detroit* Monroe* and Bronson (now Kalamazoo). The demand for 
wild lands and the desire  to exploit the virgin resou rces of the West
10 Bowrie* nBanking in Illinois, H pp. 59-63, the quotation is from  
p. 61; Johannsen, e d ., B etters of Stephen A* Douglas, pp. 13-14*
seem ed insatiable* C ities of the fixture were laid  out on paper com* 
plete with "Hotels, w arehouses and b an k s,. ,  like places in fairy­
land; p ie rs  projected into harbors* and steam boats w ere seen 
e n te rin g ,11 While some of these expectations m ay have been overly 
sanguine, Michigan’s growth during the th irtie s  was not ficticious. 
F rom  1820 to 1830 the population grew  from  8, 896 to 31, 834, but this 
was nothing when com pared to the next decade. By 1834 the popu­
lation was m ore than th ree  tim es what it had been in 183G, and 
th ree  years la te r  it had nearly  doubled again to 174, 600, This 
im m igration swelled speculations to imm ense proportions and 
boosted expectations even among the m ost conservative men. As 
Stevens Mason’s biographer has w ritten; ’’Hope and enthusiasm  
w ere in the ascendency. ” There seem ed little  reason  to believe
that Michigan with its excellent "w ater advantages” might not
Ubecome one of the rich est sta tes in the Union*
The state governm ent was not unaware of this prospect and 
acted to provide the n ecessitie s fo r such development. In the b rie f
11 See; the rem iniscences of Bela Hubbard, M em orials of a
H alf-Century (Hew York: G. P» Putnam ’s Sons, 1887), pp. 93- 
105; Thomas M. Cooley, "State Bank Issues in Michigan; A 
R etrospect of leg islation ,*’ Michigan Political Science A ssoci­
ation Publications, Vol. I (np*, n d .), pp. 1-2,0; Joseph Gantz,
”A H istory  of Banking leg is la tio n  and Currency in Michigan, 
1835-1865, ” (Unpublished M. A. Thesis, Wayn© State University, 
1936), pp. 1-5; Michigan le g is la tu re . Joint Documents, 1854, 
#12, and Legislative Manual of the Senate and House of R epre­
sentatives of the State of Michigan, 1939, p. 7 & for population 
figures. The quotations a re  from  Hubbard, pp. 94, 95~9&,and 
Lawton T. Hemans, Life and Tim es of Stevens Thomson Mason 
the Boy Governor of Michigan (Lansing, Michigan: Michigan 
H istorical Commission, 1920), p. 212.
12
period between the drawing of the constitution and the final acceptance
of Michigan as a state* the leg islatu re  organised fifty-seven townships*
provided for six ty -six  state  roads* chartered  eleven railroads* and
gave perm ission  fo r the erection  of th irteen  dams to provide w ater
for m anufacturing. The g rea tes t need was banks to provide the
necessa ry  currency  to finance both speculation and development.
Looking back on the period* Thomas Cooley wrote*
More money was requ ired  to enable people to c a rry  
out the enormous transactions that from  day to day 
they engaged in, the m ost of them purely speculative; 
but nevertheless* a t the time, seeming to a large 
portion of those who w ere parties to them* to be not 
only substantial but altogether reasonable* since 
the inflow of im m igration and the extensive system  
of ra ilroads and canals planned for the State* and 
then well underway, w ere expected speedily to make 
Michigan a populous as well as a properous / s i c /  
commonwealth* 12
Michigan’s f i r s t  bank was short lived* The Bank of Detroit 
began in 1805 and lasted  without Congressional approval until 1808 
when it was closed by the law passed that year prohibiting unauthorized 
banking* In 1817 the Bank of Michigan was chartered  by the governor 
of the territory* The influx of population following the opening of 
E rie  Canal led  the T e rrito ria l Council to ch arte r eight m ore banks 
between 1827 and 1835* In 1831 the ch arte r of the Bank of Michigan 
was extended, and subsequently it was allowed to increase  its capital
12 Thomas M cIntyre Cooley, Michigan: A  H istory of Governments 
(Boston: Houghton* Mifflin and Company, 1885), pp. 254-256; 
the quotation is from  Gooley, "State Bank Issues in Michigan, ”
p. 8.
13
and estab lish  a branch a t Kalamazoo. In general these charte rs
13w ere Mfram ed to sa lt the corporations, if not by th em .11
Up to this point there was little  anti-banking sentim ent,
and the s ta te ’s leading Jacksoaians w ere deeply involved in these
institutions. Haring the twenties the president of the Bank of
Michigan was John R* W illiams, a m em ber of the ’’libera l faction”
of the Democracy in. the next two decades* W illiams became
involved in an a ltercation  with the d irec to rs that resu lted  in his
rem oval and a su it against the bank which he eventually lost* His
place was taken  at the Bark of Michigan by P e ter Desnoyers,
another leading Jacksonianj and W illiams took over as president of
the F a rm e r’s and Mechanic’s Bank of Michigan which was chartered
14on November S> 1829*
The Bank of Michigan was made a government depository 
in 1831 and rem ained one throughout the th irties although its p re s i­
dency went from  Desnoyers to Eurotus P* Hastings* and then
13 Alpheus Felch* ’’E arly  Banks and Banking in Michigan, ” 
P ioneer C ollections| Report of the Pioneer Society of the State 
of Michigan*"' Voi*''Wj 'pp* 111-12^ and Cooley* ’’State Bank 
Issues in Michigan* ” a re  the standard accounts of early  
Michigan banking on which a ll w rite rs  have drawn* Both w ere 
w ritten  by Jacksonian®* The quotation is from  Cooley* p* 5*
14 Clarence M* Burton* ed. * The City of Detroit Michigan* 1701- 
1922 (Detroit* The S* J* Clarke Publishing Company* 1922)
2 Vols*, I* pp* 227-235* By Democrats and Whigs I m ean 
people who were consistently in one party  or the other in the 
late th irties  and fo rties when these affiliations a re  easily  
identifiable. Special cases such as John Biddle will be further 
explained. I will use ’’D em ocrats” and ’’Jacksonian®” in te r­
changeably although many people a t the tim e disputed this.
14
C. C. Trowbridge who w ere Whigs. Daring this period the great 
m ajority  of stock in the bank was held by out of state Whigs, how­
ever, the la rg est local stockholder was General Cass. In 1834 at 
the urging of John Norvell, leader of the 'l ib e ra l  Democratic 
faction, " the F a rm e r 's  and M echanic's Bank was also made a federal 
depository. According to Norvell, at this tim e 90% of the d irec to rs
w ere Dem ocrats. Interestingly, John Biddle* b ro ther of Nicholas,
15eventually became president of this Democratic "pet. "
The Michigan State Bank was founded in 1835 by W illiams 
with the aid  of Albany capita lists Thomas Olcott and fSrastus Corning, 
both m em bers of the Albany Regency. In the F ast the stock of this 
bank eventually fell into the hands of Whigs with Thurlow Weed being 
one of the investors. However, in Michigan, cash ier John Norton, a 
close friend  of Stevens Mason controlled the bank; and it num bered 
among its borrow ers m ost of the leading Jaeksonians in the state. 
Eventually this bank became the center of Whig attacks as the "pet" of the
15 Ib id ., 633-634; H arry  N. Scheiber, "George Bancroft and the 
Bank of Michigan, 1837-41" Michigan H istory, XLIV (March,
I960), pp. 82-90, gives inform ation on stock holding; all the 
stock holders a re  lis ted  in Michigan L egislature House Docu­
m ents Accompanying the Journal, 1841, #61, pp. 219-20. This
also  lis ts  .Robert A. Forsyth* A. T. McReynolds, Epaphroditus 
Ransom, T. C. Sheldon and Justus Burdick, all Dem ocrats, as 
stock holders in this "Whig bank" along with Gass.
16Democratic state administration*
The debate over the constitution in 1835 showed little  
antagonism  toward banks. The m ajority  of the m em bers of the con­
vention wished to elim inate any m ultiplication of banks; and the 
provision from  the New York constitution providing that bank 
ch arte rs  m ust receive a tw o-thirds m ajority  in the leg islatu re  was 
adopted unanimously* An attem pt by P e ter F e rry  of Monroe to 
outlaw all corporations wa$ lo st fi£ty**^ ii5£ to nme iii the convexxtxon 
that was dominated by Jaoksoniams. The nine# moreover# were not 
ail Democrats# and included John Biddle! John McDonell, a 
Dem ocrat from  Wayne county# made severa l attem pts to get the 
Convention to sanction# or a t lea s t to leave the way open for# the 
establishm ent of a State Bank with branches such as that in Indiana*
These w ere unsuccessful* the final attem pt being soundly defeated
17fifty-seven to nineteen*
The m ost crucial question to come before the Convention 
concerning banks involved the attem pt to requ ire  a ll future chartered
16 Burton* ed. * D etroit* pp* 636-640; Michigan L egislature.
Senate Documents Accompanying the Journal* 1841# #42* ■
pp. 165-7Srlists stockholders and borrow ers; Daily A dvertiser 
October 7* 1839» is a typical Whig attack on the Michigan State 
Bank; on the political affiliation of Olcott and Corning see 
Lee Benson* The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy (Princeton, 
New Je rsey : P rin ce to n U n iv ers ity  F r e s s r if ^ lK  P* 91.
17 H arold M. Dorr, e d ., The Michigan Constitutional Conventions 
of 1835-36: Debates and Proceedings (AmArbor* Michigan:
The U niversity of Michigan P re ss , 1940), pp, 392, 390, 336,
391. The ro ll call votes a re  lis ted  in Appendix A.
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banks to provide m ortgages on Michigan lands as security  for
redem ption of their notes, This idea, which eventually became
embodied in the free  banking act of 1837, was suggested in the Report
of the Committee on Banking presented June 12, 1835* In o rder to
cure the ’’g rea t evil of the p resen t system* * * its insecurity* ” the
repo rt proposed that bank d irec to rs invest in bonds or m ortgages as
a ’’pledge” against their issues* This would be of advantage to the
bank by allowing them to receive in te res t on funds invested as well
as in te res t on the discounts of the issues thus secured* Such
security  would allow the safe use of ’’the g rea te r convenience of the
paper medium* ” ’’This single provision would secure every
advantage and preclude every evil of the p resen t banking system* ”
In addition* those individuals in the society excluded from  the benefits
of the banking business, because they were, unable to use short te rm
cred it would benefit by this plant
By retaining* for m erchants * the fac ilities and 
advantages usually derived from  the cred it* and giving* 
on good security* to fa rm ers  and the producing classes* 
generally* the loan of capital of such institutions* for 
such periods as m ay be required* the different c lasses 
of the community will share  m ore equally the advantages 
of whatever moneyed corporations m ay be granted* and 
a t the sam e time* as has been shown* those institutions 
will fee placed on a m ore secure and stable foundation*
Men of intelligence and enterprise* will be enabled to 
pro ject and complete im provem ents that cannot fail 
to be greatly  to the advantage of individuals and the 
country generally* especially  in the in te rio r of the
17
state* where for m aay years to come* there mast 
fee a want of capital for such purposes.• • IS
This report was presented fey a predominately Democratic
committee chaired fey the leading “conservative” Democrat,, Lucius
Lyon, but the.com m ittee*8 proposal was lost forty-eight to twenty-
seven In a vote that defies simple class or party interpretation. Of
the members of the committee four favored the report and three
voted against it without reference to party. Within the Democratic
party* there : was no discernible split between the so-called “lib e ra ls”
and the “conservatives* ” John Barry# John Biddle# Edward Ellis#
Townsbend 0i& ey, Robert McClelland, Ross Wilkins* and William
Woodferldge* who represent practically every factional variation in
tothe subsection! party structure* voted together to defeat the motion*
IS “Report of the Committee on Banking!* is reprin ted  in. Dorr* ed* * 
Michigan Constifcutuonal Conventions* pp. $20«24» the quotations 
a re  fro m  pp* $31# 522, S23* M M . ’
I f  The designations of “liberal*1 and “conservative” have been 
applied to factions of the Dem ocratic party  fey Harold Dorr and 
Floyd Streeter* the two b e s t h isto rians of Michigan in this 
period* See Dorr* e d ., Michigan Constitutional .Conventions* 
p. 9* fin* I* and Floyd Benjam in S tree ter, Political P a rtie s  in 
M ichigan (Lansing, Michigan: Michigan H isto rical Commies ion* 
Iflijt pp.* 1*42. The na rra tiv e  should reveal som e of the 
problem s in applying these  term s to factional positions on 
banking* If anything the M&sen-MorveR-Williams faction re p re ­
sents in Michigan the position usually ealled'toonaervative” 
and is dominated fey “en trep reneurs. ” The faction that bears 
resem blance to the “rad ica ls” in usual term inology is that 
associated, with John B arry , Edward E llis and Alpheus Falch.
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A sta te  government with Stevens Mason as governor and a 
leg islatu re  with a large Democratic m ajority  in both branches came 
into existence in late 1835. Floyd S treeter argues that this government 
and the Dem ocratic party  from  1835 to 1839 was controlled by "the 
poor and rad ical elem ent" that was "hostile to monopolies and vested 
in te rests  and wished to break  down the power of monied m en in 
politics. " The m essages of Mason seem  to bear him  out. In a 
se rie s  of vetoes of steam ^boat corporations he repeated his argum ent 
that a m ultiplication of monied institutions underm ined individual 
en te rp rise . Such "souless bodies" w ere "a ris to c ra tic  in their 
tendencies" and a  departure from  true republican princip les. It 
was Mason’s belief that "the le g is la tu re  should not in terfere  unless 
a branch of business or en te rp rise , useful and im portant to the 
public cannot successfully  be c a rried  on and conducted by citizens 
in the ir individual capacity. ” In his f ir s t  m assage as Governor,
Mason p ra ised  the provision of the new constitution requiring a two- 
th irds m ajority  for the passage of corporate ch arte rs  and urged 
that prudent care  be taken in the cases of banking companies* He 
warned of the difficulties in constructing proper banking legislation 
and the evils of excessive issue of notes. However, the degree to 
which Mason and the other "rad ical"  elem ents of the Democracy 
adhered to these ideas as anything m ore than symbols is open to 
question. In 1836 acting under the re s tric tiv e  provision of the new
19
constitution concerning corporate charte rs , this *’anti-monopoly11
leg islatu re  chartered  nine new banks* and In no case did the
governor who warned against the m ultiplication of such en terp rises
re tu rn  a charte r with his veto. The th ru st for cred it was general
20and widespread; lim ited to no single party  or faction;
Various attem pts to provide security  for b ill holders cu l­
m inated in the adoption of a Safety Fund law; M arch 28; 1836; This 
b ill was reported  to the Senate on M arch 2; 1836 by Democrat Horace 
Comstock and reported  back from  the comm ittee five days la te r  
without amendment; The ".Report" which accompanied the bill 
recom mended the passage of the law which was consciously patterned 
on the e a r lie r  New York Safety Fund law; In this way Michigan could 
receive "all the benefits to be derived from  an extensive and well 
conducted cred it system ; " The "Report" went on to say:
But the g rea t object contemplated by your committee; 
and which had g rea t weight with them in recommending 
the adoption of a  safety fund system ; were* in 
addition to m ore perfect security  perhaps* on which 
banks associated  under such a system  can be placed; 
that a ll the desirable  advantages of unity and feeling; 
of interest* and of action* attainable by a single 
m am m oth monied corporation with subject branches ^
/a s  suggested e a r lie r  in the session  by John McDonell/; 
a re  thereby attained* without the r isk  of the 
dangerous influence and tendency of such an over*
20 Streeter* Po litical P a rtie s  in Michigan, p. 5; George N. Fuller, 
ed. * • M essages of the G overnors■ {Dansing, • Michigan: The 
Michigan H istorical Com mission, 1926-26), I, pp. 140-42, 
174-76$ Cooley, "State Bank Issues in M ichigan," pp. 6-7;
Felch, "E arly  Banks and Banking in Michigan, " pp. 113-14.
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powering institution? and that* instead of sub­
jecting a ll the en terp rise  and business facilities 
of the country, to the whim and caprice or 
favoritism  of a few to be managed as inevitably 
m ust and would be the case, to suit their own 
views and in te res ts , --under this system , the 
benefits of independent banking stitutions, if 
they shall otherwise be properly  guarded and 
restricted* can be extended to all the various 
parts  of the state, requiring such accommodation* ^
On M arch 21 an attem pt was made by a group of Hconserva-
tive” Dem ocrats including John C lark, Edward E llis, and John
B arry  to make bank d irec to rs  under the new law liable to the extent
of the ir property  and stockholders liable to the amount of their
stock* Yet, this failed in the Senate by a vote of ten to four* While
the vote on the Safety Fund b ill was not recorded, it was, like its
22predecesso r in Hew York, a Jacksonian measure*
About m id-1836 the D etroit Dem ocratic F ree  P re ss  began 
to pick up a rtic le s  from  Hew York papers advocating a repeal of 
the res tra in ing  laws, and to follow the Hew York argum ent over 
free  banking with some consistency* However, the asse rtion  by 
some h isto rians that ”the poor c ried  out against” the banks and 
demanded free  banking seem s both contradictory and c learly  out of 
line with the facts. Although som etim es cast in loco-foco argum ents,
21 Michigan le g is la tu re . Senate Journal, 1836, pp. I l l ,  232-33? 
Michigan L egislature. Senate Documents Accompanying the 
Journal, ’'IS&S-SA,' #9. ' '' ' ' ' ~r~"'......
22 Michigan JLegislature. Senate Journal* 1836, p« 243? Bray 
Hammond, Banks and Politics in A m erica (Princeton, Hew 
Je rsey : Princeton  U niversity P re ss , 1957), p. 600.
21
the th rust for free  banking in Michigan came mainly from  the 
en trepreneuria l desire  fo r extended credit facilities. This can 
c learly  be seen in the choice of a rtic le s  reprin ted  in the Democratic 
F ree  P re s s  which was not hesitan t in making c lear its opposition to 
loco-focoism . Although some of these a rtic le s  came from  the Mew 
York Fo$t, the m ajority  rep resen ted  the entrepreneuria l element 
in the Hew York argum ent, In general these papers w ere Democratic 
but a rtic le s  from  Whig papers w ere often reprinted* The em phasis 
was on the rem oval of the res tric tio n s which lim ited banking to the 
investors excluding ”the sm all capitalist* * ♦ that is the mechanic 
with his $100* * * *ft While the example of English joint stock banks 
was often looked to# supposed ’'ag ra rian ” d is tru st of banks 
” t ypical” of the fron tier was com pletely absent* The closest sen ti­
m ents to the traditional conception of Jacksonian ideas came from  
Mason who continued to mouth anti-bank rhetoric* In his m essage 
of January £* 1837# the "Boy G overnor” warned against a m ultip lica­
tion of banks and bank p ap ers’ that would only aggravate unfavorable 
conditions* The Whig# D etroit Daily A dvertiser for once agreed 
with Mason and urged that no banks be chartered  a t the coming 
session* ”We believe the people a re  opposed to it* --A s for the 
im portunate beggars of privileges# ” wrote the Whig organ# !'there 
is no satisfying them* They m ust be refused f ir s t  to last* Too
22
23many banks have been granted already. ”
The clam or for banks would not be stilled. Bach new town, 
whether actually established or m erely  "on paper, M demanded 
banking facilities. F urther demands came from  the people deeply 
indebted by speculative and developmental en terp rises who hoped 
that additional banking resou rces would provide relief. "The public 
seem ed imbued with the idea that to relieve them from  the galling 
burden of indebtedness# and to re s to re  activity and p rosperity  to 
the business world, nothing was needed but extensive bank issues* M 
In January  the leg isla tu re  was faced with eighteen requests for new 
bank charters* This c r is is  in the leg islature  created  by a flood of 
demands fo r banking privileges led  to the passage of Michigan’s 
free  banking law* ^  .. ,,
On January 18, 1837 Edward Ellis* one of the leading "con­
se rvative” Democrats* introduced a b ill ”te regulate banking 
associationsV through the establishm ent of "a uniform and equal 
system* ” The m ain debate on the b ill  concerned the m inim um  and 
maximum amounts of capital* B arry , McDonell, and Calvin B ritain
23 D etroit Dem ocratic F ree  P re s s * August 21* December 14* 1836* 
January 19* January 25, 1837 in particular* the quotation is 
from  the Hew Tork Evening Star rep rin ted  in the Democratic 
F re e . Frogs, December 14* 1836$ Fuller* ed* * M essages* I, p* 200$ 
Detroit Daily Advertiser* January 13*. 1837*
24 Belch, "E arly  Banks and Banking in Michigan, " p. 11% for the 
quotation? Michigan L egislature. House Journal, 1837, pp. 30,
39, 41, 45, 55, 58, 61, 65, 67, 73, 77, 86, 87, 108, 137, listed  
in Gantz, f’A H istory of Banking Legislation, " p .  6, ftn. 3.
a ll hoped to keep the m inimum capital a t lea s t $15(1000. B ritain  
pointed oat the possible political consequences. He argued that they 
did not want to be accused of uoverwhelming” the country with sm all 
banks, for the people were not p repared  for this. John Clark,
Horace Comstock, and Jonathan Davis believed that banking should 
be open equally to all a reas and those that could not ra ise  the 
n ecessary  $150, 000 capital should not be deprived of the advantages 
of credit* Davis went So far as to a s s e r t  that as  long as the proper 
security  was given there was no reason to lim it capital even to 
$50, 000 as was proposed* Clark, supposedly a "conservative” 
Democrat, favored sm all banks because they facilitated  the busi- 
ness of the fa rm e r and the mechanic* "It is when a m an commences 
in the world, " argued Clark, "that he needs assistance* " He fu rther 
advocated a m axim um  capitalisation of $100, 000 ra th e r than the 
suggested $300, 000 in o rder to lessen  the tem ptation to corruption
25
by large  eas te rn  capita listsi
The b ill which eventually becam e the Michigan free  banking 
law was introduced into the House on January 2? by Edwin Lothrop* 
a Kalamazoo Dem ocrat who was Chairm an of the Committee on 
Banks and Incorporations* It easily  passed the House on February  14 
by a vote of th irty-n ine to four, the m ain opposition coming from
25 Michigan L egislature. Senate Journal, 1837, pp. 61, 90, 150, 
158, 178; the debates a re  in the Daily A dvertiser, M arch 2* 7, 
and 9, 1837.
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‘‘conservative” Democrat Alpheus Felch, who feared  its inflationary-
character* Various attem pts were made in the Senate by McDonell,
Moore, Hough, E llis, and B ritain  to lim it b ills to denominations
above five dollars, but a ll such efforts w ere defeated; and the
Senate eventually accepted the House b ill on M arch 8 by a vote of 
26fourteen to one.
The lone vote cast against the b ill was that of John McDonell
a m em ber of the supposedly “ rad ica l” M ason-Norvell faction. He
constantly advocated the establishm ent of a  sta te  bank with branches,
and believed the free  banking law a “hazardous experim ent” that
could only succeed if lim ited to large banks with m ore than $150, 000
27capital which w ere prohibited from  issuing b ills under five dollars* 
Thus, the free  banking law of Michigan was passed  with 
little  d issen t by a  leg isla tu re  in which, according to S tree ter, “a 
m ajo rity  of the m em bers w ere Dem ocrats representing  poor and 
rad ical constituents* ” The only opposition cam e from  individuals 
within the D em ocratic party  who feared  the inflationary consequences 
of the bill* As in the constitutional convention of 1835 no consistent 
party  o r factional variation  could be seen in the voting, and such
26 Michigan L egislature. House Journal, 1837, pp. 144, 200-201, 
217; Michigan Legislature* Senate Journal, 1837, p. 245.
27 Daily A dvertiser, M arch 2, 1837.
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future anti-bank Dem ocrats as B arry , and that supposed ,!loco loco, " 
Kingsley Bingham lined up in favor of the law* 28
While the Monroe Tim es hailed the act as a ♦'killer of all 
monopolies, " its passage was a foregone conclusion. The Democratic 
F ree  P re s s , long an advocate of such legislation, p raised  the 
passage of this "Im portant M easure. " When considering the accom ­
plishm ents of the leg islatu re , it included the "general banking law" 
which by "giving equal rights and priv ileges to a il in regard  to 
banking, * .. will save thousands of dollars which would otherwise be 
expended in legislating for the creation  of particu lar incorporations. " 
However, it did not devote a g rea t deal of space to the endless 
p raise  that often accompanied party  v ictories in the newspapers of 
this period. Nor was the act vociferously condemned by the opposi­
tion. The Daily A dvertiser which had been ra th e r non-com m ittal 
while the b ill was being considered, announced the b ill’s passage 
to its  read ers  in an a rtic le  that differed little  from  that in the 
JOemocratio F r e e .P re ss  although it noted, "the associations thus ■ 
authorised a re  fenced around with such res tric tio n s  as may, and we 
hope will se rve  for the security  of the public. " In the sam e issue an 
a rtic le  appeared favoring the desire  of the people to change the 
New York banking system  to rem ove "monopoly and other political
28 S tree ter, P o litical P a rtie s  in Michigan, p. 9? Hemans, Life of 
Stevens Thomson Mason, p. 274$ Felch, "JSarly Banks and 
Banking in Michigan, " p. 115*
26
abuses which have grown up trader it, n and praising the suggestion
of the Albany Argus to estab lish  a " GENERAL SAFFT t  FUND LAW. M
This was in essence what had been passed by the Michigan leg is- 
29latu re.
The law  which received Mason’s signature on M arch 15,
183? was a  prim itive form  of free  banking which F r i ts  Redlich has 
aptly term ed  a "so rt of land bank open to all* •* The m ost im portant 
provisions of the act w ere that any twelve freeholders in any county 
might organise a  bank with a minim um  capital of $50* 000* th irty  
per cent of which had to fee paid in specie before commencement of 
operations* Discounts and circulation w ere both lim ited to two and 
one-half tim es paid in capital* and total liab ilities w ere not to exceed 
th ree  tim es paid in capital* D irectors were made personally liable 
fo r a ll debts of the bank and stockholders liable for an amount equal 
to the stock held* On commencing operation* the d irec to rs of the 
bank w ere to deposit with the Auditor General m ortgages on rea l 
estate  located within the state  or the personal bonds of residen t f re e ­
holders equal to the amount of perm issib le  indebtedness of the bank* 
|n  o rd e r to provide fu rther security  all of the banks organized under 
this law w ere to be subject to the Safety Fund law passed the 
previous year* What had been constructed for Michigan was a
29 Monroe Times* F ebruary  23* 183?* quoted in S treeter, Political 
P a rtie s  in Michigan, p. 33; Dem ocratic F re e  P re ss , M arch 15, 
M arch 29* April 5, 183?; DailyAdve r t is e r , ' M arch '15, 1837.
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Safety Fund law open to all with a provision to supply added security
in the form  of m ortgages and personal security  as co lla tera l to
30be applied against the bank debts in ease of failure.
H istorians have usually explained this law as a product of 
the fron tier or as an example of the d irec t transference of ideas by 
migration* A m ore adequate explanation would be one that em phasises 
both idealogical borrowings and the demands of the situation* From  
all sides th© leg islature  was bom barded with demands for m ore 
banks, and individual actions on these requests would have created  
a legislative bottleneck that the new and swiftly developing state  
could ill afford*
It was only logical that the idea of a  general banking law 
such as that being agitated for in Hew York be proposed* However, 
there  a re  indications that m ost of the leg isla tu re  in Michigan had 
little  faith  that the "laws of trade" would provide adequate p ro ­
tection against the "insecurity" of the banking system* Convinced 
that it was the governm ent's duty to regulate the currency in such a 
way as to p ro tect the people of the sta te , the leg isla to rs added to 
the idea of a general banking law every safeguard popular a t the time*
30 F ritz  Redlieh, The Molding of A m erican Banking (New York: 
Hafner pLfblishing^^ompany, 1947), Il, pp. 203-204; Michigan 
Laws, 1837, pp. 76*88, sum m arized in 0antz, f,A H istory of 
Banking Legislation, " pp. 8*-11*
31 S tree ter, Political P a rtie s  in Michigan, pp. 33, 26; Redlich, 
A m erican Banking, p. 203.’
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Mason had warned that f*Every guard should .. .b e  thrown
aro u n d .. ,  bank ch arte rs , which m ay have a tendency to satisfy  the
public m ind of the solvency of the institutions and of their ability
to render their paper a t the will of the holder, " All of the standard
lim itations w ritten  into bank c h a rte rs  a t the tim e w ere p resen t in
the new law. Discounts and issues w ere lim ited, and rig id  (although
not rig id  enough) requirem ents concerning paid-in capital were
established. D irectors w ere made liable for the bankfs debts, and
stockholders w ere made liable to the amount of their stock. All
of the new banks w ere requ ired  to join the Safety Fund, and thus
w ere placed under the periodic inspection of the bank com m issioner.
Finally, in line with the p rac tices of other w estern  and southern
sta tes and the suggestion m ade in the constitutional convention of
1835, fu rther secu rity  was requ ired  in the form  of co llateral
m ortgages and bonds. Given the environment, in which land was
plenty and capital sca rce , and the revival of A m erican Mland banking"
in the eighteen thirties* it was only logical that this form  of
security  a lso  be adopted* Thus, the Michigan free  banking law
stands as an eclectic attem pt to supply adequate security  once
popular demands and considerations of tim e forced the leg isla tu re  to
32give up individual chartering  of banks.
32 Fu ller, e d ., M essages, % p. 201? on e a r lie r  ch arte r provisions 
see Gantz, "A H istory  of Banking, " pp. 2-3; fo r evidence on 
le g is la to rs1 conception of their duty see rem arks by C. B ritain  
in Senate debate recorded in the Daily A dvertiser, M arch 2, 1837.
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The economic c r is is  which began to appear in the Bast 
during the winter of 1836*37 continued to mount throughout the next 
spring and finally led to suspension of specie payments by the 
E aste rn  banks in May. Although some observers believed that the 
West m ight benefit from  this* the close com m ercial and financial 
rela tion  with Hew York forced Michigan banks to quickly follow 
suit in o rder to p ro tect their specie holdings. In reaction  to news 
of the Hew York suspension received the previous day, a public 
m eeting in the Detroit City Hall p resided  oyer by the m ayor resolved 
that the banks should suspend and that a request be made to the 
governor and the leg isla tu re  to make provisions for the existing 
c r is is . A com m ittee of the town's political and economic leaders 
was established to see the governor and urge a  special session  in 
o rder to legalize the suspension* Mason responded by issuing a 
proclam ation calling for a  special session  of the leg isla tu re  to 
convene June 12* and by instructing the bank com m issioner to p re ­
pare  a  detailed rep o rt on the s ta te ’s banks to be presented  to that
, . 33body*
Mason opened his m essage to the special session  with an 
analysis of the ’’true  so u rces” of ’’the p resen t c r i s is ” which was 
fram ed in typical Jacksonian term s and placed the m ain responsibility
33 C harles B utler to C harles C. Trowbridge and Eton Farnsworth* 
December 19# 1836, and Eueius Dyon to C* C* Trowbridge* May 1* 
1837* in C* C. Trowbridge MSS. Homans* Idie  of Stevens 
Thomson Mason* p. 287,• Dem ocratic F ree  Press* May 24, 1837*
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on "overbanking. " While a paper currency was a necessary  con* 
venience, it m ust not be allowed to too greatly  exceed the m etallic  
base. The rem edies which he suggested for the country as a whole
were gradual curtailm ent of bank issues# curtailm ent of trade,
cessation of ''m ad investments'* in unproductive land, and a re tu rn
to frugality  and "honest industry* " However, he followed the
analysis with a recom mendation that the leg isla tu re  sanction the
adm ittedly "hazardous" suspension of specie payments by Michigan
banks for one year or until the New York banks resumed* In line
with this request, he asked the leg islature  to force the Safety Fund
banks to accept each o th er 's  paper during the suspension, to pro*
Mbit the banks from  selling their specie at a prem ium , and to
re s tr ic t  the issues to the "reasonable" needs of the pub lic  Further,
the bank com m issioner and the chancellor of the state should be
given un restric ted  authority to close any institution violating these 
34provisions*
One can c learly  see why Thomas Cooley might wonder, "How 
far the governor* in what he was saying* was expressing settled  
convictions in his own mind* and how fa r  he was m ere ly  repeating 
the cu rren t talk in the political c irc le s  to which he inclined* * *; " 
Defenders of Mason have answ ered that he should not be held 
responsible for the "rasca lity  and crim inality" that were prevalent
34 F u ller, ed*, M essages, I, pp* 308-212.
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a fte r the s us pens ion, but they have not resolved the illogic of the 
m essage. If Mason believed, as he asserted , that the c ris is  
resu lted  from  an excess of bank issues, why did he recommend 
legislation that would resu lt in the fu rther m ultiplication of banks 
and bank issues ? There is one possible explanation that m ost 
h isto rians have over-looked when considering the dilem m a of why
som e Jacksonians who opposed banks also supported general laws
3 5which led to the m ultiplication of banks.
It is quite possible that they believed that competition under 
free  banking would lead not to a m ultiplication of banks but a 
lim itation of banks to the "few** demanded by the "reasonable" needs 
of trade. It m ust be rem em bered  that in England the laws 
sanctioning the establishm ent of joint stock banks had led to ju st 
such a decrease  in the num ber of banks} and it was often this example 
to which Jacksonians favoring general banking laws looked. That 
such ideas affected Mason is quite likely since in the previous year, 
the Dem ocratic F ree  P re ss , the paper which supported the "Boy 
Covernor, " prin ted an a rtic le  from  the Mew Tork P ost praising  the
3
English joint stock system  as a  model for A m erican "Bank Reform* " 
However, while this explanation might supply ideological 
consistency to the position of a Leggett* it does not rea lly  remove
35 Cooley, Michigan, p. 265; Hemans, Life of Stevens Thomson 
Mason, p. 292, defends Mason.
36 D em ocratic F ree  P re ss , August 21, 1836.
32
the confusions from  M ason's m essage. This argum ent, in any form ,
assum ed, in fact depended upon, a rig id  enforcem ent of specie
payments. Mason would allow these to fee suspended. It is incorrect
to p resen t Mason and the faction he represen ted  as anything like
loco-focos of the L eggett variety* Individually they w ere alm ost
to the m an, "m en on the make. " M ason's father, John T. Mason,
was a spoilsm an, a speculator, and an entrepreneurs a  typical
"D em ocrat fey trade. " W illiams combined his bank adventures with
the presidency of an insurance company and large  land speculations*
H early a ll of the leaders of this group borrowed heavily from  the
Michigan State Sank, and m any w ere involved with other banks. In
the leg isla tu re  they w ere responsible fo r the free  banking law and
when that failed, they attem pted to estab lish  a sta te  bank* They
also form ed the spearhead for the gigantic in ternal improvements
policy undertaken in 1837* T here  is nothing very "rad ica l"  (in the
usual use of the term ) about this group although some of them  did
support unlim ited white manhood suffrage in the Constitutional
Convention of 1835. They m ight be tte r be called by S tre e te r 's
37a lterna te  term , ■ 'the office -holding faction ."
37 The John R. W illiams papers include a  le tte r  from  his cousin 
Thomas W illiams concerning their uncle (probably Joseph 
Campau a leading Democrat), "You undoubtedly reco llect his 
m axim  (d --m  a  poor man)* Take heed nephew s-•incur not the 
d isp leasure  of your uncle, m ake moneyt make it honestly if you 
can but by a ll m eans make m oney! " Thomas W illiams to J. R* 
W illiams October 17, 1836, in John R. W illiams, MSS.
While advocacy for suspension has traditionally  been 
connected with the Whig party, this was not the case in Michigan.
Not only did a Jacksonian governor propose the legalisation of su s­
pension but it was c a rried  through an overwhelmingly Democratic 
House by a  vote of th irty -seven  to eight with even Felch and the 
Speaker C harles Whipple* both of whom voted against the original 
law* favoring Suspension* The vote was much c loser in the Senate 
where Barry* Clark* and E llis failed to block its  passage nine to 
six. The Calhoun County P a trio t, an avid.Jacksonian paper* recom ­
mended allowing suspension* ^Although we a re  no g rea t friend of 
banks* and a re  decidedly opposed to the substitution of a rag money 
currency* yeti * * we believe that the Michigan banks a re  as solvent 
and as well conducted as those of any other system* * * *” Thus* 
the suspension b ill like the free  banking act itse lf was the work of
Jacksoniansi and the only opposition to either came from  the
38^conservative’1 faction of that party*
T here is little  indication that sta te  banking policy was a 
field in which party  differences w ere e ither c lea r o r im portant. The 
opposing p re sse s  echoed their party  positions on national banking 
questions, but showed few differences on state  policies* The 
position  of the Dem ocratic Free; P re ss  was-somewhat ambiguous.
38 M ic h ig a n 'leg is la tu re .,. Senate-Journal* Special Session, 1837, 
p. 430? Michigan Legislature* House Journal, E xtra Session, 
1837, pp. 44* -455*: 4.61; Calhoun County P a trio t in Democratic 
F ree  P re ss , June 28, 1837.
34
Before the suspension it favored repeal of the Specie C ircular 
a sserting  that* "It is one of the g rea tes t illusions of the day; to 
suppose that the business of this country can be c a rr ied  on prosper* 
ously, without an extensive and well guarded paper currency* "
A fter the suspension* they acknowledged the wisdom of the m easure 
and traced  the c ris is  to an excess of banks and the distribution bill. 
"In regard  to our own banking institutions it is to be hoped that 
while the leg isla tu re  acts with justice  and equity towards them it 
w ill a t the sam e tim e take good ca re  that the rights and in te rests
3 0
of the people a re  stifficiently protected* "
th e  Whig Daily A dvertiser contrasted  on national policy, 
but hardly differed on sta te  policy. E arly  the Daily A dvertiser 
w arned of a crisis* but while ascrib ing  it to overtrading and 
speculation* the paper laid  the blam e on Jackson’s "wild" m onetary 
policies* Although it attacked various Dem ocratic sta te  leg isla tu res 
for establishing monie d’ ’mons te r  s 11 and causing an over “extension of 
bank issues* it did not extend this c ritic ism  to the sta te  banking 
policy of the local D em ocratic party* In fact* it complimented the 
sta te  leg isla tu re  on its work including the free  banking law which it 
believed to be the body’s leading accomplishment* Following the 
suspension* the Daily A dvertiser suggested legislation to sustain 
banks and to secure  safety to the public which was virtually  that
39 D em ocratic Free, P re ss , May 3 and 24, 1837.
40enacted by the Democrats in the special session in 1837*
These general attitudes w ere reflected in the party  p lat­
form s w ritten  in late July and early  August* While each reflected 
its party* s position on national policy, neither mentioned the state 
banking question* The gubernatorial election of 1837 brought the 
bank issue into state, politics* but in ways hardly consonnant with 
the generally  accepted in terpretations of the parties and state 
banking. The situation was confused by a factional split in the
Dem ocratic party* and the fact that the Whig party  really  only
41em erged as a political fo rce  a t this time*
The charges and counter charges concerning banks and 
bank influence grew out of the argum ent between the parties over 
national policy* The Whigs charged the Dem ocrats with destroying 
the positive controls on over*expansion exerted by the national bank* 
and calling for a specie currency  while a t the sam e tim e sanctioning 
the vast increase  in unstable state  banks. The Dem ocrats re to rted  
with a ttacks on Biddle and the idea of a national bank* and the charge 
that the suspension was a v ictory  for the Whig policy of an i r r e ­
deemable paper currency* Both parties adm itted that an ove r  - expans ion
40 Daily A dvertiser, January 13 and 27* F ebruary  28, M arch 15 and 
22* and May 1* 1837*
41 The platform s a re  rep rin ted  in F&ul Randall, e d ., "G ubernatorial 
P latform s for the Political P a rtie s  of Michigan (1834-1864)" 
(Unpublished M* A. T hesis, Wayne State University, Detroit,
19371 pp. 18-13.
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of state  banking had been an im portant cause of the c r is is , and each
tried  to blam e this situation on the opposition. The Whigs usually
m ade their argum ent by pointing to the many banks chartered  by the
D em ocratically controlled leg isla tu res, and the Dem ocrats responded
by pointing to those leg isla tu res where the Whigs had chartered
banks. T h e ‘Democrats* perhaps because they saw the weakness of
the ir position* shifted to the m ore tenable charge that even if banks
w ere ch arte red  by the Dem ocrats, it was the Whigs who w ere the
bankers and speculators* This eventually led  to another round of
charges and c o u n te rc h a rg e s  concerning the political affiliations of 
42Michigan bankers*
In o rder to repe l Dem ocratic charges that m ost bankers
w ere Whigs* the Daily A dvertiser lis ted  the officers of Mighigan's
banks showing that twelve bank presidents favored Mason while
only th ree  favored C harles C* Trowbridge the Whig candidate*
Among the cash iers eight w ere Democrats* four were Whigs, and
the affiliation-of-two was unknown* The Dem ocratic F ree  P re ss
rep lied  that this was another Whig lie  since Austin Wing* Sidney ICetchum
and lohn Biddle along with "half a  dozen m ore" w ere erroneously
43named as Democrats*
42 These argum ents can be followed in the Dem ocratic F ree  P ress  
and the Daily ■ Adve r  tia er«
43 The affiliation of bankers is in the Daily A dvertiser, August 11,
1837, and the rebuttal is in the Democratic F ree  Press*
August 16, 1837.
Since such estim ations have had great weight with h istorians, 
some comment on the meaning of these changes is in order. The 
Whig estim ate  was that roughly sixty-nine per cent of the bankers 
w ere Dem ocrats. The Dem ocrats charged that this was false and in 
rea lity  fifty-five p er cent of the banker® w ere Whigs* Both se ts of 
s ta tis tic s  tend to confirm  only that being a banker had little  to do 
with a  m an1 s choice of party . Further* the problem  is complicated 
by the unstable political situation that existed. Weither party  wished 
to claim  John Biddle although he was popular with both p arties . The 
tru th  is that Biddle was consistently with neither party  a t this time. 
After 1839 he was a Whig, and in 1834 he had run on the opposition 
ticket, but in the constitutional convention and the f i r s t  senatorial 
contest, he proved his popularity among the Dem ocrats and his 
w illingness to cooperate with them* A careful reading of the 
Dem ocratic F ree  P re ss  (as the A dvertiser pointed out) Shows that 
its  editor believed Biddle to be a Dem ocrat in 1836* In the election 
of 1837 he could be attacked by both parties  because he ran  with 
Edward E llis on the sp lin ter ” Jeffersonian D em ocratic” ticket. 
Finally, such sim ple tabulations do not even reveal what they a re  
supposed to show, namely the re la tion  of the parties to the financial 
power of banking institutions* Whatever one m ay consider Biddle, 
he was a t the tim e presiden t of the ”pet” whose stockholders were 
m ainly Dem ocrats.
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On the other hand, while the stockholders of the Michigan
State Bank w ere m ainly Whigs* and its president was a Whig* it was
actually run by its Dem ocratic cash ier and was the ’’pet" of the
State adm inistration. Nearly every m ajor Democrat borrowed
heavily from  this bank with a Whig president, A lim ited examination
of the stockholders of Detroit banks reveals that "dem ocratic"
banks had Whig stockholders* and that Dem ocrats invested in "Whig"
banks* C ertain  nam es appear again and again regard less of party.
Interestingly  the Daily A dvertiser tabulation of the politics of
Michigan bankers showed that in six of the twelve banks in which
politics of both p residen t and cash ier w ere known, the president
was from  one party  and the cash ier from  the other* This is not to
deny the existence of predom inantly Democratic or Whig banks, but
to ag ree  with F ro fesso r H arry  Scheiber "that personal in te r-re la tions
of en trep reneurs and politicians in the ’Age of Jackson* complicated
what a re  too often described  as s tric tly  political divisions. " In
Michigan there was an en trepreneuria l group that invested in and
borrow ed heavily from  banks. Many of these men* perhaps a sizeable
44m ajority , w ere affiliated w ith the Dem ocratic party.
44 Scheiber, "Oeorge Bancroft and the Bank of Michigan, " p. 90.
H istorians wishing to find a quantitative m easu re  of influence have 
too often accepted partesan  charges as proof. Even F ro fesso r 
Scheiber accepts unque3tioningly the figures of Samuel Medary as 
a m easure  of Whig control of financial power {Harry N. Scheiber* 
"The P e t Banks in Jacksonian Politics and Finance, " Journal of 
Economic H istory* XXHI / June, 1963/* p. 204.) Further system atic 
examination m ay prove Dem ocratic charges* but thus fa r this has 
not been done.
The Whigs w ere to a degree responsible for making state 
banks a political issue, because they nominated as their candidate 
for governor, C harles C* Trowbridge, the president of the Bank of 
Michigan* The Dem ocrats could and did ra ise  the spector of bank 
influence $ but they w ere forced to tread  ra th e r lightly, because of 
the general banking law* The d e m o c ra t ic  A ddress” chided over* 
banking and attacked the Bank of the United States declaring, "Our 
motto in rela tion  to the cred it system  is, DET IT BE PRESERVED 
and LET IT BE REFORMED*" Even though in the Special Session 
a lim itation on the size of b ills  had been defeated, the "A ddress'1 
advocated as one "reform " laws lim iting circulation  to b ills over 
five dollars* A second "refo rm " would be the passage of general 
laws by a ll s ta tes such as the Michigan law which the "A ddress" 
p ra ised  as a system  "based upon the soundest princip les, and which* 
with such fu rther provisions fo r the public security  as experience 
will soon suggest will render it the m ost safe and popular system  of 
banking that has ever been adapted* " As fa r as the opposing candidate 
was concerned* the Dem ocrats also had a problem* They argued 
that his nomination was consistent with Whig veneration of the 
incorporated m onied power* However, they also attacked Trowbridge
as an apostate Dem ocrat who had backed Van Ruren in 1836; and the
45Whigs for bringing banks into politics*
45 Dem ocratic F ree  .F rees, August 9, 1837.
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Up to this point the Whigs had generally denied Democratic 
charges and had attacked Jackson 's policies. They denied that 
Whigs favored an irredeem able paper currency, and countered with 
the a sse rtio n  that Jackson favored an exclusive m etallic  currency. 
They attacked "T ory  Consistency" that talked against a  m ultip li­
cation of banks and leg islated  them into existence. However, the
Whig platform  did not m ention the state  banks or the free  banking 
46law.
The f i r s t  attacks on the free  banking law evolved out of 
the argum ent concerning the inconsistency of Democratic rhetoric  
and policy that led the Whigs to point out unethical p rac tices of 
Dem ocratic bankers. In July the Dally A dvertiser called attention 
to the Pontiac Sank which it charged was run by Van Buren m en to 
lend to its own. stockholders* The Ann Arbor Journal noted the 
defalcation of the -Alan A rbor Bank which was run by leading Demo­
c ra ts  saying* "This standing in the dem ocratic ranks won't- redeem  
their b ills  in circulation*" The Daily A dvertiser commented that 
the Ann A rbor Bank was "the f i r s t  fru its"  of the free  banking law 
which had been passed  by a "Tory leg isla tu re  and charged fraud 
against the people by the "T o ries"  who ran  the bank. In November 
the- Daily A dvertiser attacked the opposition as "the Bag Party"
46 Daily A dvertiser, May 27, July 28, August 12, 1837. The Whig 
platform  is in Daily A dvertiser, August 7, 1837 and reprin ted  
in Randall, e d .» "guberna to ria l P latform s, " pp. 8-10.
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questioning how the Dem ocrats could say they opposed paper
currency  and supported the free  banking law "which” now tends to
47fill our state  with m iserab le  rags*"
The Dem ocrats took these attacks as an opportunity to defend 
the free  banking law and attack their opponents as the a ris to c ra ts . 
Their argum ent was c learly  m ade in an a rtic le  "The A ristocracy  vs. 
the d e a e ra i Hank Daw" which argued that "F ed era lis ts"  were 
agitating against the law because its anti-monopoly fea tu res did not 
Suit "the organs and re ta in e rs  of the monied aristocracy* " The 
existence of the free  banks would drive down the value of bank stock* 
particu larly  that of Trowbridge* the la rg e s t holder of such stock in 
Michigan* The "F ed era lis ts"  Were the a ris to c ra ts  and the party  of 
monopoly} the Dem ocrats w ere the party  which favored "giving 
equal rights to a ll c lasses  of investing the ir capital in that branch 
of business which had been heretofore monopolised by the few* "
F a r from  being anti-bank the Democratic p ress  hailed the estab lish ­
m ent of each new bank* The Fontiac Hajance p raised  the Bank of 
Oakland as a true "anti-monopoly bank" which would bring to the - 
a re a  lib e ra l discounts and prosperity* Pontiac had three banks for 
less than one thousand people* and the Balance proudly declared 
"few easte rn  villages can boast of like m eans of enterprise* " Sim ilar
47 Daily A dvertiser* July 28* August 22, November 2* and November 
28, 1837| Ann Arbor Journal in the Daily A dvertiser, August 22, 
1837.
statem ents came from  the Democratic papers all over the state* The 
Grand R iver T im es, the Constantine Republican, and the Ann Arbor 
Argus ail joined in welcoming new banks se t up under the "anti* 
monopoly" law. This affluent p raise  was even extended to the m ost 
famous of the "wild cats, ” the Bank of Brest} and ira te  ed itorials 
appeared in the Tecumseh Dem ocrat and the Pontiac Balance
48defending the soundness of the banking system  against Whig "libel, " 
Mason and the Dem ocrats won the election of 1837 by the 
close m arg in  of 5l4 votes, but th is could hardly be term ed  as a 
v ictory of " rad ica l11 principles concerning banks. Throughout the 
election, they had stood for a m ultiplication of banks in every corner 
of the sta te . It would a lso  be inco rrec t to te rm  the free  banking 
law victory for a newer se t of cap ita lis ts over an  older one* By 
th e ir own sta tis tic s , that probably rep resen ted  an absolute minimum} 
forty^fxve per cent of the officers of the s ta te 's  chartered  banks were 
D em ocrats, and nearly  every leader of the party  was involved in  
the Michigan State Bank* They used the anti-monopoly argum ents to 
attack not the chartered  banks in general, but the ir political opponent 
who happened to fee p residen t of one of them. It appears to have been
48 Dem ocratic F ree  P re s s , Septem ber 6, 1837; Font lac Balance in 
the Dem ocratic F re e  F re e 3, September 20, and September 27, 
1837; Grand R iver T im es in Dem ocratic F re e  F re es , October 11, 
1837; Ann A rbor Argus in Democratic F ree  F re ss , December 20, 
1837; Constantine Republican in Democratic F ree  P re s s , January 
17, 1838; Tecum seh Dem ocrat in Dem ocratic F ree  F ress^  
November 8, 1837.
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a selective use of party  sym bolism  ra ther than actual attack by one 
economic group upon another. Nor can the Whigs be considered 
defenders of the chartered  banks. They attacked Democratic banks 
whether chartered  or organised under the free  banking law. In 
general they m aintained a ra th e r consistent, position throughout 1837 
urging m oderation in the creation of new banks. A th ird  party  in 
the 1837 race  could be m istakenly in terp reted  as a pro-bank "con­
se rv a tiv e” faction of the Dem ocratic party  like that in New York. 
However* this was not the case. While the group included Biddle*
John A. Wells* John &♦ W illiams, and <3mliea Brown all of whom 
w ere involved in.banks, its ticket was headed by Edward Ellis, one 
of the m en who had constantly voted like a "loco-foeo" in the 
Michigan Senate. The Whig P re ss  attacked this group as "loco- 
focos, " while the Dem ocratic P re ss  called  them "Whigs* " and they 
re fe rred  to them selves as "Jeffersonian Dem ocrats, " "Mechanics* " 
o r "C onservatives/! While they certain ly  w ere not mechanics* there 
seem s to be little  evidence to substantiate the charge that they were
financed by the .Whigs* Probably they represen ted  resentm ent
49against the control of the party  by the Mason-Morvell faction.
Democratic* F ree  P re ss  August 9, September 6, and November 8,
1837; 'Daily A’dybrii's^rT May ?,?, July 28* August 16* and October
and November issues contain num erous references to "Ellisites* " 
Hemans, Idfe of Stevens Thomson Mason, pp. 303-304, argues 
that "E llis ite s"  w ere financed by Whigs to sp lit the Democratic 
vote. While this is certain ly  quite possible, the evidence he gives 
is very  weak and hardly proves that the "E llis ite s"  v/ere not 
what they said they w ere, opponents of the office-holding faction.
During the 1830* s, even after Jackson10 defeat of the Bank of 
the United States, there was very  little  opposition to state  banking in 
the Old Northwest and the en trepreneuria l sp irit was dominant.
Every portion of that a re a  joined in the demand for banking facilities. 
Neither party  was immune although there was a tendency for those 
opposed to banks to congregate in the D em ocratic party. Before 
1837 this group was a m inority  within the party  and the section. 
Although the experiences of the 1820*s would have dictated d is tru st 
of bankSi "ag ra rian ” sentim ents did not reappear until the political 
and economic situation was a lte red  by the Panic of 1837 and the 
depression which followed in its  wake.
CHAPTER II
PARTY PERCEPTION OF THE PANIC OF 1837
The Panic of 1837 and the subsequent depression signifi­
cantly a ltered  the attitudes toward hanks as each party  read its 
own meaning into the course of events. In o rder to exonerate 
Jackson, the Dem ocrats found it n ecessa ry --an d  logical given the 
rheto ric  of t h e "Bank W ar"--to  blam e the nation 's banking system  
for the c r is is . The Whigs developed a con trary  in terpretation  of 
the causes of the c r is is  which em phasized Jackson 's responsibility. 
These in terpretations originated with the national leaders of the 
party, but soon sp read  to the Old Northwest where they form ed the 
basis for the subsequent debate over banking in the sta tes.
In p rac tically  every  sta te  the banking boom was actively 
aided by Jacksonians, and it was an unintended consequence of 
Jackson 's policy* A larm ed by the excesses to which this policy had 
given r ise , Jackson and his subordinates moved in the mid-1830's 
to re s tra in  the expansion and paper issues* In 1834 Congress p ro ­
hibited governm ent agents from  making disbursem ents in currency 
that was le ss  than par value. The following year the T reasu ry  
established  a policy of accepting no b ills  under five dollars for land 
purchases and indicated that in the future this prohibition would be 
extended to b ills  under ten  dollars* In 1836 governm ent d isbu rse­
m ents w ere lim ited to b ills over ten dollars and M arch 3, 1837 was 
se t as a  date at which this would be ra ised  to include all b ills
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under twenty do lia r  3.
In his annual m essage a t the end of 1836 Jackson p raised  
this legislation along with those state  laws which elim inated sm all 
notes for " resto ring  to the country the sound currency  provided for 
in the Constitution* ” He hoped that future salutory legislation of
2this type would be forthcoming from  both Congress and the States.
Most im portant of the actions taken during these years to 
lim it the expansion of the banking system  and place the federal 
governm ent’s transactions on a  specie basis was the Specie C ircu­
la r  issued by S ecre tary  of the T reasu ry  Levi Woodbury on July 16, 
1836* This provided that public lands m ust be paid for in either 
gold o r silver* In this way "frauds” and "the monopoly of the 
public lands” would give way to settlem ents by "actual Settlers, ” 
and "the ruinous extension of bank issues and c re d its” upon which 
speculation was based would be discouraged. Jackson p ra ised  the
1 Scheiber, ”The P e t Banks in Jacksonian Politics and Finance, 
1833-1841, ” pp. 196-214, is an in teresting and m is-nam ed analysis 
of Jacksonian financial policies, ft, along with George Rogers 
Taylor, The T ransportation Revolution 1815-1866, Vol. IV of
The Economic H istory of the United States, e d ,, ' Henry David, 
e t al. (10 'vo ls.''j Hew Y ork:1 Holt "Rinehart “and Winston, 1945-), 
ppT*338-34S; Reginald C harles McGrane, The Panic of 1837 
(Chicago; The U niversity of Chicago P re ss , 1924), and R ichard 
T im berlake, ”The Specie C ircu lar and the D istribution of the 
Surplus, ” Journal of Political Economy, LXVIIX (April, I960), 
pp. 109-11?, form s the basis  of m y analysis of the panic.
2 Jam es D. Richardson, e d ., A Compilation of the M essages and 
P apers of the P residen ts (Washington; By Authority of Congress, 
1900), m ,  pp. 236-260.
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Specie C ircu lar in  December:
it  checked the c a ree r of the W estern banks and gave 
them additional strength  in anticipation of the p ressu re  
which has since pervaded our E aste rn  as well as 
European com m ercial cities* 3
Jackson did not note the adverse affects of the C ircular.
It had caused an increased  demand for specie in the in te rio r where 
the land offices could only be supplied by withdrawing specie from  
the easte rn  financial cen ters. This drain  on the eastern  banks came 
a t a time when they faced an unfavorable international situation. 
England, A m erica’s m ain creditor* had undergone a banking expansion 
sim ila r to that of the United States* As loans increased, a drain 
on the gold re se rv e  of the Bank of England forced that institution 
to ra ise  its discount ra te  in July, 1836, to 4 1/2%. Eventually the 
Bank moved to cu rta il the activ ities of the joint stock banks that 
w ere deeply involved in the purchase of A m erican b ills. This might 
have caused little  a la rm  had it not been for the exceedingly large 
balance of trade  that had turned against the United States at this 
tim e. The boom of the th irtie s  led  to increased  purchases of 
foreign goods by A m ericans; and the m ania fo r in ternal improve* 
m ents Hooded the English m arke t with State bonds* At the same 
tim e grain  crops, which m ight have balanced th is m ovem ent of goods
3 Ibid. , p. 249* The Specie C ircu lar is rep rin ted  in Henry Steele 
Commager, 'ed.-, Documents of A m erican Higfory (New York: 
Appleton#Century*Crofts, Inc*, 1949 fifth e d .), p. 283.
and capital, w ere so poor that wheat actually had to be im ported in 
1836.
The Specie C ircu lar thus acted in two ways to bring on 
the panic of 1837* It weakened easte rn  banks at a tim e when the 
international situation placed them under a severe s tra in  disrupting 
norm al banking arrangem ents. More im portant, the C ircular con­
tributed  to a general public d is tru st of banks and fragm ented mutual 
confidence within the banking community. In the West, fa r from  
strengthening the banks by giving them a broader specie basis,
the C ircu lar struck  a t the b asis  of bank circulation! the belief that
4the notes would be accep ted  a t the land offices*
The problem s of the banks, both easte rn  and w estern, were 
accentuated by the Deposit Act of 1836 which proposed a distribution 
of the surplus revenue of the federal government to the sta tes for 
safekeeping* At the tim e this act was passed, the struc tu re  of the 
A m erican banking system  was inadequate to make the necessary  
tran sfe rs  from  the West, where revenues from  land sales w ere 
collected, to the populous sta tes of the Bast; and within that section 
from  the com m ercial cen ters to banks in m ore ru ra l areas* The
4 Moat h isto rians like McGrane and Taylor have acknowledged the 
im portance of the Specie C ircular; however, T im ber lake, "The 
Specie C ircu lar and the D istribution of the Surplus, " pp. Ill, 117, 
disputes this. Scheiber, "The Pet Banks, " and C arte r H. 
Golembe, "State Banks and the Economic Development of the 
West, " (Unpublished Ph. D. D issertation, Columbia University, 
1952) uphold the trad itional view.
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governm ent responded by trying to keep in tersectional tran sfe rs  to a 
m inim um  and was partia lly  successful. However, enough specie 
was moved to cause a severe decline in re se rv es  and a general con­
trac tion  was the resu lt. ^
The Deposit Act had been passed by a coalition of Whigs and 
Dem ocrats against the advice of Jackson and Woodbury and tended 
to stim ulate state  investm ents in internal improvements* Hoping 
to aid Van Buren in the West w here the b ill was popular Jackson 
refused to veto it, but he presented  his objections to it in his 
December message* His opposition was based on s tr ic t construction 
of the constitution* s ta te s ’ rights* and an abhorrence of the m oral 
consequences of a national debt* He showed little  or no aw areness 
of the question of the tran s fe rs  or the degree to which the w estern 
banks w ere hurt* Jackson m ust have been aw are of the problem* 
because Chief Justice  Roger B. Taney had w ritten  to him in October 
that the m ercan tile  community* which was indebted to the deposit 
banks* had been hurt when these banks w ere forced to call their 
loans to m ake the tran sfe rs  of government deposits* Taney also 
added that the m ercan tile  c lasses  would foolishly blam e Jackson’s 
policies when it was in rea lity  their own folly that brought on distress* 
“The currency  will however be always liable to these ruinous fiuctu-
5 T im berlake, ’’The Specie C ircu lar and the D istribution of the 
Surplus, ’’ pp. 114*16, is a  convincing analysis of the effect of the 
distribution. See also dolem be, “State Banks and Economic 
Development, ” pp. 207-209*
so
afcions while it continues to fee of paper, and nothing will cure the
evil hu t the success of your g rea t plan of resto ring  the Constitu-
6tional currency  of Gold and silver. "
With the whole financial s truc tu re  suffering under the 
severe  s tra in s  Brought on fey the Deposit Act, the Specie C ircular, 
and the policies of the Bank of England; the collapse of the cotton 
m arke t in early  1837 led to the com m ercial and financial panic 
which precipitated  the suspension of specie payments fey the nation*s 
banks in May of the year.
Although New O rleans and New York w ere hard  hit in 1837, 
and business was dull everywhere, ag ricu ltu ral a reas  and some 
m anufacturing a reas  w ere not badly-hurt. ■ 1838 saw conditions 
improving, and a resum ption based  on B ritish  c red it which was 
again expanding. However, the situation worsened in 1839* A 
rev e rsa l of English c red it policies* and the failu re  of the attem pt of 
the Bank of the Baited States to "peg" sagging cotton prices led to 
a second suspension of specie payments in October 1839. Depression 
had come to stay  and during the next four years, the whole economy 
experienced one of the m ost severe  setbacks in A m erican history*
6 Roger R. Taney To Jackson, October 27, 1836* in John Spencer 
Bassett* e d ., Correspondence of Andrew Jackson (Washington,
D. C .: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1931), V* pp. 431-32. 
R ichard M. Johnson to Jackson, June 21, 1836, Ib id ., indicates 
there  w ere many Dem ocrats who favored the act. See also 
Thomas H art Benton, Thirty  Years* View (New York: D. Apple­
ton and Company, 1854), I, p. 658.
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Such financial d isa s te rs  inevitably give rise  to conjecture 
as to their causes, and the depression from  1837 to 1843 was no 
exception. The keenest com m entators of the day, including Biddle, 
tended to em phasise the effect of the Bank of England*s cred it 
policies while they blam ed Jacksonian policies to a le s se r  o r g rea ter 
degree in line with their general economic beliefs. One such 
individual, C harles F rancis  Adams, who voted for Fan Buren in 
1836, and who would la te r  become a leader of the "re fo rm 1* elem ent 
in the Whig and Republican parties , presented a relatively  non­
p a rtisan  analysis* The c ris is  of 1837 was, according to Adams, 
the re su lt of capital borrow ed from  Europe* This could only have 
been handled adequately if the country w ere free  from  the burden 
of a  vast speculative debt caused by an undue expansion of the state 
banking systems* Concerning the responsibility  of the P residen t 
he wrote*
Perhaps I m ay be in grievous e r ro r  $ but to me 
G eneral Jackson appears highly responsible* not for 
the p resen t state of things, inasmuch as in this 
trading country it is always m ore or le ss  likely to 
happen, but for the defenseless condition into which 
the governm ent of the Union* in trusted to him for 
very different ends, has been thrown by it* It was 
the voluntary withdrawal of the beneficial influence 
of the national power over currency which threw
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away a ll control over private and corporate 
cupidity* for which he m ust answer. 7
However# m ost contem porary analyses w ere not as
balanced as that of Adamsj and two conflicting conceptions of the 
Causes of the depression were advanced by the pa rties  contesting 
for power* The Whigs had been warning that such a convulsion 
would be a re su lt of Jacksonian financial policies, in particu lar the 
destruction  of the Bank of the United States. They successfully 
exploited the issue, laying the blam e for the depression  entirely  
on Jackson’s policies, and joining in a call for a national bank of 
some sort* Usually they in terp reted  their e lecto ral success as 
repudiation of the policies of the Dem ocrats. On the other hand, 
the D em ocrats defended the P resid en t’s policies and w ere forced 
to fall back on a  vague general theory of business cycles which laid 
the blam e on the speculative expansion of banks* This in te rp re ­
tation had been offered by W illiam Deggett and the loeo-focos of 
New York in u m oral term s well suited to explain political defeats
7 G. F* Adams* F u rth e r Reflections Upon the State, of the Currency 
of the United sta tes (Bostons W illiam D* Tieknor, 18371, p. 5j 
Deonard C. Hilderman* National .and State Banks s. A Study of 
th e ir Origins (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company* 19311, 
pp, 2-8. M artin B. Duberman, C harles F rancis Adams 1807 - 
1886 (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), pp. 56-61, ' 
a rgues that Adams was connected with neither party  and that 
his com m ents on the c r is is  “countered’* partisan  assessm ents 
of Jackson. While the basic  argum ent of the pamphlet shows 
Adams to hold economic ideas that would be m ore eomfortable 
among Whig® in the 1840’e, Duberman is essen tia lly  co rrec t.
The tone of “F u rth e r R eflections” differs greatly  from  con­
tem porary  partisan  pieces.
as the resu lt of "bank influence” and corruption, ®
Both parties  a sse rte d  that there  was some evil agent 
corrupting the proper functioning of the economic system . For 
the Dem ocrats, it was the ”bank specu la to rs” who sought to control 
the supply of currency and to expand and contract it fo r their own 
advantage. F o r the Whigs, Jackson 's policies had been like ’’setting 
a B lacksm ith to mending a watch with a sledge ham m er.
The D em ocratic conception of the causes of the " d is tre s s” 
m ight be traced  to Condy Raq uet, William Gouge or Leggett, but 
its m ost im portant and influential exponent was Jackson himself* 
Taney had urged Jackson to attack the reck less expansions of the 
"paper making corporations and specu lators;" and both the "Farew ell 
A ddress” in M arch, 1837, and Jackson’s annual m essage in December
8 The debate on the responsibility  of Jackson’s policies for the 
depression  was recen tly  revived by two econom ists, basically  
in te res ted  in using the question to advocate their own theoretical 
hypotheses. George M aeesich, "Sources of Monetary D isturb­
ances in the United States, 1834-1845, ” Journal of Economic 
H istory , XX (September, 1960), pp. 407-26 argues that the 
p rim ary  source of the depression  was external. His theoretical 
m odel and resulting conclusions a re  attacked by Jeffrey  G. 
W illiamson, "International Trade and United States Economic 
Development: 1827-1843, ” Journal of Economic H istory , XXI 
(Septem ber, 1961), pp. 372-83. M aeesich attem pts an answer, 
"International Trade and United States Economic ^Development 
Revisited, " Ibid. , pp. 384-5, W illiamson has m uch the best
of the argum ent.
9 W illiam Woodbridge to W illiam L. Woodbridge, May 19, 1837, 
Woodbridge MSS.
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of the previous year struck  out a t the evils of the “paper system . ” 
While corruption and political danger of the Bank of the United 
States w ere emphasized* a ll banks received the P residen t’s censure 
as agents harm ful to the in te res ts  of the producing classes* “under­
mining the purity  and complicating the sim plicity of our virtuous 
Government . . His annual m essage Set forth  the indictment of 
paper issuing banks in its c lassic  form :
When thus, by the depreciation in consequence of 
the quantity of paper in circulation, wages as well 
as p rices become exorbitant* it is soon found that 
the whole effect of the adulteration is a tariff on our 
home industry for the benefit of the countries where 
gold and s ilv er c ircu late  and m aintain uniformity and 
m oderation in prices* It is then perceived that the 
enhancement of the p rice  in land and labor produces a 
corresponding increase  in the p rice  of products 
until these products do not sustain  a competition 
with s im ila r ones in other countries, and thus 
m anufactured and ag ricu ltu ral productions cease to 
bear exportation for the cost* This is the process 
by which specie is banished by the paper of the 
banks* Their vaults a re  soon exhausted to pay for 
foreign commodities* The next step is a stoppage 
of specie paym ent--a  total degredation of paper as 
currency--unusual depression  of prices* the ruin 
of debtors, and the accumulation of property  in the 
hands of c red ito rs  and cautious capitalists* 10
ID Roger B* Taney to Jackson October 27* 1836, in B assett, e d ., 
Jacksbn Correspondence, V, pp* 431-32} Richardson* ed* * 
M essages and P apers of the P resid en ts , HI, pp* 236-260* 
292-308} the b rie f quotations from  Jackson to Roger B* Taney* 
October 13, 1836, in B asse tt, ed*, Jackson Correspondence, V* 
p. 430, and the longer one is from  Richardson* 111* p* 2481 
On general theories concerning banking and the business cycle 
a t this tim e see: H arry  32. M iller, Banking Theories in the 
United States Before I860 (Cambridge, M ass: H arvard University 
P re s s , 1927), pp. 55-70, 187-208.
Personally , Jackson’s anim osity to Banks and the paper
system  was on a le ss  sophisticated level* The suspension and the
depression  itse lf w ere p a rt of the conspiracy by the monied in te rests
led by Biddle to control the government in their own in te res ts  and to
underm ine true  Republicanism. In tnid*1837 he wrote to his friend,
the Jacksonian editor of the Cincinnati A dvertiser, Moses Dawson,
"ts it possible that any true  republican of talents and experience
can have confidence in Banks as a safe reposito ry  of the public
revenue a fte r w itnessing the ir late t reacherous conduct to the govern*
m ent joining in league with Biddle and the Bearings to Bankrupt the
government, degrade its charac ter, both a t home and ab ro ad .. . .  “
The only proper regulation of the cu rrency  could come from  ?,a
11s tr ic t  specie policy.11
Although Van B uren hardly mentioned Banking in his 
Inaugural, he se t forth  the official party  position on the causes of 
the depression  in  his Septem ber 4, M essage to the special session  
of C ongress. Van Buren asserted* Hthe p resen t condition is chiefly 
to be a ttribu ted  to overaction in a lt  departm ents of business-*an  
overaction deriving* perhaps, its f i r s t  im pulses from  antecedent
11 John J. Whealen* e d ,, "The Jackson*Dawson Correspondence, '* 
Bulletin of the H isto rica l and Philosophical Society of Ohio*
XVI (January, 1958), 'pp**_3*So!,' The quotation is from  Jackson 
to Dawson* August 31, 1837, pp. 9*10* Other Jacksonian 
ed ito rs had sim ila r exchanges with Jackson* for an example 
see the le tte rs  to and from  F rancis P. B lair in B assett, e d .» 
Jacks on Cor respondence, V, pp. 474*479.
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Causes, but stim ulated to its destructive consequences by excessive 
issues of bank paper and by other facilities for the acquisition and 
enlargem ent of credit* ” "Eedundaney of c red it” and the sp ir it of 
speculation which it engendered led to an increased foreign debt, 
unwise investm ents in "unproductive public lands11 at inflated 
p rices, 11 im provident" expenditures of "imm ense sum s” on internal 
im provem ents, "the diversion to the pursuits of much of the labor 
that should have been applied to ag ricu ltu re” making it necessary  
to im port grain, "and finally, *. ♦ the rap id  growth among all 
c la sses , and especially  in our g rea t com m ercial towns of luxurious 
habits founded too often in  m erely  fancied wealth, and detrim ental
IEalike to the industry, the reso u rces, and the m orals of our people*11 
Van Bureips m essage was m ildly worded and fa r from  an 
anti-bank d iatribe, but he presented  a ll of the them es that w ere 
cu rren t in the Dem ocratic literature* Business fluctuations* in 
general, and the Panic of 1837, in particu lar, were viewed as the 
re su lts  of the paper money system* Banks in their greed for 
profit expanded c red it beyond a "natural” amount* This led to a 
general r is e  in the price level which engendered a false sense of 
wealth* The re su lt was an increase  in the sp ir it of speculation 
which undermined habits of thrift* Once this had happened, the 
m oral fiber of society, was weakened* fo rm erly  virtuous young men
12 Hi char da on, e d ., M essages and Papers of P residen ts, IE* 
pp. 334*346, the quotations a re  from  pp. 325, 336.
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left the professions of the ir fathers for the improvident life of the 
speculator and developed luxurious tastes that could only be s a tis ­
fied by the products of a depraved Europe. This caused a decrease 
in the basic products of the United States and an adverse balance of 
trade  which led  to the withdrawal of specie and eventually economic 
em barrassm ent.
In each of the sta tes of the Old Northwest, the Democratic 
p ress  and the Dem ocratic politicians developed the Jacksonian 
view of the depression  although it  som etim es led them to strange 
contradictions. In Michigan, where the .Democrats were intim ately 
connected with banks and m ultiplication of banks resu ltan t from  the 
free  banking act* the imm ediate reaction of the party  of Jackson was 
to absolve the P re s id en t’s policies by blaming the ''p resen t pecuniary 
em barrassm ent" on the pp irit of speculation fostered  by "the 
excessive issues of paper money" by the banks, and to call for a con­
tinuation of the adm inistrative attem pts "to introduce a g rea ter amount 
of specie into our circulating medium. ” Governor Mason had warned 
against /overbanking in January, and in this m essage to the extra 
session  of the leg isla tu re  in June, he ascribed  the "c ris is  of the
moneyed affa irs of the country" to the "one fatal e r ro r  into which the
13country has fa lle n .. * overbanking. "
13 The 1837 Dem ocratic state platform  is rep rin ted  in Randall, 
e d . , "G ubernatorial P latform s, " pp. 10-11; F u ller, e d ., 
M essages, I, pp. 200-212, the quotation is on p. 209.
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The Dem ocratic F ree  P re ss  p raised  the opening of the new 
banks and attacked the Whig ’’panic makers*1 in late 1836 and early  
1837. On May 10* 1837 the paper somewhat prem aturely  announced 
that the panic, which it believed had been caused by overtrading, 
speculation, and the distribution bill, was over. While continuing 
to defend the state*s banks and particu larly  those se t up under the 
free  banking act, the Dem ocratic F ree  P re s s  slowly shifted its ground. 
By m id-sum m er it a sse rte d  "that a ll sagacious m en of both parties 
have long been anticipating the difficulties in the money m arket, 
in consequence of the unwise legislation of Congress and the states 
in regard s to banking, ** In early  June the paper printed a rep o rt 
of the Dem ocratic m em bers of the Hew York leg islatu re  denying 
the Whig charges that the veto of the Bank of the United States and 
the specie c ircu la r w ere responsible for the panic* The report 
blam ed overtrading, speculation, the heavy foreign debt* and the 
m easu res of the Bank of England. The following month a  discussion 
of the causes of the panic p resented  the standard dem ocratic in te r­
p reta tion  em phasising overtrading, overbanking, speculation in 
land, and the d istribution  of the b ill which caused specie to be locked 
in sta te  tre a su rie s  and forced the state  banks to contract. Through­
out the year attacks on Biddle and his "wild eat*1 bank w ere printed, 
and attem pts w ere m ade to associate  the Whigs with those banks 
m ost responsible fo r the c r is is . Both the Dem ocratic F ree  P re ss  
and the Constantine Republican w ere forced to adm it that the
Dem ocrats played an active role  in granting bank ch arte rs . However,
they both argued that the Whigs made up a large proportion of the
bank m en and speculators s ince they w ere wealthy m en while the
Dem ocrats w ere fa rm ers  and workingmen. “The tru th  i s , 11
a sse rte d  the Dem ocratic F ree  P re ss , "the sp ir it of stock-gam bling
and desperate  speculation, in which the Whig a ris to c racy  have
borne the principal share , has been alm ost the exclusive cause of
the m ultiplication of Worthless local banks without specie capital,
and without any substantial basis, fo r securing public confidence,
14on prom pt redem ption of th e ir  b ills. H
Much the sam e p rocess occurred  in the other states* but 
in no other was the Dem ocratic situation so ambiguous* Although 
there  was a  sizeable faction of the Ohio Democracy that was anti­
bank in the thirties* the party , in general, had supported state  
banking and m ost of the ch a rte rs  for Ohio banks w ere secured  from  
D em ocratic legislatures* Nonetheless, the party  accepted the 
Jacksonian in te rp re ta tion  of the causes of the panic* In January 
the Dem ocratic m eeting of Delaware county blam ed the depression 
on the Bank of the United States and the sta te  banks* Two months 
la te r  the Ohio Statesm an reprin ted  an a rtic le  from  the Globe,
14 .Democratic. F ree ,.P ress , January 25, May 10, May 24, May 31, 
June 7, Juhe 14, June 25, July 5, July 12, 1837, and the 
Constantine Republican reprin ted  in the Dem ocratic F ree  P re s s , 
July 26, 1837, show the development of the argum ent. The 
quotations a re  from  the issues of June 14 and July 5.
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"D em ocratic Creed in Relation to Banks# State and National, ” which 
blam ed the sta te  banks for the depression. In his annual m essage 
in 1839, Governor Wilson Shannon alienated the loco-foco faction 
of his party  by his friendly attitude toward banks, but he presented 
the party  position on the causes of the c ris is . An adverse balance 
of payments resu lting  from  "the overgrown system  of banking" 
that m ultiplied currency  beyond "the rea l business wants of the 
community" and drove up dom estic p rices making im portation 
favorable* The following year he fu rther developed this to include 
the Standard argum ents concerning the relation  between paper money 
and speculation* unnecessary debts, and extravagance* He empha­
sized  the im portation of b read  stuffs in 1836 by which the United 
States was "made tribu tary  to Europe for the necessities of life by 
m eans of this artificial* anti-A m erican system *" A paper currency 
made a  ta riff u se less and acted as a bounty to foreign m anufacturers 
"thus operating so ass to prom ote the in te res t of the foreign m anu­
fac tu re r a t the expense of our own* " Thomas W* Bartley, who
served  out Shannon1 & second term* and was well liked by the loco-
15foco faction of the party  echoed this in terpretation  in 1844*
15 Qhlo Statesm an, January  3, 1838; Washington Globe reprin ted  
in the Ohio Statesm an, M arch 14, 1838; D ocum ents.. .o f  the 
State of Ohio* 1839, Document #1; Documents*. . of the State 
of Ohio, ■ 1841, - Document #1; Docum ents:. .  of the State of Ohio, 
1845, Document #1*
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Through this period the leading Jacksonian editors presented 
Jackson’s in terpretation  of the depression to the people and attem pted 
to associate  the Whig party  with the banks, The Newark Advocate 
charged that ’’the Banks a re  Whig children?” and the Ohio Statesm an 
re fe rre d  to Governor Vance and his associates as a  ’’knot of 
B ankers, ” To prove these charges the editor of the Statesm an com­
puted that of 405 bark  officials in the state# 341 w ere Whigs and
16only 64 w ere Dem ocrats,
In Illinois m uch the sam e pattern  was repeated. ’’Dong
John” Wentworth’s Chicago Democrat connected the banks with
the crisis# and the Whigs with the banks* Governor Thomas Carlin
charged that the banks had brought ’’gloom and desolation” where
’’p ro sperity  and happiness had existed* ” The banking system  which
was ’’unsanctioned by any principle of republican v irtue” was the
only way to account fo r the ’’fluctuations” of the economy which
c reated  ficticious value# engendered a sp irit of speculation and led
to ru in  by turning the people from  honest industry* He had e a rlie r
attacked the ’’pernicious and corrupting influence upon the m orals
17of the people” exerted  by the suspension of specie payments.
16 Newark Advocate rep rin ted  in the Ohio Statesm an# October 24, 
1837; Ohio Statesman# October 27# August 9# 16 and 27# 1837.
17 Illinois. Governor# 1838-1842. Charles Manfred Thompson, 
’’The'W inois W ” University of Illinois
Studies in the Social Sciences# IV (March# 1915), pp. 52, 83, 
and Don Fehrenbacher# Chicago Giant (Madison, W isconsin: 
A m erican H istory  R esearch  Center# 1957), p. 27, a s s e r t  that 
Illinois bankers w ere Whigs.
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The situation in Indiana differed from  that in the other 
sta tes and gave r ise  to some local variations on the standard 
pattern . The Whigs had solid control of the state  throughout the 
1830‘s; and the State Bank of Indiana was one of the soundest and 
best m anaged banks in the country. In the state Senate, the 
Dem ocrats p resented  the ir in terpretation  in answer to Whig charges, 
defending Jackson’s policies and attacking those of the Whig state 
administration* They denied that the general government was 
responsible, but ra th e r that the "p resen t collapsed s ta te ” was "a 
necessa ry  consequence of our fo rm er inflated condition. ” This 
condition could hardly have been the resu lt of Jackson 's policies 
since England as well as the United States was affected* This 
inflation was the re su lt of the "vicious paper System” and in particu ­
la r  the action of the Bank of the United States, which by contracting 
its issue forced the sta te  banks to expand, m ultiplying the currency 
extravagantly* They thus placed the blam e for the expansion on the 
Bank of the United States and the sta te  banks (excluding the ir own 
State Bank)* F rom  this point they developed the standard Democratic 
argum ents that the banking expansion led to extravagant foreign 
spending, and "induced m en of a ll c lasses  to drop their lawful 
callings and to tu rn  out into the g rea t M aelstrom  of reck less
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speculation,
In addition the Dem ocrats argued that Indiana had Its own
peculiar local c ircum stances that aggravated the general d is tress;
and it was those they connected with the Whig party. In particu lar,
they attacked the in ternal im provem ents system  e£ the Whigs that
provided for sim ultaneous construction of all infernal improvements.
To the Dem ocrats it was na system  in fact conceived in sin, brought
forth  in iniquity, and attem pted to be sustained fey deception* “
F u rth e r the system  had underm ined the cred it of the sta te  and
crippled the state  bank. They concluded:
Our depressed  financial system  in short has been 
produced by our own unwise system  of internal 
im provem ents, by our m ore unwise m anner of p e r ­
secuting it, and by the m ost,unwise course pursued 
by our fund com m issioners in trusting  our state 
bonds to so large  an amount in the hands of i r r e ­
sponsible and swindling corporations /the  Mew 'fork 
banks/, and not as m odestly suggested by Governor 
Wallace is it owing to the m easu res of Andrew Jackson 
or M artin Van Buren. 19
The Dem ocratic p ress  of Indiana was somewhat less de li­
cate although it also  avoided d irec t attacks on the State Bank* By 
mid-1837 the standard  Jacksonian in terpretation  of the c r is is  was
18 1'M inority Report on Select Committee of the Senate on the 
Governor* s M essage ,” in Dorothy Riker, e d ., M essages and 
P apers Relating to the A dm inistration of David W allace, 
G overnor pf Indiana, 1837-1840 (Indianapolis, Indiana: Indiana 
H isto rica l'’Bureah,''' 19&3), pp. '376-SI, the quotations a re  from  
pp. 377, 378.
19 Ib id ., pp. 380, 381.
cu rren t and Gouge the accepted authority on banking. Bven Stevens 
T. Mason, M ichigan’s young governor, was quoted authoritatively 
on the re la tion  of over-banking to the crisis* The Biddle-Whig 
currency  of irredeem able  paper was contrasted with the Jaeksonian- 
Republican currency  of gold and silvers and the Whigs were attacked 
as the bank party. In its notice of the election, the Indiana Democ ra t 
tabbed Whig David Wallace as "The Speculator’s C andidate.,f 
However, m ost attem pts w ere made to prove that the Whigs 
nationally, not just in Indiana, were the bank party; and M edary’s
20figures on the political affiliation of Ohio bankers w ere reprinted.
The Whigs blam ed the c ris is  and the bank suspension on 
the policies of Jackson’s adm inistration. Clay made the c lassic  
statem ent of the Whig in terpretation  in his speech on the Sub-Treasury 
Bill. "P r io r  to that se rie s  of unfortunate m easu res"  instituted by 
Jackson, "no people on earth  enjoyed a be tter currency* or had 
exchanges be tte r regulated, than the people of the United States. "
But in 1837 the country was endangered by the p rospect of an 
irredeem able  paper currency. "Gan it be doubted that it is the 
resu lt of those m easu res to which 1 have averted?  When at the very 
m om ent of adopting them, the very consequences which have happened 
w ere foretold  as inevitable* is it n ecessa ry  to look elsew here for
20 Indianapolis Indiana Democrat, May 3, July 12, June 7, June 21, 
July 26, Septem ber 6, 1837. The Charlestown Indianan did 
attack the State Bank when it suspended, "We do not believe the 
people d esire  a  bank longer. JLet Indiana be f i r s t  in the noble 
w o rk ..» , " in the Ohio Statesm an, November 1, 1837.
th e ir cause ? Hover was prediction m ore distinctly made? never
was fulfillm ent m ore lite ra l and e x a c t.11 Clay attached to Van Buren’s
argum ent that the fact both Europe and B ritain  also  suffered
"em barrassm ent" showed it could not have been the resu lt of
Jackson 's policies* "The degree of em barrassm ent has been m arked,
in com m ercial countries there by the degree of their connection with
the United States. " The g rea t failu res w ere among those houses
engaged in the A m erican trade. The suffering in those countries
showed that B rita in  which was the m ost involved with the United
States was w orst h it followed by France "and so on in the o rder of
th e ir g rea te r o r le ss  com m ercial in tercourse  with us. " However,
the fact rem ained that the intensity  of suffering in the United States
exceeded that of any other country* This, Clay argued, indicated
that this country suffered from  "som e peculiar and m ore potent
causes than any which" operated in Europe? "1st* The veto of the
bank* 2nd* The rem oval of deposits, with the urgent injunction of
S ecre tary  Taney upon the banks to enlarge their accommodations*
3rd* The gold biil* and the demand for gold for foreign endemnities.
4th* The clum sy execution of the deposit law? and Sih* The
21
T reasu ry  o rder of July, 1836* "
Clay* s speech included m ost of the them es that made up 
the Whig in terpretation . The veto of the re c h a rte r  of the Bank of
21 Thomas H art Benton, e d ., Abridgem ent of the Debates of 
Congress F rom  178^ to 1856 (Hew York* D. Appleton and 
Com pany," 1859),' XIII, pp. ^04-405.
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the United States rem oved its sa lu tary  effects on the currency, and 
abdicated federa l control over the banks. The rem oval of the 
deposits along with the encouragem ent of the Secretary  of the 
T reasu ry  led  to the banking expansion of the m id -th irties . However, 
although expansion had been encouraged, the mishandling of the 
d istribution and the specie c ircu la r struck  at the entire banking 
system  and led to depression* It was a  c lear question of the m isuse 
of power by the executive.
Throughout the Old Northwest the Whig p ress  and the Whig 
politicians echoed these charges* Whig governors joined in 
blam ing the c r is is  on the ’’unhappy policy of the national govern­
m ent. " Ohio’s Governor Vance argued that " it is not the amount 
of c ircu lation  that produces these evils* but the want of power to 
control, and judgem ent in the application of our m eans, by those 
who have the m anagem ent of our financial system* " What was 
necessa ry  was a  well regulated financial system  capable of con­
trac tion  and expansion in line with the needs of a  growing economy* 
Duncan* the governor of Illinois* agreed  that Congress should 
’’regulate the currency* and re s to re  it to its fo rm er sound condi­
tion and beneficent action" ra th e r than try  to escape the conse­
quences of the Dem ocratic policies “by amusing the people with the 
absurd  and im practicable p ro jec t of an exclusive hard  money 
currency* " In Indiana a lively debate over the causes of the depression 
was touched off by Governor David W allace’s m essage on December 3,
183 9 which laid  the blam e fo r the "sudden blight which has come 
over our prospects" on the policies of Jackson 's Adm inistration, 
Dem ocratic com m ittees in the state Senate and House answered 
Wallace denying the adm inistration 's responsibility  and urging the 
governor to te ll the tru th  and to accept the consequences of his 
actions and those of his party . In the p ress  C hristian C. Move 
countered these rep o rts  and a sse rte d  that the Dem ocrats were 
com pletely wrong in their in terpretation . The responsibility  lay 
•with Jackson* Samuel Judah also came to the defense of the Whig 
sta te  administration* He argued that the d is tre ss  was a  national 
phenomena and it could hardly be blam ed on the Whig policies in 
Indiana* ^
Although the Whigs em phasised the responsibility  of the 
Jacksonian financial policies, they did not ignore the relation  of 
"overbanking" to the depression, and they w ere not uncritical of 
the state  banks. In Illinois, the Whigs constantly rem inded the 
Dem ocrats that they had voted overwhelmingly for the State Bank, 
and had tr ie d  as b est they could to disconnect them selves from  the
22 F u ller, e d ., M essages, I* pp. 371*72; Docum ents., .  of the
State of Ohio, 1838* Document #1; Illinois. Governor, 1834-1838; 
Indiana L egislature . Documentary jo u rn a l , ' 1839* P a r t  II, 
Document #9; "M inority R eport of Select Committee of the 
Senate on the G overnor's M essage, " and "Report of Select 
Committee of the House on G overnor's M essage, " in Riker, 
e d ., M essages*«. Relating to the A dm inistration of David 
WallaceT pp. 376*81, 393*99; Indianapolis fodiana Journal, 
January 14, F eb ruary  3, F ebruary  10, 1840.
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institution. David Wallace in Indiana told his constituents that 
11 experience teaches us the fearful lesson that there  a re  lim its 
beyond which if banking privileges and banking operations a re  
ca rried , they cease to do good, and become engines of incalculable 
m ischief. " In Ohio Thomas Corwin readily  adm itted that banks, 
when not p roperly  controlled, could cause dangerous fluctuations 
in the currency. It was in Michigan, however, where the Whigs 
vied with the Dem ocrats in their damnation of banks. The Detroit 
D ailyA dvertiser believed that the sp ir it of speculation and over­
trading helped to produce the c r is is , but that "the g rea t moving 
cause" was the Specie C ircu lar. The Ann Arbor State Journal con- 
nected "overbanking" to Jackson’s policies?
«Mffr
Overtrading and overbanking is /^sic/ then not the 
cause of the p resen t difficulties, but the effect, 
the legitim ate and undeniable consequence of the 
fatuifcous ac ts  of a party  administration* 23
In m id**1837 the Dally A dvertiser began attacking "Tory
Consistency1’ which produced the  increase  in banks and turned the
Jacksonian charges against the party* A run down on bank presidents
and cash ie rs  showed a la rg e r  num ber to be Democrats* Concerning
23 Thompson, "Illinois Whigs# " p. 66; Indiana L eg isla tu re .
Documentary jou rnal, 1838, Document #1? D ocum ents.«. of the 
State of Ohio. 1841* Document #76; Detroit Daily A dvertiser,
  r -  1  , . •     t mm- m . . . .  i.  . . .  • » • .»
January 27, 1837; Ann Arbor State Journal reprin ted  in the 
D etroit Daily A dvertiser, July 28, 1837.
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which party  housed the speculators the A dvertiser wrote:
The speculators a re  of all parties , but of one m ore 
than another, the m ost of the Van Buren party, 
because these had control of the pet banks, Who 
form  the g rea t land companies of New York and of 
Washington? Ask the B utlers, ask Kendall, B lair 
and a ll that race.
Michigan was suffering from  a bank mania and the Dem ocrats talked
24"gold humbug" but gave the people "a  U tter of infant m onsters. M
All of the elem ents of the Whig in terpretation  w ere pulled
together in the 1841 platform  in Michigan th ree  fourths of which
was devoted to banking and money questions. It se t about to trace
how the country which had been in 1829 "generally  prosperous and
happy" cam e to its condition of "unparalleled em barrassm en t and
d is tre s s"  and argues that this is the re su lt of "the m ismanagem ent,
the im proper and dangerous m easu res, the m isconduct and
corruption of our late ru le rs . " It then noted:
Our enem ies say that all these things have been p ro ­
duced by the sp ir it  of speculation which has p re ­
vailed, and by and by the g rea t increase  of Banks, 
and of a paper currency* But what stim ulated this 
sp ir it of speculation and brought it into existence* 
and what caused the increase  of Banks and paper 
cu rrency?  Who created  these banks ? * * * m ore than 
tw o-thirds of these banks w ere created  by the loco 
foco party* m ostly  in the sta tes of New York*
Pennsylvania* Virginia* Ohio* Indiana* Louisiana* 
Alabama, M ississippi* Michigan* and a few 
others, * * the loco foco party  created  m ore than one 
hundred and fifty m illions of dollars of State Bank 
capital* between the years of 1829 and 1838, and
24 D etroit Daily A dvertiser, August 11, August 12, 183? and 
M arch 5, 1638.
claim ed to be the particu lar friends of State 
Banks, in opposition to a National Bank, until 
the general suspension and the g rea t shock of 
1837, when they suddenly renounced their own 
progeny, denounced all Banks and Bank paper, 
and becam e advocates of the Sub-Treasury, and 
specie currency.
What was needed was ”a well regulated National B ank.. .  to furnish 
the people of the United States a sound and uniform currency; to 
check the over issues of local State Banks, and to regulate the
2 K
exchanges of the coun try .. . .  ”
Im plied in each of these in terpretations were certain  ideas 
about banks and the ir relation  to the Good Society. In the Jack* 
som an’s view of banks, their economic function was subordinated 
to the ir symbolic ro le . All of the struc tu re  of political sym bolism  
that had been created  during r?th@ Bank W ar” was extended in the 
period following 1837 to cover all banks until the sins of the Bank 
becam e the sins of banks in general. The Jacks onians conceived 
of the Good Society in te rm s of sim ple decentralized government,
Mrepublican virtue, H and the ultim ate m orality  of ag ricu ltu ral 
labor* In certa in  cases the la s t elem ent was a ltered  to all "pro** 
due live c la sse s” although th is was not lim ited to Jaeksonians* The 
United States rep resen ted  a ll of these values in the ir minds* How* 
ever* they rea lized  that the purity of their ideal had been somehow 
corrupted. Banks functioned as a perfect symbol of the corrupting 
influence in A m erican society* The banks were the nsnake” in the
25 Randall, @d*, "G ubernatorial Platform s,*1 pp. 20*28.
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Republican Eden.
Each of the positive values for which the Jaeksonians
stood found its negative in the banking system . The “paper
a ris to c rac y 1* was the constant ta rge t of Jacksonian literature*
W illiam Gouge declared  that “a paper money aris toc racy  /Ts7 the
only kind of a ris to c racy  that can possibly ex ist in the United States"
because of the im possibility  of ecc lesiastical, m ilita ry , or landed 
26aristocracies*  The only a ris to c ra ts  the Jaeksonians saw were 
bankers.
The purity  of elections was soiled by ’‘bank influence. " 
Jacksonian defeats in the la te  th irties  and early  fo rties w ere 
ascribed  to bank influence* In particular* the supposed party  
played by "bank influence" in the New York elections of 1827 and 1838 
was echoed throughout the Dem ocratic press*
N early a ll corruption had its  genesis in the banking system* 
By drawing labor from  agricu ltu re  and other virtuous occupations 
into the m orally  destructive activity  subsumed under the general 
ruberic* "speculation* " banks underm ined m orality  in the society. 
The banks corrup ted  the youth of A m erica and forced the m ost 
fe rtile  land in the world to go begging among the potentates of 
Europe fo r foodstuffs*
26 Gouge is quoted in the Dutchess County* New York, Anti*Bank 
Democrat* #4, April* 1842, p. 61.
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This general se t of beliefs led to the demand for the "divorce
of bank and state* " The pure sim plicity  of republican government
should no m ore be associated  with the schem es of the bankers than
those of the c le ric s . And the funds of the people should no m ore
support the banks than the churches. Government too easily  could be
made to stand in the way of liberty  when made subservient to certa in
c lasses o r in te res t groups. All such influences m ust be sheared
from  the ir rela tion  to government, and republican sim plicity  resto red .
"All comm unities a re  apt to look to government for too m uch .. .  the
fram ers  of our excellent C onstitution.. .w ise ly  judged that the less
governm ent in te rfe res  with private pursuits the better for general 
27prosperity*"
The Whigs viewed banks as purely economic institutions 
whose m ain function was to supply the cred it necessary  for economic 
development. They functioned as valuable tools when properly  used, 
and the im proper use was no argum ent that they should be discarded.
In general this coincided with the Whig conception of the Good 
Society which m ore readily  accepted the function of business e n te r­
p rise , em phasised the opportunity created  by economic d iversifica­
tion and development, and saw the ideal e itisen  in te rm s of the self-m ade 
man. While symbolic content was not absent, it was le ss  im portant 
in the Whig conception of banks than in the Dem ocratic conception*
27 Richardson, e d . , M essages and P apers of the P residen ts, III, 
p. 344.
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More im portant to the Whigs was the idea that government bore
some responsib ility  to aid en terp rise , and m ost could agree with
W ebster When he said  in the debate on the Independent T reasury ,
“I feel as if I were on some other sphere, as if I were not a t home,
as if this could not be A m erica when I see schem es of public policy
proposed, having for this object the convenience of Government only,
28and leaving the people to shift for them selves. * *. "
Although these in terpretations and conceptions played a 
c rucial role in the struggle over the Independent T reasury , they 
becam e m ore im portant when the Jacksonians succeeded in shifting 
the center of the banking struggle to what Van Buren called "the 
proper tribunal*-the people of the States* " The Democracy of the 
Old Northwest had not opposed state banks; and while they readily  
accepted the Jacksonian in terpretation  of the causes of the economic 
c r is is , they w ere also slow to em brace the central program, of the 
A dm inistration 's "hard  money" policy, the Independent Treasury*
The logic of the Jacksonian in terpretation  of the depression eventually 
drove them to oppose a ll banks as political and economic problem s 
multiplied* In contrast, the Whig argum ent, which im plicitly accepted
28 W ebster is quoted in Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Jacksonian E ra  
(New Iforks H arper and B ro thers, 1959), p. 122.
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governm ental responsib ility  for economic p rogress and blamed
m ism anagem ent for the c r is is , led the party  into a  se ries  of attem pts
29
at refo rm  of the state banking systems*
29 Biehardson, e d ., l&es sages, and F apers of the P residen ts, 111,
p. 342} A rthur S c h f e s l n g e ^  fhc.A ge o f 'l ’ackson.fBoston!
L ittle  Brown and Company, 19S©)#*T5>ri^ Evarts
B. C reene, ed*, ’’L e tte rs  of CSustav K oerner, 1837-1863, H 
tra n sa c tio n s  of the Illinois State H istorical Society For the 
f e a r  1907 (19081, pp. 224-26.
CHAPTER III
THE REVUESION AGAINST BANKS, 1837*1845
During the depression  period from  1837 to 1845, the logic 
of the Dem ocratic in terpretation  of the economic c r is is  worked 
itse lf out. The Democracy of the Old Northwest became dedicated 
to the extinction of banks and a re tu rn  to the "constitutional 
currency" of gold and silver. This transform ation took place in two 
stages. Between 1837 and 1839 anti-bank feelings grew# but the 
party  stood for refo rm  ra th e r than abolition of the state banks.
A fter the second suspension in 1839* the Dem ocrats moved quickly-- 
spu rred  by political rev e rses* -to  a complete "hard money" posi­
tion advocating abolition of all banks* In this they followed the 
lead of the eas te rn  m em bers of their party. The Whigs w ere not 
uncritical defenders of a ll banks, but tr ie d  to refo rm  the state 
banking system s in o rder to provide abundant c red it and a well 
secured  currency. By the mid-1840,s the Dem ocrats conceived of 
economic refo rm  in te rm s of retrenchm ent and deflation} while the 
Whigs hoped that a m oderate Inflation would ra ise  p rices and wages* 
and, thus* quicken economic expansion.
The effects of the panic w ere not im m ediately fe lt in the 
Old Northwest because ag ricu ltu ral prices* while falling* held up 
fa irly  well throughout 1837 and 1838* The c r is is  of 1837* which was 
basica lly  urban and commercial* forced a ll of the banks into su s­
pension; but in each state , bank com m issioners affirm ed the sound­
ness of local banks and a sse rte d  that suspension was a defensive 
measure* In the main* the W est was bothered by a shortage of 
adequate currency* and there  w ere m any individuals who believed 
that the m isfortunes of the E ast would benefit the West* Eucius 
Byon* one of Michigan1 s senato rs, wrote Charles Trowbridge in
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May, 1837, ’I t  is estim ated that 4000 m echanics were discharged 
here  on Saturday las t, and m ost of these, together with several 
thousands previously out of employment will find their way to our 
country. This will do something toward counteracting the effect of
i
the p resen t sca rc ity  of money, so fa r  as we a re  concerned. M
The year 1838 brought with resum ption of specie payments,
an increase in c red it fac ilities, and the trem endous expansion of
expenditures in a ll of these sta tes fo r internal im provem ents p ro jects.
Although land p rices  never recovered, optim ism  did. Lyon continued
to p ra ise  the possib ilities of Michigan, and from  Ogle bounty,
Illinois, T« ft. Smith wrote to a  friend in the East, ’’All hinds of
business a re  good / ,  and a_/ good m eehanik can get any kind
3of p rice  and cash down* ”
This resurgence of the economy continued into 1839* However 
the suspension of specie payments by the Bank of the United States 
of Pennsylvania in October, signaled a downturn into a full Hedged 
depression* By 1840 this was increasingly fe lt in the Old Northwest*
1 Lucius Lyon to C. C. Trowbridge, May 1, 1837, in the Trowbridge 
MSS.
Z Numerous le tte rs  boosting Michigan a re  to be found in ’’L ette rs  
of Lucius Lyon, ” H istorical C ollections.. .  Michigan P ioneer and 
H ia to r le a lS o c ^ (L a n s in g , Michigan: Robert Smith C o., 1897), 
XXVII, pp. 412«604j Jr. H, Smith to David Porta , May 27, 1838, 
in ’’L e tte rs  F rom  Ogle and C arro l Counties, 1838-1857, ” T ran s­
actions of the Illinois State H isto rical Society For the Year 1907 
n f " B i o » pp* 247-261. 
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Ih e  banks of the a re a  had again suspended specie payments; and by
1843 m ost of them had gone into liquidation* Illinois was entirely
without authorized banking facilities; and Michigan was left with
she ra th e r shaky institutions one of which closed voluntarily and
two of which failed in the next th ree  years, la  Ohio, the m ost
econom ically developed of these sta tes, the charte rs  of fifteen banks
expired in 1843 and 1844, leaving the state  with eight banks. Only
the Bank of Indiana came through the period with its reputation
intact* Hhe num erous exposures of fraud and m alpractice  during
these years along with the two suspensions of specie payments built
up a g rea t deal of d issatisfaction  with banks in general.
However well deserved much of this censure was, there is
good reason  to believe that banks and the banking system  were made
the scapegoat fo r the economic d isa s te rs  of the period. Men who
had stood in the forefront of c red it expansion in 1836 and 1837 shifted
their allegiance to the "loco foeos" by 1841. flood banks were
attacked along with the bad, as the experience of the Bank of Indiana
shows * One student has very succinctly w ritten;
Mo m atter what the policy adopted, It was su re  to be 
criticized* An increase  in accommodations was evidence 
of " reck less  banking'1 while, if the bank attem pted to 
reduce its c irculation  and called some loans, it was 
oppressive* " 3b a period of c r is is  failure to suspend 
specie payments m ight m ean ruin, but the suspension 
m eant that the bank was a "fraud, " issuing w orthless 
promises* 3
3 Oolembe, "State Banks and the Economic Development of the West, " 
p. 74.
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The political possibilities of such a flexible issue were 
c lear, and the Dem ocratic party  which was hu rt by the hard tim es 
seized upon it. The rhetoric  of the "Bank War" was easily, alm ost 
logically, extended to all banks. The policies of the Old Hero could 
be defended against Whig charges, and the em barrassing  situation 
of the "party  of the people" being soundly trounced at the polls could 
be explained by "bank influence. " In each of the sta tes of the Old 
Northwest banking becam e a political issue of f ir s t  importance 
during the depression years* Although there were certa in  local 
variations, a  pa ttern  em erged from  this controversy that was rem ark ­
ably s im ila r in each state . At f irs t, the Dem ocrats disavowed any 
intention to "war on cred it" or destroy all banks, and favored "bank 
reform* " However, a fte r the second suspension of specie payments, 
the Democracy becam e increasingly opposed to banks of any kind 
so that by the m id -4840*s this was a tes t of orthodoxy within the 
party.
1
The suspension of specie payments which came in May, 1837, 
encouraged the appearance of a w idespread hostility  to banks within 
the Dem ocratic party. The Chicago Democrat and the Jacksonville 
(Illinois) News redoubled th e ir attacks against a ll banks} and fo rm er 
advocates of the Illinois State Bank such as ex-governor Ewing 
turned against that institution. The Ohio Eife Insurance and T rust
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Company was forced by its charte r to resum e without red re ss  from  
the leg islatu re . In that state a number of ’’loco foco” papet*s de* 
manded that all other banks either forfeit their charters  or resum e. ^ 
However, anti-bank ideas did not yet dominate the party.
The Indiana Dem ocrat defended the soundness of the State Bank and 
argued that xt was compelled to suspend for self-protection ju st as 
the Michigan Dem ocrats defended suspension in their state. Even 
Ohio’s Samuel Medary, who would become one of the m ost v irulent 
opponents of banks, tried  to prevent hysterical reactions against 
banks, and a ssu red  his read ers  that, ’’Our own are  stric tly  solvent, 
and ought not to be a slave for many m isdeeds. H The leading Demo­
cra tic  organ in Illinois, the Illinois State R eg ister, joined with the 
Whigs in supporting the bill to legalize suspension. Sim ilar b ills were 
passed  in Michigan and Indiana with the support of both parties, 
allowing the banks to suspend and requiring conformity to certain
res tric tio n s  which it was hoped would insure resum ption at an early
5date.
Following the suspension the Democratic p ress  began an 
attack on banks that was m ore a resu lt of the ir attem pts to defend
4 Pease, F ro n tie r State, pp. 307-308; W eisenburger, Passing of 
the F ron tier, p. 336.
5 Indiana Democrat, May 31, 1837; W estern H em isphere (Columbus, 
Ohio), May 17, 1837, quoted in W eisenburger, Passing of the 
F ro n tie r , p. 335; Illinois State R egister, August 4, 1837; Jam es, 
Chicago Banks, I, pp. 122-123.
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Jackson’s policies and the logic of the ‘'Bank W ar" than any deeply 
ingrained opposition to banks# The party  p ress  blamed the depression 
on the m ultiplication of banks and generally advocated reform  of the 
state banking systems* Biddle was a favorite ta rge t both in private 
correspondence and in the p ress. The Indiana Dem ocrat attacked 
Biddle and the Whig bankers fo r saddling the country with an i r r e ­
deemable paper currency*
Biddle’s b ills a re  now a t two per cent discount. The 
New York City Banks refuse to fake them* while the 
Jackson currency# the gold and silver# demands a 
prem ium  of ten per cent and there  will always be this 
rela tive  difference between the Whig and Dem ocratic 
currency. 6
Throughout 1837 and 1838 p4a rty  conflict revolved around the 
question of the Independent T reasu ry  system* The Indiana Democrat, 
3DtTiao.ois State R eg iste r, the Ohio Statesman# and the Detroit 
Dem ocratic F ree  P re ss  a ll backed Van Huron’s plan while their 
Whig counterparts# the Indiana Journal# the Sangamo Journal# the 
Ohio State Journal# and the D etroit Daily A dvertiser opposed the 
Independent Treasury* State platform s and resolutions of county 
com m ittees reflected  th is conflict and usually ignored state banking 
problems* In some a re a s  Dem ocratic county com m ittees advocated 
a "hard" currency* The vigorously anti-bank C harleston -Indianan 
declared# "That sta te  which f i r s t  casts off her banks will be In the
■ "»« '"■ ....... . ' " ■» ■ * *» ■',»!<■)' * > <■. »■ i f ' * - -' ■* .......*  ........................................................
6 Indiana Democrat, June 7, 1837.
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best financial condition--she will draw her supply of specie from  the
adjoining states* ” Still m ost county m eetings and the leading
Dem ocratic papers denied that their party  wished to destroy the
banking system  as the Whigs charged. The nDemocrats of Old
F ranklin  /pH io /” asserted* ft0 u r  object is not to destroy* but to
p reserve* -to  co rrec t the e rro rs  of Banking* and p reserv e  the
rights of the people* is the desire  of a ll true  Dem ocrats. ft Banks and
paper money w ere seen as dangers to Itcontest 1 e e t Jrui s * ari^ d ©^v^eri
freedom  of the p ress  was threatened by 'C orporate  power. " The
charge that the defeat of the Dem ocrats in Mew York resu lted  from
the in terference of the money power was repeated in each state. To
insure "the m & RM M A& t OF TB'B PFOPBE, « the Dayton (Ohio)
H erald asserted* "TO'TAD AMD THOROD0H bank reform *. * " was 
7necessary .
The Dem ocratic concept of bank reform  a t this time seem ed 
to involve th ree  p rincip les: an im m ediate re tu rn  to specie payments; 
individual liability  of stockholders; and the prohibition of sm all notes* 
The Dem ocrats of Muskingum County* Ohio* explained that they
7 Dem ocratic F ree  Press* July 9 and IE, 1837; Newark Advocate 
tbe Ohio Statesm an* October 24, 1837; Ohio Statesm an,
October 27* and November 20* 1837; Charles ton Indianan in the 
Ohio Statesm an* November 1, 1837; Illinois State R eg ister,
■ August 4*’11837; Ohio; Statesm an, December 2 and 12, 1837, and 
M arch 13, 183.8; Democ ratio  F ree  B rees* November 24, 1838; 
Dayton H erald in the Ohio Statesm an* December 4, 1837.
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desired  a m ixed currency with large bills ’’for M erchants and T raders, 
and Gold and Silver for the government and the people. " The Indiana 
Dem ocrat was m ore specific about reform . Throughout November,
1837, the paper suggested a number of ways to reform  the banking 
struc tu re  of the sta te . A  specie  re se rv e  of 33 1/3% should be 
established against issues* deposits, and liab ilities. No notes under 
$10 should fee issued after 1840, and none under $20 after 1842* Further, 
such notes should not be received or paid out. Resident stockholders 
should be made individually liable and non-residents asked to give 
security . The sta te  itself should be responsible to the amount of 
its stock. Suspension of specie payments was to lead to forfeitu re  
of the ch arte r. Surplus profits over 1/16 of the Bank's capital were 
to be divided once every th ree  years. If the p residen t or the 
d irec to rs  owed the Bank or w ere liable as endorsers, they were to 
be removed* A schedule of the debtors of the Bank was to be published. 
Sometimes the paper suggested that the leg islature  m aintain the right 
to repeal or ammend the charter* ®
The Whigs* in general* tended to be fa r  less  c ritic a l of the 
sta te  banking system s and to justify suspension* They steered  a
® OhiqStatesmaa* November 26, 1837} Indiana Democrat, November I, 
15, and 22* 1837? "D em ocratic A ddress" in Michigan saw the free  
banking law in these te rm s, Dem ocratic F ree  P re ss , August 9*
1837$ and by September 18, 1838, the Democratic F ree  P re ss , 
accepted this concept of reform , favorably reprinting an a rtic le  
from  die Indiana Democrat*
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m oderate course. In Indiana a number of repo rts  from  the Whig
controlled State Bank assu red  the leg islature  of the soundness of
the institution* but recommended that no new branches be created
until sound business conditions returned* Samuel Merrill* the
presiden t of the State Bank, took note of the demand for increased
currency* but warned that m atte rs  be allowed to regulate them selves
and that an overabundance of currency  would only m ake things worse.
He was not opposed to an increase  in capital and the num ber of
branches once the c r is is  had passed! and, in fact, he recommended 
9such a  move.
Governor Joseph Vance of Ohio reflected  a number of Whig 
attitudes in his m essage in December, 1837* Besides setting forth 
the Whig in terp reta tion  of the c r is is , he looked upon economic 
society and money in ways that tended to be m ore common among 
Whigs than Democrats* He had a  co rpo ra tis t view of society which 
saw various economic in te res ts  as interdependent ra ther than antago­
nistic*
Agricultural* com m ercial, m anufacturing and 
m echanical labor, a re  linked together by a strong 
common in te rest, and he who shall undertake to 
sever either branch of business from  the others* 
s tr ik es  a blow at the p rosperity  of the whole*
9 Sangamo jou rnal, August 19* 1837; Governor Duncan!s Message 
of Ju ly  ll, 1837# in Illinois* G overnor, 1834*1838? Detroit Daily 
A dvertiser, May 197*18377 Woodbridge fam ily to W illiam 3L. 
Woodbridge, May 22, 1837, in the Woodbridge MSS? Indiana 
Legislature* D octm entary Journal, 1837, Documents #3, #8, 
and #29*
As far as money was concerned, he believed that the quantity had a 
d irec t effect on price  level*
Every m an conversant with the laws of trade* and 
the effects of currency  m ust adm it that all a rtic le s  
of m erchandise, and all descriptions of property, 
m ust fall in proportion to the reduction of c ircu la ­
tion*
An exclusive m etallic  currency would thus contract the money 
supply, lower p rices , the value of land, and wages* He could not 
see how anyone other than office holders could be helped by the sub­
stitution of "hard  m oney'1 fo r credit* With c red it the disadvantaged 
youth of high m oral principles could compete with the m ore fortunate 
m em bers of society. "That the destruction of c red it will make the 
rich  rich e r and the poor p o o re r ," was to Vance, n. . .  too plain a 
proposition to be called into question*" It was not ju st individuals 
who w ere aided by credit* C redit was the dynamic elem ent in economic 
growth* The state  of Ohio had been built on cred it which served as a 
spur to enterprise* Vet* neither Vance nor the many other Whigs 
who agreed  with this point of view could be described  as unbridled 
inflationists or advocates of fia t money* Vance thought that the 
suspension of specie payments was "one of the g rea tes t calam ities 
that can come upon an industrious and en terprising  people*" Hor 
was he a thorough-golag advocate of taissez»faire« He argued, in 
con trast to the dem ocrats* " it is not the amount of circulation that 
produces these evils, but the want of power to control, and judgement
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in the application of our m eansv by those who have the management 
of our financial system . ” What was needed was a well regulated 
financial system  capable of contraction and expansion to comply with
The problem  was seen by Vance as a national one, and he
urged a  national solution, but the P residen t and Congress prom ised
no relief. "Our only reliance then m ust be on the state  institutions. rt
He suggested that the prohibition of sm all notes be rem oved on the
condition the banks resum e specie payments and !,a relinquishm ent
of any right they may possess /a s  som e Ohio banks did/ to issue
11notes tinder the denominations of one dollar* "
The Dem ocratic p ress  - viganoualy. opposed Vance. The Ohio 
.Statesman thought his proposal would flood the state "with nothing 
but trash* M The Norwalk Experim ent attacked his idea of an elastic 
cu rrency  as "an absurdity . ” When the question came before the 
legislature* the Whig m ajority , which included a num ber of bank 
d irec to rs and stockholders* c a rried  through Vance*s plan by a s tr ic t
12party  vote with every Dem ocrat in the House and Senate in opposition*
10 Documents... .  of- the State of. Ohio* 1837*38# Document #1, the
: quotations a re  from  pp. 24, 10* U, 14* and 12.
It Ibid* *- p. 14. :■
12 Ohio Statesman,* December 5, 1837* Norwalk Experim ent in the
Ohio" Ita tesm an ,' December 19# 1837s Huntington* "A History of 
Banking and Currency in Ohio*11 pp. 289-290* W eisenburger,
F ass  mg of the F ron tie r, pp. 343-346.
com m ercial and ag ricu ltu ral needs. ^
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It is in co rrec t to ass tame that all of the opposition to bank 
suspension came from  among the Dem ocrats. The Whig Indiana 
State Journal, which usually defended the State Bank, noted that 
opposition to the Bank was not confined to the "Van Buren Party . n 
Such leading Whigs as Oeorge P roffit and Samuel Judah w ere oppo­
nents of the Bank. Judah, an outspoken advocate of internal improve - 
rnents, was a  constant c ritic  of the State Bankfs policies and la te r a 
leader of the free  banking movement in Indiana, In January, 1838, 
he reported  to the Jud iciary  Committee that the State Bank had 
forfeited  its c h a rte r  by suspending. The m ain object of the estab ­
lishm ent of the Bank had been to insure a sound currency redeem able 
in specie. He was not theoretically  opposed to banks, but ra ther 
a  staunch defender of a  redeem able currency. Judah was also the 
leading m em ber of the Investigating Committee that reported  la te r  
that month. The rep o rt is critical* but not a true  anti-bank document; 
and it shows a su rp rising  aw areness of the problem s created  by 
the dual ro le  of the State Bank as a public institution and a private 
corporation designed to yield profits* The m ain argum ents of the 
rep o rt w ere d irected  toward supplying the leg isla tu re  and the 
public d irec to rs  with g rea te r control over the Bank* Judah believed 
that as a  public Bank it should be used to aid the public welfare and 
encourage the industry of the people* The rep o rt p ra ised  the "cred it
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13system ” in general* but warned against wild speculation*
Nor had the Dem ocratic party  been purged of bank advocates 
by 1838. In Michigan* as one m ight suspect* the Dem ocrats, who 
w ere successful in the 1837 elections, tried  to establish  a State Bank.
Michigan Dem ocrats had allowed suspension in the special 
session  of 1837 to save the state*s banks. As the year continued, 
Michigan currency  degenerated; and it was only taken in Buffalo 
and Cleveland a t a  substantial discount. B efore the free  banking 
system  had hardly been tried  and before its fraudulent operations 
had been uncovered, suggestions that Michigan establish  a State Bank 
w ere coming from  the Dem ocratic p ress . In January, 1838 Mason 
p ra ised  the free  banking b ill for removing "the odious features of 
monopoly. ” Yet in the sam e address he recom m ended a State Bank 
to help pay for in ternal im provem ents. It would also help sustain 
public credit* have a "sa lu ta ry  influence upon our currency* ” and 
aid the com m ercial community. Mason believed that such a bank 
should be a m ixed en te rp rise  with the sta te  holding control. It 
should be lim ited  in its circulation and issue no bills under ten 
do llars. As added security* the private stockholders should be made 
to place secu ritie s  with the sta te  equal to their holdings. P referab ly
13 Indiana1 Journal* - January  20, 1838} Indiana le g is la tu re . Docu-
m en ta ry 'jo u rn a l* 1837, Documents #30 and #32. The Judah reports 
a re  exam ples of opposition to bank monopoly s im ila r to that I 
associated  with Seward in New York and quite in line with my 
generalization concerning the Whigs and the "banking school. "
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these should be six  per cent bonds of Michigan. ^
Although a g rea t deal of the session dealt with the free  
banking system , a b ill to estab lish  a State Bank passed the Senate 
and died in the House where it failed to receive the necessary  two** 
th irds vote* The D em ocratic F ree  P re ss  favored the establishm ent 
of a  State Bank and charged the defeat to the Whig insistence that a 
m ajo rity  of the d irec to rs be chosen by the private stockholders.
This, thought the paper* was a perfec t example of Whig d is tru st of
15
the people*
Whigs* if they opposed the State Bank, generally feared
that if control w ere in the hands of the governor, the Bank would be
used for political purposes* Trowbridge who was consulted by mem*
b a rs  of both parties believed it was best to leave control with those
whose financial in te res ts  w ere involved, and suggested that all
other bank c h a rte rs  be extinguished including that of his bank, the
Bank of Michigan* Isolated Whigs even opposed the Bank on the
ground© that no m ore bank capital was needed* The Daily A dvertiser
lbwas silen t on the issue*
14 ICalamaaioo Gazette in the Dem ocratic F ree  F rees , November 29, 
1837; F u ller, e d ., M essages PP« 227-232*
15 Dem ocratic F r e e , P re ss , F ebruary  7, 1838.
16 0* G. Trowbridge to Woodbridge M arch 5, 1838, in the Woodbridge 
MSS; C. C. Trowbridge to C harles Moran, M arch 27, 1838, in 
the C. C. Trowbridge MSS* £ . P. Hastings to Woodbridge, 
Feb ruary  3, 1838, in the Woodbridge MSS opposed any new banks. 
The Daily A dvertiser, M arch 19, 1838, believed there  w ere too 
many banks*
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One student has a sse rted  that it was a  c lear fight with
both parties holding firm , the Whigs favoring private control and the
D em ocrats favoring state control. The vote in the House hardly
suggests this, JSqual num bers of Whigs could be found on either side
of the issue. The failure of the b ill resp ited  from  the fact that eight
of the twenty-two Dem ocrats, including the defender of free  banking
Mr. Gantt and the Speaker Mr. Bingham, voted against the bill.
The tw o-thirds clause in the Michigan constitution ra th e r than
17opposition from  either party  killed the bill.
Throughout the sum m er of 1838 the Democratic papers kept 
up demands for a State Bank in which the State m aintained control.
They a sse r te d  that it was a question of the Democrats favoring ”A 
People’s Bank” the ’’fed e ra lis ts” opposing it because of the ir d is tru st 
of the people. They w ere the corporation party  and f,true T o r ie s ,” 
During th is period, the Dem ocratic Free. P re s s , attacked the Bank 
of Michigan, and a t the sam e tim e defended the Michigan State Bank 
from  the ’’loco foco m alignity” of the Whig Daily A dvertiser, At 
one point the Dem ocratic F ree  P re ss  argued that C, C* Trowbridge* 
Thurlow Weed and the ’’bank whigs” defeated the State Bank bill, 
because such an institution would endanger their ”enormous profits, ”
By the late  fall, although it s till was attacking the Whigs as ”loco focos, ”
17 Gante, ”A H istory of Banking Legislation, ” pp. 3 5-36; Michigan 
L egislature . House jou rnal, 1838*. p. 453.; Michigan L egislature. 
Senate Journal, 1838, p. 311,
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fche Dem ocratic F ree  P re ss  became m ore vehement in its  attacks
on bank influence and m ore rigid in its defense of Jackson and
’Constitutional currency.
The Whig p ress 'm a in ly  concerned itself with attacking'the
Independent T reasu ry  system  and the Michigan State Bank. When the
Daily A dvertiser dealt with the question of a new State Bank* it
w arned that control in the hands of the state would make the Bank
a ’’political engine. ” Would it be a bank controlled by ’’the people”
o r one controlled by the ’’executive and his tools” ? The Whigs, the
Daily A dvertiser argued, wanted a State Bank not a political 
19m achine.
Again Mason opened the session  calling for reform  of the
banking system  through the establishm ent of a State Bank; and a
bill was favorably reported  out of the House Committee on Banks.
Although the only opposition came from  Dem ocrats, the Com m ittee's
rep o rt and the overwhelming vote indicate that anti-bank ideas did
20not yet dominate the Dem ocratic party.
18 Gants, ”A H istory of Banking legislation* ” p* 36; jgalamaaoo 
Gazette in the Dem ocratic F ree  P re ss  May Zf 1838; Democratic 
F ree  P re s s  A pril 18, A pril 25, May 9, May 16, September 5, 
Septem ber 12* October 17 and December 19, 1838.
19 Dally.. Adyertia e r , August to September issues attack the Sub 
T reasu ry  plan, August 18, October 24, December 27, 1838, and 
January  3, 1839, deal with the State Bank plans.
20 F u ller, e d ., Messages..,, 1, pp. 251*260, the quotation is from
p. 259. Michigan le g is la tu re . House Documents Accompanying 
the Journal, 1839, Document #29, the quotation is from  p. 578; 
Dem ocratic F ree  P re s s , M arch 27, 1839, reported  the debate.
While Michigan was attem pting to solve its problem s by 
setting up a State Bank* the idea of free  banking spread  throughout 
the 014 Northwest. C ertainly the attitudes necessary  for an attem pt 
at f re e  banking w ere well d istributed  during this period and had 
invaded both parties.
Following the establishm ent of the Michigan system* the 
Chic Statesm an noted derogatorily  that bank pro jects w ere taking 
on the new form  of Hre a l estate  banks. « Although the Statesm an 
was not Im pressed  fey the land bank idea, it and the Cleveland 
A dvertiser followed the defeats In Hew York during 183®. Hew York 
ed ito ria ls w ere reprinted! and M edary p ra ised  the ,5locQ*focos* »
He advocated “free  scope fo r every th ing .H "The issue* H wrote 
the editor of the sta tesm an, 11 Between Bank monopoly despotism , and 
flr^Ctm bA and equal rights- had to fee m ade sooner o r la te r  and we 
a re  rejo iced  that the la s t stroke has been struck  and the standard 
of freedom  has been r a is e d . . . » *'* T h e  Cleveland A dvertiser pro* 
claim ed the Mew York law as  a  trium ph of Hioco*foeo” principles 
and chided the Whigs who backed the law for having none of th e ir own. 
S im ilar charges w ars m ade fey Michigan Dem ocrats who w ere busy
2i
defending the ir own law.
ZX Ofcjp .Statesman* -November %% , December 13* and §2, 1837?
Cleveland A dvertiser In the #hio. Statesman* May 9* 1838;
.Detroit Dem ocratic F roe Press* April 18, 183S.
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Yet, many Whigs were in favor of free banking. Ohio’s
Governor Vance noted in his 3.837 m essage that, "The g rea t amount
of local legislation, and bestowment of corporate priv ileges, is
believed to be a growing evil in the State. " The following year he
discussed free  banking as a  possible way to reform  the s ta te ’s
banking system . He rem inded the leg isla to rs that it had failed in
Michigan, but was large ly  successful in Hew York. He left the
question to the leg isla tu re  and recommended ’labo rous and careful
investigation. n In the 1839 session  an unsuccessful free  banking
bill was introduced by a Whig* John Green of Pickaway County.
The Ohio Statesm an did not hesitate  to attack the b ill and rep rin t
an a rtic le  from  the Cleveland Gazette opposing the free  banking m ania. "
We have felt the disasfcerous effects of the bursting 
of one General Banking experim ent in a s is te r  
State, and we p re fe r that the experim ent Hew York 
is working, should be further tested* before Ohio 
em barks on a sim ila r one.
Governor Wilson Shannon’s second m essage in 1839* echoed doubt
concerning free  banking* ?,It will not do to tru s t  en tirely  to the
com m ercial law of supply and demand to regulate the amount of
22paper circulation* ”
— v —i r — ■. j  ..... -  - ' u . • - - r ; \ ' ;  - i -  - '--i : t  Hf -rf iT-r-^ - n  r .....  -  t: ■ ii- r - v  - r  t - - i-  - • r  -• .................   r -
22 |>ocirments*. * of the State of Ohio, 1837-1838, Document #1, p. 24; 
Tkmuments. . . of the State of Ohio, 1838-1839, Document #1; 
Cleveland Cassette in the Ohio Statesm an, F ebruary  6, 1839* 
D ocum ents.. . of the State of Ohio, 1839*1840, Document #1, 
the quotation is from  p. 12.
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Understandably the Michigan experience made m em bers of 
both parties  w ary of the security  of free  banking system s. Democrats 
w ere usually a ttrac ted  to the idea of freedom  in the banking business. 
The Whigs w ere a ttrac ted  to this, and the idea that a currency  based 
on stocks or m ortgages would provide both security  to the note 
holder and a way to bring dorm ant capital funds into active use. 
Illinois* Governor Duncan had severa l tim es proposed a  plan by 
which notes would be issued against m ortgages on Illinois land and 
be used ’’with d iscretion” as currency. His plan which was very 
m uch like that suggested by the Lyon Committee in the Michigan 
Constitutional Convention of 1835 had the sam e ends. Like the Lyon
23
plan it did not provide for freedom  in the banking business.
By m id-1838 the Indiana Dem ocrat had begun to agitate for
free  banking in that sta te , In Svme it printed “M r. Young's Report
on C urrency and F ree  Banking* “ and p raised  it highly. Commenting
on the Young Report* the editor asse rted :
We a re  willing to be distinguished as u ltra* when 
we can find authority for our course in the m essages 
of Andrew Jackson and M artin  Van Buren* and in 
the official repo rts  of Samuel Young* 24
The  Indiana constitution prohibited the establishm ent of any 
but a State Bank* and this caused a constitutional problem  concerning
23 Duncan’s speech is in Illinois L egislature. House journal, 
1838-1839, pp. 18-17.
24 Indiana Democrat* Jfune 13, 1838.
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free  banking, th e  Indiana Democrat took the position that the con­
stitution did not prohibit private banking, but "private banking, if 
c a rried  on indiscrim inately  by a ll men, would soon entail upon the 
community, unless controlled and regulated by the legislature, 
evils g rea te r than can be imagined. " th e r e  was no doubt, according 
to the paper, that the leg isla tu re  could not regulate private banking.
However, the Indiana Dem ocrat did not come out positively fo r such
2 5a refo rm  leaving the decision to the legislature*
The Whig Indiana State Journal took issue with the argum ent 
that a general banking law was constitutional* but it was not an out­
spoken opponent of such legislation. In his annual m essage Governor 
W allace asked for an addition of capital to the State Bank, but 
could hardly be described  as a violent bank advocate. He warned 
this should not be done reck lessly , nor should the leg isla to rs 
believe that banks can relieve the people of taxation. "Experience 
teaches us the fearful lesson  that there  a re  lim its beyond which 
if banking priv ileges and banking operations a re  ca rried , they cease 
to do good, and becom e engines of incalculable m ischief*tT He also 
w arned against the establishm ent of "swindling shops* " On the 
question of bank investigations he argued that the bank as a public 
institution m ust be open to the represen ta tives of the people, but he
25 Ib id ., Hovember 21 and December t ,  1838.
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also asked for a lim itation on the governor's ability to call an 
investigation*
Is he anxious to secure an election? What be tter 
expedient can he re s o r t  to than to make war upon 
the bank? Is it n ecessa ry  to shield his conduct 
o r the complexion of his principles from  too severe 
a scrutiny, how m ore successfully  can he accom plish 
this than to join in a crusade against the bank? The bank I 
Why hostility  to the bank or banks has become in 
these la tte r  days a kind of universal panacea--a  cure 
for every d isease of political p rincip le--the  v ilest 
leprosy  of F edera lism  may even be made whole by it*
The rep o rt of the State Bank noted that business conditions 
w ere improving and specie payments had been resumed* The bank­
ing capital of the sta te  was sm all and perhaps at this tim e the amount 
of sta te  owned capital m ight be increased* While this was the 
eventual resu lt, SamueT Judah led an attem pt to pass a free  banking 
law in Indiana in 1839*
Judah had been an ea rly  follower of "the Old Hero, " but as 
the Whig party  developed in Indiana, he became one of its leaders*
He was best known as a  supporter of internal im provem ents in his
state. He was also a defender and adm irer of Biddle* His position
27on state  banking was one typical of m ore p rogressive Whigs*
Indiana Journal, November 10, 1838$ Indiana L eg islatu re* Docu-
26 menfcary Journal, 1838, Document #!, the quotations a re  from  
pp. 10, 12-13.
27 Paul 3U Haworth, "Samuel Judah, " in Dumas Malone, e d ., The 
Dictionary of A m erican Biography (Charles Scribners Sons, 1946), 
X, pp* 227-228? for Judah on Biddle, Indiana Journal, February  
15, 1839.
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Judah som etim es sounded like an advocate of la issea  faire. 
in his rep o rt to the leg islatu re  he wrote:
Banking# in all its rela tions, whether dealing with the 
precious m eta ls  and in exchange, or em bracing the 
production and distribution of a paper circulation, is 
a  m ere  trade? a branch of com m erce; and as such, is 
Open to all men, to a free  competition, in all civilized 
countries unless res tra in ed  by law.
But he did wish legislation to "regulate the exercise  of private
banking" such as the free  banking law of New Tork. "The New Tork
regulations for private banking, a re  the best yet devised, " he
argued, because the m ain principle of the law was that notes be
based on ample security*
If ample secu rity  be given to the public for the 
notes it is not easy to discover any well founded 
objection to free-banking; none certain ly  that can 
be sustained on just p rincip les; none consistent 
with any approved system  of Political Economy, 
can be shown; none but such as would sustain all 
the long abandoned fallacies of tim es past; the 
regulation of p rices and wages, the duration of 
apprenticeships, the prohibition of the exportation 
of specie, sum ptuary laws and all those varied  
regulations, by which Governments fo rm erly  
attem pted to re s tra in  the freedorajof com m erce, 
and to lim it the wants of society /m y ita lic s /.
- ' JM' -  J - ' - i n  n i l  ...I I .11 I [ T r i l l  — r — r — n — r r  * mm * mm
The laws of supply and demand would regulate banking, but they 
m ight not p ro tec t the public. This protection had to be supplied by 
security  of sta te  o r national stocks. As an additional bonus this 
would create  a  demand for Indiana stocks, and hopefully it would
"induce m en of wealth and experience to em bark in the business of
9?
Banking in this state* . .  *
His argum ent was m ore thoroughly developed in the debate 
on his bill, and its essen tia l sp ir it was m ore c learly  revealed. He 
denied that his b ill was unconstitutional and a sse rte d  that "we ask 
only a *^gtdation of the p resen t undoubted rights of individuals. " 
However, he introduced a new argum ent. C ertain  a reas of the 
state which desired  banks w ere unable to obtain them  under the p re ­
sent system . He warned that* nWe have no right to expect men to 
act in opposition to the dictates of their own interest* and especially 
this should not be expected from  bank d irec to rs . H An addition of 
new branches increased  the risk  to all other branches because they 
w ere m utually responsible* It was Judah* s belief that the d irec to rs
should hardly be expected to assum e such risk s  without some 
29hesitation*
Judah hoped that a free  banking law would provide for ’'The 
extension of bank fac ilities to various pa rts  of the state  now desti­
tute in our p resen t system* would encourage commerce* stim ulate 
agriculture* and bring forth  and susta in  m anufacturers. u Here was
28 Indiana Legislature* Documentary Journal, 1838, .Document #13, 
the quotations a re  from  pp. 188* 191* and 192.
29 The debates a re  in the Indiana Journal* F ebruary  15, 1839. 
Exam ples of Whig argum ents against the Independent T reasu ry  
using a s im ila r argum ent a re  those of Lincoln in B asler, e d ., 
Collected; Works of, Abraham Lincoln* I* pp. 157-179* and of 
Jacob M* Howard in Michigan L egislature. House Documents 
Accompanying the jou rnal, 1838, Document #62.
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nearly  a repetition of Governor Seward’s stand concerning the New
York law. Judah had no fear of banks* in fact, p a rt of his argum ent
was that free  banking would not^hurt the State Bank* He looked upon
cred it and banking as positive elem ents of the economy which should
30be regulated for the ultim ate good of the society*
In the debate on the b ill Judah received strong support from
Robert Bale Owen* the Dem ocratic represen tative  from  Posey
County. Owen argued that Judah’s free  banking law was republican
in its  ch arac te r because it opposed monopoly.
It is  founded upon the principle from  which so 
m uch that is good and useful sp rings--the  principle 
of free  competition. It grants to a ll certain  general 
r ig h ts -- to  none exclusive priv ileges. .And it r e ­
gards, as every banking system  ought* the security  
of the people f i r s t  and the profit of the stockholders 
afterwards* 31
The opponents of the b ill em phasised the constitutional 
question, but they hardly  took a position that could be term ed ’’p ro - 
business. ” B asil Champer, a Whig from  Owen County, believed 
such a b ill c learly  unconstitutional} yet* he acknowledged the neces­
sity  fo r banking facilities* and urged his colleagues to f ir s t  wait 
and see what would be the re su lt of the increase of the capital of 
the State Bank* He was joined by Robert Cooper* a Whig from  Henry 
County, who believed that Owen was wrong in asse rting  the bill to
30 Indiana Journal, F ebruary  15, 1839*
31 Ibid*
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be "a dem ocratic m easure" and that it was rea lly  "a private 
m easure; a m easure  for private speculation. . *. " He feared  the 
depreciation and the destruction  of the State Bank should free  bank­
ing he instituted. George Cutter* the representative  from  Wig© 
County who was affiliated with neither party, warned that the good of 
the sta te  should not be subverted to sectional feeling o r local
interest* "P ass this bill and you put a dagger in the hands of private
32p a rtn e rs  to stab the d eares t in te res ts  of the sta te*11
The m any references to private desires  and local in te rests , 
including Judah 's d iscla im er of any such in te rests , indicates that 
these w ere fac to rs influencing the voting on the bill* What is in 
question here  is party  position* The Dem ocratic paper in the state 
supported the Judah b ill on the grounds that the b ill provided m ore 
safety than the State Bank fo r the note holder* The paper commented 
on the security  of the Hew Work system  and even m ildly defended 
the Michigan system* The leading Whig paper had very  little  to 
say about the bill* It b riefly  a sse rte d  in November that such a law 
would be unconstitutional* While the b ill was before the legislature* 
i t  prin ted the .debates* but refrained  from  either an attack on the 
bill o r defense of the State Bank* The Whig party  "A ddress to the 
People of Indiana" in F eb ruary  acknowledged that perhaps the 
State Bank currency  was not the b est possible, but since the system
32 Ibid*
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had been adopted, it was now in the best in te res t of the people to
insure proper m anagem ent of the system . In other w o rd s ,  the
party  p ress  does not seem  to have fought on the issue with one side
b ittd rly  opposing and the other defending the bill. This ambivalence
of position is revealed  in the vote which tabled the bill. The State
Bank was associated  with the Whig adm inistration and seem s to have
been run by Whigs. This would in itse lf go a long way in explaining
why the m ajo rity  of Whigs voted against free  banking and the m ajority
of Dem ocrats voted for it. Yet, forty-four per cent of the Dem ocrats,
a sizeable m inority , opposed free  banking, and Judah, the Whig
sponsor of the b ill was able to get th irty  per cent of his fellow party
33m em bers to back free  banking.
In Ohio and Illinois Dem ocratic bank reform  candidates 
succeeded in the 1838 elections. Yet, the p icture was not so c lear 
as it m ight have been. Illinois Governor Duncan had been a supporter 
of Jackson, but he steadily  moved toward the Whig fold* He was 
elected in 1834, before the r is e  of parties in Illinois, and represen ted  
the Republican d istaste  for the sp ir it of party  that was coming to 
dominate sta te  politics in the late th irties . In 1838 the newly developed 
convention system  brought the feuding Dem ocrats together on a 
ra th e r undistinguished com prom ise candidate, Thomas C arlin  who
33 Indiana Dem ocrat, F eb ruary  28, 1839? Indiana Journal, F ebruary  
15 and 9 ,‘ M39? ‘indiatta L egislature. House Journal, 1838, 
pp. 501-502.
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soundly defeated Cyrus Edwards* the candidate of the "People's 
Party . " The campaign centered on the internal improvements 
policy and the question of currency. On the la tte r question the argu­
m ent revolved around the Independent T reasury  plan with little  
attention paid to the State Bank. The Dem ocrats b itte rly  attacked 
the idea of a national bank and called for the "divorce of Bank and 
State. " F or their p a rt the Whigs called for a sound and uniform 
currency "so that a  dollar in Illinois will be equal to a dollar in 
New York or new-any-p lace-e lse . " It was the governm ents's duty 
to "foster en te rp rise"  and ra ise  p rices. The V&ndalia F ree  P re ss  
and Blinpis Intelligencer, a Whig journal, declared:
The Whigs would have the farm er obtain $10 a b a rre l 
for his F lour, and that in money, which would be 
received by the governm ent for lands and other 
dues--$20 a 'head' for his cows and for asses  heads 
ju st what they a re  worth.
Aside from  lowering p rices, it was believed that the Independent 
T reasu ry  would enhance executive patronage and increase  govern­
m ental corruption. Finally, it  would "create  two species of currency,
gold and silv er for the pam pered office holders and rags for the
34people, the lab o re rs , and producers of the country*
Conditions had m easurably  im proved in 1838 and specie 
resum ption had been c a rr ied  out voluntarily by the Illinois State Bank
34 Pease, F ro n tie r State, pp. 136-149, 236-250; Charles Manfred 
Thompson, "The Illinois Whigs, " pp. 59-60; the Vandalia F ree  
P re s s  and Illinois Intelligencer, July 27, 1838, quoted in 
Thompson, p. 60, ftn. 41; Sangamo Journal, October 11, 1839.
102
in August. This tended to quiet Democratic attacks. When the
question of state  banking arose , the Whigs generally repudiated the
system  and denied responsibility  for the passage of the law creating 
35the State Bank.
C arlin 's  Inaugural Address echoed Dem ocratic party  ortho­
doxy on the causes of the panic and the necessity  of the Independent 
T reasu ry  to "dissolve the connexion between the Government and 
B anks--a  connexion as unnatural and dangerous as the union of 
church and s ta te . . . . "  The State Bank was not d irectly  attacked 
by Carlin, but he gave indications of things to come asserting  that 
the whole banking system  was "radically  defective* " He chastized 
the laws legalizing suspension as violations of m oral obligations 
and as a corrupting influence on the people. Suspension would never 
be n ecessa ry  in a well regulated system . He warned against the 
growing political influence of banks and called for repeated examin­
ations* Finally, he exhibited the fea r that any institutions which 
could control the currency  whether controlled by the sta te  or private 
individuals w ere dangerous to freedom  and liberty* Carlin had
not made any specific Suggestions* and nothing was done to a lte r
36the Illinois banking system  at that session  of the legislature*
35 Jam es, Chicago. Banks, I, pp. 126-127; Thompson, "The 
Illinois Whigs, " p* 66,
36 Hlinois. Governor, 1838-1842,
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In Ohio the currency  question also had a place in the
election of 1838. As in Illinois and the other states of the Old
Northwest a g rea t deal of argum ent concerned the independent
T reasu ry  question with the Dem ocrats upholding the plan and the
Whigs attacking it. On state hanks the Dem ocrats argued that
banking refo rm  was the true  issue. 11 An Address to the People of
Ohio” proclaim ed:
The Dem ocratic party  one in favor of Bank Reform **- 
in favor of compelling banks to resum e specie 
payment8*»*ia favor of making the holders of Bank 
stock individually liable for their corporate debts - -  
a re  in favor of imposing heavy penalties on Banks 
and their agents, whenever guilty of usurious 
p rac tices; and in favor of annuling the ch arte rs  of 
Banks when they have been violated.
Governor Vance was attacked as an advocate of the "Bank monopo­
lis ts "  and his opponent Wilson Shannon was p raised  as a leader 
of the bank refo rm  forces. Shannon made his position c lear July 7 
a t a  speech a t Ravenna in which he called for stockholder liability,
la rg e r  specie re se rv es , prohibition of sm all notes, and prohibition
37of loans to stockholders and d irec to rs .
The Whigs generally  attacked Shannon for making too much 
of the bank question. However, they could hardly be term ed  un­
c ritic a l defenders of state  banks. In his final m essage to the
37 W eisenburger, Passing  of the F ro n tie r, pp. 347*351, Ohio 
Statesm an, July 3* July 31, and July 20, 1838. The official 
organ of the Dem ocratic party  the Globe p raised  Shannon’s 
speech, Ohio Statesm an, August 14, 1838; and the Indiana 
Dem ocrat, December 28, 1838, showed agreem ent with his 
ideas as expressed  in his inaugural.
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leg isla tu re  Vance argued in favor of a national bank to control
currency* The idea of allowing twenty-six states to each regulate
the currency  was "totally im practicable and delusive. " Banks, he
believed, originally fulfilled a public function enabling sm all
investors to share in their profits through the purchase of stock
and allowing "the en terprising  c lass, who have not been favored by
an inheritance of wealth" to "wield capital not often possessed  even
by our w ealthiest individuals* " But this system  m ust be controlled
for public advantage not private  profit and " subject to the control
of the people through the ir representatives* " Something m ust be
done about the sta te  banks "or a few great bankers, doing business
en tire ly  on their own account, irresponsib le  to the people, and yet
a t c ritic a l m om ents, able, very  seriously, to cripple their
38re s o u rc e s .. .V Will dominate.
Following the election, Shannon embodied the Democratic 
idea of bank re fo rm  in his m essage to the leg islatu re , and suggested 
that provisions be in serted  in bank ch arte rs  allowing the leg islature  
to ammend, a lte r , or repeal them in the public in te rest. This had 
been opposed by many Whigs, but o thers such as Vance believed 
that such "u ltra ism " in favor of "vested righ ts’1 only hu rt the party. 
In ea rly  1839 the leg isla tu re  c a rr ie d  part of Shannon’s plan into 
effect lim iting the issue of sm all noted and following the example
38 W eisenburger, Fag sing of the F ron tier, p. 348; Documents*. * of
the State of Ohio, 1838-1839, Document #1, the quotations are  
from  pp. 6, 7 and 8*
1G5
of Illinois by prohibiting the issue of notes to unauthorized eo r-  
39porations.
Thus was Dem ocratic bank refo rm  in the period from  the 
suspension to mid-1839* Constantly the party  of Jackson denied 
Whig charges that it wished to burden the country with an exclusive 
specie currency. Rather, it would refo rm  the banking system  by 
prohibiting sm all notes, extending individual liability, and requiring 
the resum ption of specie payments. A few Dem ocrats w ere out­
spokenly opposed to banks of issue, but as yet* they w ere in the 
m inority  in  every state . The Whigs for the ir p a rt opposed the 
extension of liab ility  and the prohibition of sm all notes, but agreed 
with the Dem ocrats on the im portance of the resum ption of specie 
payments.
11
The events of 1839* particu larly  the ^ second suspension of 
specie payments in October, signaled a shift in the Democratic 
party  toward a fill fledged opposition to banks of issue. It was 
a fte r 1839 that the anti-bank fo rces came to dominate the Democratic 
party . Anti-bank feelings seem ed to r ise  as the economy sank.
In May, 1839* John Wentworth renewed his attack on the 
Illinois State Bank accusing it of financing pork and lead speculations.
39 Shannon’s inaugural is in the Ohio Statesm an, December 14, 1838; 
Joseph Vance to John Sloan, M arch 4, 1838, quoted in W eisen- 
burger, Passing  of the F ron tier, p. 348; Huntington* MA History 
of Banking and Currency in Ohio, ” p. 390.
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Although the accusations la te r  proved true* much of the early
attack from  Dem ocrats was m otivated by the fact that Whigs ran  the
State Bank; and the attack itse lf accounted to a g rea t degree for
40Whig defense of the Bank*
The second suspension in October led to a redoubled effort
of the anti-bank forces. Several Dem ocratic County Committees
in Illinois passed  anti-bank resolutions* Indiana Democrats
attacked the State Bank and called  for a "constitutional c u rre n c y .11
The Johnson County, Indiana, Dem ocrats blam ed the fluctuations
of business on the "se izure  of banks by Whigs" who used them for
political purposes only* Banks, they argued, w ere only needed to
facilita te  the tran sp o rt of the only true money, specie; and thus,
it  was only n ecessa ry  to have b ills of large  amounts. The Indiana
Dem ocrat insisted  that it did not oppose banks established on
"co rre c t p rincip les" but rejo iced at the renewed suspension.
It is  not because any re lie f will be given that 
we think the suspension a glorious event, but 
it is because, that the time is now at hand when 
all the evils of the p resen t banking system  can
40 Pease, F ro n tie r State, p. 308; B essie Louise P ierce , A History 
of Chicago (Hew York: A lfred A. Knopf, 1937), I, pp. 154-155. 
Sangamo journal, August 23, 1839; Thompson, "The Illinois 
Whigs, " p. 83; Thomas Ford* H istory  of Illinois (Chicago!
S. C. Griggs and C o., 1854), pi 22o; Charles Manfred Thompson, 
"A Study of the A dm inistration of Governor Thomas Ford, " in 
Elvarts B. Greene and Charles M. Thompson, e d ., G overnor^  
L ette r -Books, 1840 -1853 (Springfield* Illinois: Illinois State 
H istorical L ib rary , 1911), p. x liii, a ll support this conclusion*
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be rooted out* *when unsound and swindling 
institutions can be wound up--when paper prom** 
ise s , based upon nothing, will no longer be seen, 
and when the p resen t v itiated and false cred it 
system  will be made to yield to a sound, safe 
and proper one*
Such a system  would be Msteady and prosperous** without the
fluctuations of the p resen t one.
Ohio Governor Shannon’s m oderate ’’bank refo rm ” views
expressed  in 1839 no longer sa tisfied  a large  segm ent of his party
and his ’’Whig view s” w ere attacked. A  Cincinnati Democratic
m eeting in  December denounced Shannon's views, proclaim ed gold
and silv er as the only "constitutional currency” and called the
chartering  of any m ore banks inexpedient. Governor Carlin of
Illinois b itte rly  attacked a ll banks. He opposed the legalization of
suspension as ”a fatal blow at the fundamental law of contracts. "
He also  believed that "incorporation of companies for the regulation
of the financial operations of the country, /w as? at war with the
genius of free  government. ” He repeated his e a r lie r  charge that
the banking system  was defective and "unsanctioned by any principle
of republican virtue. ” The argum ents that the State Bank was forced
to suspend to defend itse lf  and that its  destruction would harm  the
people of the state  w ere rejected  by the Governor. "We indeed
labored  in vain,”  he said, "in  overthrowing the Bank of the United
States, if we should now draw to our em brace an institution above
41 Illinois State R eg ister, November 23, 30, and December 25, 
1839j Indiana Democrat, November 26, and October 23, 1839.
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responsib ility  and capable of inflicting within its own sphere a
42still  m ore  deadly sting* "
Perhaps the g rea tes t shift in attitude came in Michigan.
Up to 1839# the Dem ocrats often mouthed the standard rhetoric
concerning banks, but had shown no reluctance to c a rry  through a
free  banking experim ent and to attem pt to establish a State Bank*
On the other hand# the Dem ocratic p ress  tabbed their opponents as
"loco focos* " The two p arties  sp lit not on banks as such but on
th e ir attitudes toward specific banks. The Dem ocrats were m ost
closely  associated  with the Michigan State Bank# and it was the
constant ta rg e t of the Daily Advertiser* The Dem ocratic F ree  P re ss
defended the Michigan State Bank and tra ined  its guns on the Bank
of Michigan which was m ore closely associated  with the Whigs
because of th e ir gubernatorial candidate# <3. 0* Trowbridge. When
the Michigan State Bank failed in 1839 with $600# 000 of the s ta te ’s
money on deposit* the Dally A dvertiser g loried in exposing "Iroco
Fraud" revealing that nearly  every  leading Democrat in the state
43owed the Michigan State Bank money*
42 Springfield Republican in the Ohio State Journal, December 10, 
1839} Bdgar A* Bolt, "P a rty  Politics in Ohio, 1840**1850, " Ohio 
A rchaeological and H isto rica l Publications, XXXVII (July, 1928), 
p. S0$| Ohio Statesm an, December IT, 1839; 'Weisenburger, 
S^ssing~'of'^ the'"frontier', p. 354; Blinoia* (Soyernor, 1838-1842.
43 Daily Adve.rtlaer, August and September, 1838* and October,
1839 issues; D em ocratic F ree  P re ss , April 18, Septem ber 5, 
Septem ber 12, 1838 and M arch 13, 1839; Daily A dyertiser, 
November 6, 1839*
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By the end of the year a shift in attitude of the Democratic 
p ress  could be seen. The election of that year resu lted  in the victory 
of the HDem ocratic^W higs1’ led by W illiam Woodbridge. Elan 
Farnsw orth, the Dem ocratic candidate m ay have lo s t as a resu lt of 
opposition of the ‘'rad ica l11 elem ents of the party  who had lo st con­
tro l to the ’’conservatives* ” The resu lt was that the Democrats no
longer w ere in power* and within the party  the elem ent which was
44m ore generally  opposed to banks had control*
Attempts were m ade to associate  the Whigs with the "Wild 
Cat" system . By Septem ber, 1839 the Democratic F ree  P re ss  was 
a sse rting  that the Whigs had a full share  in the passage of the free  
banking law and had organized m ost of the banks under it* Now the 
paper argued, "the whig party  headed by their wild cat Whig bank 
p residen ts, d irec to rs , and stockholders have the audacity and 
hardihood to endeavor to throw upon the dem ocratic party  the responsi­
b ility  of the irredeem able  issue  of wild cat banks. " It also began to 
rep rin t demands from  other anti-bank Dem ocratic organs such as 
the Indiana Dem ocrat, the Ohio Statesm an, and the Chicago Dem ocrat. 
The fa ilu re  of the Michigan State Bank came not as a blow to the 
D em ocrats, but as a kind of emancipation which allowed them to be 
consistently anti-bank. The D em ocratic F ree  D ress charged the
44 S tree ter, Political P a rtie s  in Michigan, pp. 19-21, 35-37?
"L ette rs  of Lucius L yon ,11 p* 525. It is my contention that the 
"conservatives” such as B e rry  w ere the opponents of banks, 
while the " rad ica ls” associated  with Korvell w ere not.
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fa ilu re  to DeGarmo Jones and his "Whig friends, " and printed a
le tte r  from  the popular John Nor veil minimizing the amount owed
the bank by Dem ocratic politicians, The suspension of specie pay*
m eats finally pushed the Dem ocrats into an anti-bank stand, seen in
the blatantly anti*bank a rtic le , "Bank Currency, M in the Democratic
F ree  P r e s s :
B etter be poor than the panders to vice; be tter 
reduce our currency  to com m odities, than ou r­
selves to be fleeced of our hard  earnings by 
fa ith less banks and banking institu tions. . ,  .
Will the people tac itly  p e rm it  a bank clique and 
party  to ru th lessly  e n /t^ /a il  these m ise rie s  
upon them  again in continuous succession, while 
every other sta te  is restra in ing , res tric tin g  and 
guarding its  bank issues. 45
In his valedictory Governor Mason chastised suspension as
a re su lt of the "false and pernicious system  of banking, " The banking
system  m ust be changed to p ro tec t the public by personal liability,
a s tr ic te r  crim inal code, and private  banking. "Take from  them
to th is extent the corporate  veil, which now encourages, and at the
sam e tim e conceals and pro tects the ir frauds and villainies. "
M ason a ssu red  his audience that these sim ple refo rm s would insure
adequate capital and responsible management, All of these evils
46could be traced  to the free  banking law.
45 Dem ocratic F ree  P re s s , Septem ber 18, September 25, October 
16, 1838, and M arch 11, 1839, the quotations a re  from  September 
18, 1838 and Decem ber 11, 1839* DeGarmo Jones was the Whig 
m ayor of Detroit and la te r  a State Senator.
46 F uller, e d ,, M essages, 1, pp. 287*289. This was not delivered, 
but prin ted In the' Daily F ree  P re s s .
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Revelations of fraud, and unbusinesslike activ ities on the
p a rt of the banks added to the d is tru st of banks. In Illinois this
turned m em bers of both parties  against the State Bank. The Whig
p ress  had tended to m oderately  defend the State Bank and charge
the Dem ocrats with the desire  to estab lish  a  new bank under their
control. However, individual Whigs seem ed willing to le t the State
Bank die. Lincoln w ro te  John T. Stuart in December, 1839, that
the leg isla tu re  had '*Suffered the Bank to forfeit its charter without
Benefit of C lergy. There seem s to be but very little  disposition 
47to resu sc ita te  i t . '*
The report of the legislative investigating comm ittee con­
firm ed m ost Dem ocratic charges and silenced Whig defenders, 
who had been a t best m oderate. It showed that the Chicago branch 
of the State Bank had been involved in pork speculation, and that 
the branch in Alton had been deeply involved in the attem pt to make 
that city the cen ter of the lead trade on the upper M ississipp i The 
State Bank was also chastised  for over lending to d irec to rs and 
m em bers of the legislature* Other violations of the law w ere 
revealed as w ere generally  unsound m anagem ent practices* A 
m inority  rep o rt was even m ore c ritica l, and argued that an 
excessively  large  amount of State Stocks w ere held in the Bank’s
47 Sangamo Journal, January 7, 1940; Roy P. E asie r, edu , The 
Collected Works’ of Abraham  Lincoln {.New Brunswick, New 
Je rsey : ' R utgers .University P re ss , 1953), t, p. 159.
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portfolio.
The Dem ocrats made as much political capital as possible
out of the d isclosures and the suspension, but shied away from
killing the Bank. The Illinois State R egister continued to urge
m oderation! and the leg isla tu re , which was dominated by Demoor a ts ,
decided that the in te res ts  of the sta te  demanded that suspension
be sanctioned until the close of the next session  of the leg islatu re .
A num ber of Whigs, such as Lincoln, w ere disgusted by the way the
Dem ocrats used the bank issue for p artisan  purposes, “detaching a
fragm ent from  their party  to help the Whigs pass a m easure  and then
turn  around and kick and cuff us for i t . . . .  “ The Chicago Am erican
believed that the Dem ocrats w ere adopting a “ru le  or ru in '1 policy
against the State Bank. Since it would not become their “political
engine, “ the Dem ocrats had “in a m ost unnatural m anner turned
against th e ir own bantling, because it  had m ore honesty than its 
49fathers* "
During 1840 economic conditions improved slightly, but the 
reputation of the Illinois State Bank was im m easurably harm ed by 
the rep o rt of the investigating com m ittee, and the financial condition 
of the state  deterio rated . A special session  of the leg isla tu re  was
48 The m ajo rity  rep o rt is in B asler, e d ., Collected Works of 
Abraham Lincoln, 1, pp. 185*195; Dowrie, “Illinois Banking,“ 
pp. 90-94; Barnes, Chicago Banks, 1, p. 136*
49 Illinois State Beg is te r, December 25, 1839; Dowrie, “Illinois 
Banking, “ pp. 94-9Sj B asler, e d ., Collected Works of Abraham 
Lincoln, I, pp. 237-238; Chicago A m erican in the Detroit 
Daily A dvertiser, January 31, 1846.
mcalled to handle this problem, C arlin  again attacked the banks for 
suspending* Such "usurpations” for whatever seem ingly good purpose 
led to "political slavery, " "The idea that the people should look up 
to /governm ent/ for assistance  in tim es of pecuniary d is tre ss , is 
m ost revolutionary in its  tendency*.»* " Especially, when it  leads 
to aid for private in te res ts  and thus destroys equality. "In the 
pure republican days of the Revolution, m e rit  and dem erit, virtue 
and vice, alone drew the line of separation between one m an and 
another; now the pam pered fed m onopolist scorns an association 
with honest poverty. " The Dem ocrats then chose to in te rp re t the 
end of the special session  as the tim e of term ination fo r the suspen­
sion, and they w ere  able to force the banks to resum e over the 
p ro tes ts  of the Whigs* This forced resum ption months before the 
other banks of the country had begun to pay specie had the expected 
result* The Sank was drained of $455, 000 in specie and forced to 
cu rta il its  business d ras tica lly  increasing the p ressu re  on debtors 
and causing a fall in the price  level. The policy of curtailm ent 
was extended to cover loans to the sta te  and this combined with 
the Bank’s refusal to cash sa lary  w arran ts caused a m inority  of 
Dem ocrats to vote with the Whigs to legalize suspension* Again 
s im ila r provisions res tric tin g  the Bank’s activ ities w ere p a rt of the 
bill. This tim e the Bank was allowed to issue bills in denominations 
of one, two, and th ree  dollars to ease the currency shortage, but
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in exchange for this forced  to take $50, 000 of six per cent Illinois 
bonds a t par every six months for the next two years* Before this 
plan was worked out Lincoln had w ritten a bank bill to ease the 
tight currency  situation by creating a bank that would issue notes 
against Illinois stock, but this was not accepted. ^
Whig action in Illinois was generally  in line with the policy 
of cu rrency  expansion through the use of the banking system s urged 
by Whigs in the other sta tes in 1840 and 1841.
A  sp lit in the Ohio Democracy over the bank question aided 
in the victory  of Whig Thomas Corwin, While not unaware of the 
dangers of banking, he also proposed that Ohio either accept a State 
Bank system  or that the p resen t banks be rech arte red  under the d i­
rection  of a board of control that issued  a ll paper and examined 
the banks. He would also estab lish  a safety fund, lim it dividends, 
and se t amount of circu lation  in relation  to capital. Neither suggested 
plan was successfu l as Dem ocrats w ere able to block action on any 
bill without individual liab ility  of stockholders. The Whigs in 
Michigan and Indiana w ere m ore successful, in their program  of 
"bank re fo rm .fr^
50 Dowrie, "Illinois Banking," pp. 95-100; C arlin ’s m essage is
in Illinois L egislatu re . House Journal, 1840, pp, 18-30; Jam es,
Ohlcago'Sanks, 1,''pp .' 137-140 ;~ 'e  as e , F ro n tie r State, p. 311.
51 W eisenburger, Fas sing of the F ron tier, pp. 404-406;
D ocum ents.. . of the State of Ohio, 1840-1841, Document #76.
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The Whig victory in 1859 in Michigan had been complete
giving them control of both houses of the legislature and the gave* -
Her*# chair. $t was obvious that one question with which the- mm
administration would have to deal: was that of currency and banking.
During the fall* the Pally Advertiser mainly contented itself with
attacks on the Michigan State Bank and assertions that the Democrat®
could only view banks as political machines run by party mem fa
October* it attacked Biddle *s bank for suspending and viewed this
as further failure-of "loco £&mn policy! "
The suspension of the U. S. Bank is'the climax of 
the- assertion* that every financial scheme of the 
present administration is sure to fall. The pet 
Bank system was the first. T h a t  failed* The 
Pennsylvania DV S. Bank scheme was next.
That has failed. -*Jf even the Sub*treasury goes 
into' operation* that will fail. Equally unsuccessful 
have been all the fiscal schemes of the loco focos 
of this State. They gave us the wild cat system.
That*® gone. They took the State Bank to their 
bosom and that sleeps. Tea o&a% make currant 
jelly oat of calves heads. BZ
la December* 1839 the newly elected governor received a 
series of letters suggesting various plan®. Eob-ert Stuart, a shrewd 
Whig politician* saw the main problem as one of adequate currency. 
He favored a State Bank* but feared it would either become a 
"political engine" or fall into the hands of men who would misuse it. 
Private banks he believed were less likely to fail and less open to 
fraud? thus* perhaps the state could take advantage of the Detroit
BZ Daily Advertiser* October 7* 9 and 15* IBS9*
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banks by diverting in ternal im provement funds. He, like other
Whig correspondents of Woodbridge, believed that a State Bank
could not be organised quickly enough to give adequate relief. He
was not pa rticu la r about how it was done but believed that "the
Banks /m u s t/ be enabled to extend that re lie f that is so much needed. "
There was not enough currency  even to pay taxes le t alone move
crops. The th rea t of necessity  to resum e seem ed to Stuart the reason
that banks couldn’t provide needed currency. He believed Woodbridge
should sanction suspension, but fo r political reasons cast this in
term s of demanding resum ption a t some future date, Stuart had a
generally  dynamic view of money like many Whigs and believed that
only adequate cu rrency  could revive the economy. He had no use
for retrenchm ent.
Iw a s  pleased to hear you rem ark  the other day,
/he  wrote to Woodbridge/ that retrenchm ent alone 
cannot relieve us, this is  so self evident to my 
mind, that 1 was amassed to hear a m an 1 had 
taken to be w ise and experienced in business, say, 
that a ll we needed, was reform  and digging in the 
earth ; th is m ight answ er if we were preparing for 
our g raves, but if we m ean to live, there  is a 
need of m uch m ore**. 53
The view that the legitim ate function of banks was to 
encourage industry  and facilitate  trade , and that currency had a 
dynamic function in  this p rocess was reflected  in other le tte rs  to 
Woodbridge. jnhn A. W ells, a  Dem ocratic banker turned Whig,
53 Robert Stuart to Woodbridge, December 23, 1839, in the 
Woodbridge MSS*
11?
agreed basically  with Stuart that the g rea tes t problem  was a lack of 
currency  and that a  State Bank could not be easily  form ed. He 
suggested the sta te  buy the a lready existent banks, refo rm  them, 
and make sta te  officers their d irec to rs . The m ost novel p a rt of 
Wells* plan is his Suggestion (somewhat like the Populist Sub* 
T reasu ry  plan) that the banks lend money to fa rm ers  on deposits
of produce a t accessib le  points, with the proceeds of the sale m inus
54shipping going to the fa rm er.
Many of these ideas w ere echoed in Woodbridge*s m essage 
in January. While he laid  the blame for the evils of the currency 
a t the steps of the adm inistration, he analysed the problem  as had 
S tuart and W ells. "The melancholy tru th  is now brought home to 
ua all, that fa r the want of /Sound currency?, the ample products 
of our soil*»the rich est fru it of the toil of the husbandman, a re  in 
im m inent danger of rem aining a m ass of useless rubbish in his 
yard  and g ran aries , because a safe and convenient currency can 
alone furn ish  the avenue through which an appropriate m arket can 
be found, " The state  was obviously lim ited and Congress m ust act; 
until then something tem porary  m ust be done. Because experience 
has shown there  was not sufficient capital for a State Bank, the 
existing banks had to be used to give the re lie f the people demanded
54 John A. Wells to Henry Chapman, December 30, 1839, in the 
Woodbridge MSS.
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by increasing  bank issues to facilitate  movement of crops* Wood- 
bridge concluded with a suggestion that if the use of private banks 
was attempted* they should f i r s t  be thoroughly investigated. J
During the session  the Whig p ress suggested that a State 
Bank like that of Indiana was probably the best way to supply the 
additional two m illion do llars needed to move crops. "Hundreds of 
thousands of do llars worth of wheat a re  heaped up in counties where 
absolutely* there  is not a sufficient circulating medium if it were 
a ll scraped  into one pile* to m eet the town, county and state taxes.
S£
This sta te  of things is  intolerable* and m ust be rem edied. "
The Daily A dvertiser was favorably disposed to a plan 
p resen ted  to the Senate by a  se lec t com m ittee headed by Democrat 
Samuel Etheridge. This report* which was concurred to by the 
Whigs on the com m ittee, examined banking in various foreign 
countries and concluded that none offered a completely safe p rece ­
dent and in general such exam ples w ere "not in accordance with the 
genius of our political institutions. " A banking system  m ust be 
erec ted  that fits M ichigan's problem s and aids in resto ring  prosperity . 
Thus a  State Bank like that of Indiana was suggested. Concerning 
the question of control, the officers of the state  w ere to be made 
d irec to rs . It was hoped that such a system  could provide adequate 
fac ilities to a ll p arts  of the state  and Investment opportunities to
55 Fu ller, ed. * M essages, X, pp. 320-324.
56 Daily Advertiser* January  17, 1840.
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capita lists * without the m ultiplication of weak institutions as tinder
the free  banking law, and the costs of the charte r system . The
com m ittee also hoped that corruption of the charte r system  and
political domination as under the Safety-*Fund in New York would
be avoided, By the com m ittee’s admission, it was an attem pt to
gain the advantages of free  banking without the drawbacks. The
plan for such a State Bank never got out of the Senate where it was
57opposed by the Whigs.
In general the Whigs followed the suggestion of Woodbridge 
to make use of the D etroit banks {the Bank of Michigan and the 
F a rm e r 's  and M echanic's Bank). Dike Woodbridge the m ajority  of 
the com m ittee to consider this question (two Whigs) blam ed the 
poor sta te  of the cu rrency  on the Jackson and Van Buren Adminis­
tra tions, Now, " , . .  the sta tes a re  compelled to re s o r t  to the m ost 
available m eans in their power to sustain  their own credit, and 
m itigate, if possible, the emfearassments of the people. 11 Thus, 
Michigan 11should not re jec t"  the possible use of the already 
established  banks fo r relief. To force them to resum e and wind up 
affa irs would only fu rther accentuate the depression, Instead of 
m in istering  to perverted  "party  m adness" and "the c lam ors of 
h ireling p a rtisan s"  the com m ittee hoped that the recommended
-U-t-Ui-ii um j i  u h u M h m u ^m w h w i i .w j i w  i,^m >i»ii» j  n» 11, 1,  Hi» >,iji m »>«««■ M ii| .illiii «i 111 iiwin • i i i  n  )— i
57 Daily A dvertiser, January 17, 1840j Michigan L egislature.
Senate Documents Accompanying Journal, 1840, Document #49,
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m easures could secure  the "best circulating medium within the
power of the leg isla tu re  to obtain, and to our citizens the m ost
ample rew ard for the products of their labor and industry* " It was
a choice between this or leaving "the country wholly destitute of
58the m eans of liquidating balances between our citizens. "
'Throughout M arch the Daily A dvertiser defended the
"C urrency B ill” as impending the Whig legislation was called.
Uveryone would be hu rt by a "no-currency" policy, and the "Currency
Bill" would be the b est way to augment the currency.
Without it, inevitable ru in  would s ta re  every m an 
in the face--w hether m erchant m echanic fa rm er 
o r labo rer. - - I t  will give new life to every 
departm ent of trade. It will enable the fa rm er 
to se ll his produce a t a fa ir p rice --th e  mechanic 
and lab o re r to find employment a t living w ages— 
and the m erchan t to se ll his m erchandise to pay 
his debts. 59
On M arch 20, the "C urrency B ill" was enacted into law 
authorizing the sale of the drafts for the installm ent of Michigan’s 
in ternal im provem ents loan. These future drafts would serve as 
the basis for a  loan to the sta te . In this way the banks w ere to 
supply the state  with currency  to pay its con tractors, hi exchange 
for this the banks w ere allowed to legally  suspend until F ebruary  1,
SB Michigan jbegislature. Senate Documents Accompanying Journal, 
1840, Document #50, the quotations a re  from  pp. 481, 482, and 
483.
59 Daily A dvertiser, M arch 7 and M arch 9, 1840.
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1841 and increase  the ir issue to the amount of their paid in capital.
To th is w ere added a num ber of res tric tio n s to safeguard the
public, in an unusual vote the m easure was c a rried  in the Senate
with every Whig favoring it and every Democrat opposing. One
House Dem ocrat joined the twenty-nine Whigs who favored the bill,
and one House Whig joined the twelve Dem ocrats who opposed it.
The C u r re n c y  B ill” was c learly  a party  m easure . The "Whig
L egislative A ddress’' took full cred it.
Hot only will it enable the state  to pay off its 
debts, prom ptly, to its  con tractors on public 
works**-and thus enable the contractor to pay 
off his lab o re rs --an d  thus enable the laborer 
to feed and clothe his ch ildren--and  thus enable 
the m erchant to pay off his debts $ but will 
c reate  a circulation  fo r the purchase of the 
fa rm e rs  produce--give life to trade and 
com m erce--labo r to m echanic - - c red it to the 
sta te  abroad--and  business energy and sp irit 
to everyone. It will not only do a ll this, but 
will give us, what is indispensable to the success­
ful prosecution of business, a sound healthy, 
redeem able currency* 60
While Whig confidence in mid-1840 was no m ore justified 
than that of the Dem ocrats the previous year, the ir program  
reveals the essen tia ls of the Whig attitude toward banks* They 
tended toward a co rpo ra tis t view of the economy with an em phasis on 
cooperation between governm ent and business and the inter-dependence
60 Gantsa, "A H istory  of Banking Legislation, " pp. 50-52; Michigan 
L eg isla tu re . Senate Journal, 1840, p. 441; Michigan L egislature. 
House Journal, 1840, p. 393; Dally A dvertiser, A pril 4, 1840.
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of the various elem ents of the economy. They favored an expansion
of the currency  supply to spur economic development and, thus,
bring re lie f to the entire population. Fearing an irredeem able
currency, they chose to base this expansion on bank currency, and
came to the aid of the banks they believed to be strongest.
S im ilar attitudes can be seen in the way Indiana Whigs
attem pted to bring about re lie f  in the ir state. Governor Wallace
urged leg islation  that would provide as much uniformity as possible
between specie and paper. In late 1840 he c ritic ised  banks that
did not have proper capital and p ra ised  the Scottish system  for its
frequent settlements* His successo r Samuel Bigger made the
Whig position very  c lear in his inaugural address.
When properly  regulated, banks exercise  a bene­
ficial influence on labor and en te rp rise , alm ost 
incalculable. When injudiciously or dishonestly 
conducted, they a re  powerful instrum ents of evils 
to the country* and ultim ately, of loss to those who 
own their stock* They should be watched with a 
jealous eye* not with view to their destruction but 
for the purpose of res tric tin g  them  to the ir 
appropria te  spheres.
He then went on to in s is t that a  convertible paper currency  was
"essen tia l to our p rogressive  im provem ent. "
In it  is  la id  the foundation of the true  c red it 
system , which is  our su re s t protection against 
actual monopolies of cap ita lis ts . C redit consti­
tutes the capital of the poor man* bestowed upon 
him as the rew ard  of his en terp rise  and in tegrity .
With it he can compete successfully  with wealth in 
a ll its  form s. Without it, labor and property  would 
be brought en tire ly  within the h eartless g rasp  of 
individual wealth, whose operations can never be 
brought under the control of legislation.
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Bigger concluded by critic izing  those who would set in te res t
against in te re s t and argued that the various branches of business
a re  m utually dependent and it is the duty of government to protect
each from  undue encroachm ent of the rest* H ere the Whig position
€>3was c learly  delineated. '
The State Bank in its repo rt to the leg islature  often made 
the argum ents that bank cred it opened opportunity to the poor but 
honest and thus kept business from  the hands of a sm all group of 
cap ita lis ts . These repo rts  also  complained that the leg isla tu re  was 
"making the business of banking a  m atte r of party  contest, H and 
accused its  opponents of wishing to rem ove the controls of the Bank 
and ‘‘engross the profitable business of regulating the exchange of 
the country. . . . !t^2
The Whigs generally  defended the State 'Bank and backed 
the leg islation  increasing its  stock and authorizing it to issue sm all 
b ills . At the sam e tim e, they favored legislation prohibiting the 
issue of irredeem able  cu rrency  by both the sta te  and private 
en trep reneurs. C harles T est charged the Dem ocrats with being
61 Indiana L egislature. Documentary Journal, 1839, F a r t IJ, 
Document #9? Indiana le g is la tu re . Documentary Journal 1840, 
F a r t  t» Document #8; Indiana le g is la tu re . Documentary Journal, 
1840, F a r t  I, Document #9, the quotations a re  from  p. 129*
62 Indiana Begiglature. Documentary Journal, 1842, F a r t 1, 
Document #8, r'pritM r~and F a r t  II, Document #?, pp. 168*69.
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in favor of irredeem able  currency so that the public would eventu­
ally revolt and demand a specie currency* ’’Our object, ” he 
asserted , ’’should be to give all proper encouragem ent to good 
banking institutions, and th ru st aside the m ise ra b le  tra sh  with 
which the community is threatened* ” He, Judah, and the Whigs in 
general favored the issue of sm all notes by the State Bank in the
hope that these would drive out w orthless sh inp lasters which they
63connected with the Dem ocratic party .
Although some Dem ocrats agreed with the Whig views, 
the official p a rty  reactions to these Whig policies show a contrasting 
set of attitudes w ere coming to dominate in that party. In general, 
th e ir view of economic society was atom istic, with the various 
elem ents of the economy in beneficial (for the whole) competition.
To them , Whig attem pts to use the banking system  or other c o r­
porations sm acked of special leg islation  and a violation of equality 
in economic a ffa irs . In con trast to the Whigs, they feared  price 
r is e s  and believed that re lie f  would only come with retrenchm ent 
and the re tu rn  to a redeem able currency. They did not tru s t  bank
63 ’’Introduction, ” of Hiker, ed», M essages and P apers of Wallace 
Adm inistration, pp. 40-41} Samuel Judah to Noah Noble, Octo­
b er 26, 1039 in |h ld ., pp. 277*278; Charles H. T est to Editor 
of the HichmoncTWBadimn, January 19, 1841, in Thornbrough, 
©d., M essages and P apers of Bigger Adm inistration, pp. 193- 
195; Samuel Judah to Editor of ’Vincennes Saturday Qazette, 
January 24, 1841, in Ib id ,, pp. 198-200; Samuel Judah to 
Editor of Vincennes Saturday Qaaette, February  8, 1841, in 
Ibid*, pp. 226*228.
money, and many turned to demands for a specie currency. Most 
of them d istrusted  government, particu larly  legislative in terference 
in the economy. As the depression grew worse the party  moved 
toward deflation, hard  money, and la isaez  fa ire .
The attack on the "C urrency B ill" by Michigan Dem ocrats 
reflected  these attitudes. According to the hostile m inority  repo rt 
on suspension and the use of the Detroit banks for relief, suspension 
struck  a t "the basis of civil liberty" and was a  "corporate infringe­
m ent of individual right, " What the people wanted was re lie f from  
banks and bank frauds. Only by resum ption and the establishm ent 
of the only "constitutional currency" could the state re tu rn  to 
p rosperity . The Dem ocratic p ress  charged that the bill would 
provide re lie f  only to the bankers. All the Whigs w ere doing was 
using the public funds to save the tottering Bank of Michigan, Anti­
bank a rtic le s  charging the Whigs with being the party  of speculators, 
m onopolists, and suspensionists w ere printed in the various papers. 
The two them es m ost dominant w ere that the Whigs favored an 
irredeem able  currency--"W hig  wild cat cu rrency"--and  that the 
Whig leg islation  was a  trium ph of the "money power. " The only 
alternative offered was a re tu rn  to "constitutional currency. " To 
the Dem ocrats the idea that an increase  in currency, credit, and 
p rices could spur economic recovery  was absurd, Currency was 
only the rep resen ta tive  of wealth and had no dynamic function. The
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only Answer was economy and retrenchment* ^
la  the election of 1841 John Berry* an early  and consistent 
opponent of banks, won the governorship of Michigan on a policy 
of a re tu rn  to s tr ic t  economy. In his m essages of 1843 and 1844 he 
b itte rly  attacked banks and suspension. These views were echoed 
in the Dem ocratic platform  of 1845 which stated that the party  was 
11 en tirely  opposed to the fu rther incorporation of banks of issue in 
the state* * • * ” B erry-s successor Fetch and the Democratic p ress 
joined in this anti-bank stance* ^
In Indiana the anti-bank attitudes such as those expressed 
by Ebeneser M. Cham berlain and his Dem ocratic colleagues abated 
a fte r they gained the governor’s chair in 1843. The new governor 
Jam es Whitcomb took typical Dem ocratic positions on the causes
64 Michigan L egislature. Senate Documents Accompanying Journal* 
1840, Document #51; D em ocratic F ree  Press* January 29, 
F eb ruary  5, F ebruary  19, M arch 11* M arch 18, and April 1,
1840; F ree  P re ss . * . Extra,* January 24, 1840. It is  significant 
that on M arch  11,"' 1840'the' paper rep rin ted  an Ohio Statesm an 
a rtic le  charging that a ll Whigs came from  the non-producing 
groups in society: bankers, office holders* law yers, doctors, 
m erchants, and speculators.
65 The 1841 Dem ocratic platform  is rep rin ted  in Randall, ’’Guber­
natorial P la tfo rm s, ” pp. 30*37;; S treeter, Political P a rtie s  in 
Michigan, p. Zt} Cooley, Michigan, pp. 294*296} Fuller, e d ., 
M essages, 1, pp. 448-454, 467-68, 489, and 506-507} the 1845 
D em ocratic platform  is reprin ted  in Randall, ’’G ubernatorial 
P latform s, M pp. 64-70; Fuller* e d ., M essages, II, pp. 33, 81} 
■Democratic F ree  P re ss  September 22, 1845} M arshall Expounder 
in the Dem ocratic F re e  P re s s , September 11, 1845; Pontiac 
Jack so 3 an  in the Dem ocratic F ree  P re ss , February  6, 1846.
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of the depression, the nature of money, and the desire  to ’‘again
seek the ancient land m arks of frugality  and republican sim plicity
from  which too many have unwittingly strayed* “ However, a fte r
he replaced  Samuel M errill as president of the 3tate Bank with a
Dem ocrat, Judge Jam es M orrison, little  was heard  about the bank
66question in Indiana*
As in Michigan where many of the Whigs turned anti-bank 
a fte r the failu re  of the Bank of Michigan, both parties  became 
increasingly  anti-bank in Illinois a fte r the failure of the State Bank 
in February , 1842* In the election of that year Duncan was attacked 
as “a B ritish  Bank Whig’1} and he constantly rep lied  by pointing to 
his hostility  to banks as governor. The question that rem ained 
concerned how to wind up the a ffa irs of the State Bank. The new 
Governor Thomas Ford  urged m oderation and was opposed only by
66 Ebenezer M. Cham berlain to the Editor Goshen Democrat,
Decem ber 11, 1841, in Thornbrough, e d ., M essages and Papers 
of Bigger A dm inistration, pp. 349-184} Ebeneaser M* Chamber- 
la in  to the Editor Goshen Dem ocrat, January 15, 1842, in 
Ib id ., pp. 395-398} Indianapolis Indiana State Sentinel, January 
17, 1842, Indiana le g is la tu re . Documentary Journal, 1843, F a r t
1, Document #8, p. 316} Harding, “The State Bank of Indiana, “ 
p. 12} B sarey, “State Banking in Indiana, “ p. 257, Throughout 
the r e s t  of the decade Whitcomb’s speeches did not mention 
the State Bank.
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U sm all m inority  of ’’u ltra ’’ Dem ocrats led by Lyman Trumbull. ^  
The period between 1843 and 1851 in Michigan, Indiana, 
and Elinois was an anti-banking period in which the Democrats 
controlled each of these states* The governors of each argued 
that the economic revival resu lted  from  the policies of re tren ch ­
m ent urged by their party  and took a consistently anti-bank line.
In Elinois and Michigan the Dem ocratic •’ultras*'' seem  to have 
c a rr ied  the day* Throughout the decade Wentworth kept up his an ti- 
bank barrage , and the m ore  m oderate Elinois State R eg ister in- 
s is ted that it was unequivocably opposed to banks. By the m id- 
fo rties Elinois Dem ocrats regu larly  included anti-bank planks in 
the ir p latform s.
Only in Ohio which cam e under Whig control during this 
decade was a  sound banking system  established. In the late  th irties
67 Robert Stuart to W illiam Woodbridge, January 29, 1841, and 
Robert S tuart to W illiam Woodbridge, July 16, 1841, in the 
Woodbridge MSS; Sangamo Journal May 13, 1842; Pease, F ron tie r 
State, p. 312; Dowrie, ’’Illinois Banking, ” p. 113; Ford, H istory 
of Illinois, pp. 297-304. The Whigs charged that Trum bull
had purely political m otives. Ford  (p. 304) ascribed  his action 
to his wish to aid his friends and to his hatred  of Shields and 
M cClernard. Pease  (p. 314) seem s to give credence to these 
charges. M ark Krug in .Lyman Trumbull (New York: A. $. 
B arnes and Company, In c ., 1965), pp. 38-39, sees T rum bull's 
action as Ma m atte r of principle, " but offers no evidence other 
than reference  to T rum bull's future ca ree r.
68 F u ller, e d ., M essages, it, p. 81; Indiana L egislature. Docu­
m entary  Journal, 1847, F a r t $, Document^#?; Illinois (Governor, 
1843-1846; Elinois State R eg iste r, F ebruary  3, August 18, 1843, 
F ebruary  9, and October 11, 1844; F ie rce , H istory of Chicago, 
t, p. 169; Charles Hunter Oarnett, State Banks of Issue in 
Illinois (n. p. M Published by the U niversity /o f Illino is/, 1898), 
p. 43. ~  “
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Ohio went through the sam e pattern  that was seen in the other states 
with the anti-bank faction withimthe Dem ocratic party  growing with 
each suspension as economic conditions worsened. As in other sta tes 
the Whigs opposed the independent t r e a s u ry  and tended to defend 
the banks, but they could hardly be pictured as opponents of bank 
reform* Shannon's m essage that the radical elem ents of his party  
attacked was applauded by the Whig p ress  which som etim es taunted 
the Dem ocrats to reconcile the views of Van Buren with those of 
Shannon. By 1840 the leading Dem ocratic ed itors Moses Dawson and 
Samuel M edary w ere vehemently anti-bank and opposed to Shannon. 
This is  also true  of the Ohio congressional delegation. However, 
the m oderates retained control and re-nom inated Shannon. This 
factional bickering combined with a large Whig turnout put Thomas 
CSorwin in  the governor's chair. &9
Whig county conventions called for a  p roperly  re s tric te d  
banking system  affording a convertible currency. These demands 
w ere in the Whig platform  in 1840* During the campaign, the Ohio 
State Journal p ictured  the Democrats* "War on c red it” as a d irec t 
th ru st a t the poor who without the benefit of c red it w ere a t the m ercy  
of the wealthy. It and o ther Whig papers tried  to p icture the Whigs
69 Holt, "P a rty  Politics in Ohio, " XXXVII, pp. 456-5?, 501-503? 
Ohio State jo u rn a l, October 23, December ?, 1839, and
January 4, 1840} W eisenburger, Passing of the F ron tier, 
pp. 402-403} Qhio Statesm an, July 30, 1839} W eisenburger, 
Passing of the F ron tier, pp. 404-405.
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as friends of the common man, and denied that the party  of Van
70Buren had the right to the name, 11 Democrat. "
Corwin suggested two possible plans: a State Bank, or
the rec h a rte r  of the p resen t banks under a safety fund like that of
Hew York* While a  m ajo rity  of Whigs seem ed to favor the la tte r
plan, nothing was c a rr ie d  through in the session  of 1840-41. The
Dem ocrats had in sisted  on individual liability  which the Whigs argued
would allow only the wealthy to invest in hank stock. A standard
Whig argum ent was that the sm all denominations of bank stock
71opened good investm ents to the "little  m a n .,f
Conditions w orsened during 1841. In two years from  1840 
to 1842 the amount of specie in Ohio banks declined to alm ost half 
of what it had been, and many banks w ere failing. The banks them ­
selves often increased  suspicion by not reporting. In the leg is­
lative elections of 1841 the Dem ocrats w ere v ictorious, and the 
county m eetings took violently anti-bank stands. The defeat of 1840 
enabled the m ore  rad ica l elem ents to gain control of the party, and 
attem pts by the banks whose ch a rte rs  w ere expiring to obtain new
70 Holt, "P a rty  Politics in Ohio, " XXXVII, p. 510; Ohio State 
Journal, October 7* 1840; Holt "P arty  Politics in Ohio, "
XXXVII, pp. 486-491.
71 Documents. *. of the State of Ohio, 1841-1842, Document #76;
Halt, "P a rty  Politics in Ohio, " XXXVII, pp. 515.517; Ohio 
State Journal. F eb ruary  13, 1841.
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ones were rejected.- The rio ts in January* 1342 against the
Cincinnati banks which resu lted  in the looting of their vaults received
sympathy from  the Ohio Statesm an which b itte rly  denounced the
bankers as thieves and hoped "The people--a  robbed, swindled,
and ruined people--w ill re s tra in  their feelings under the outrages
72of these sh in -p iaste r g a m b le rs .!t
■ Corwin-again suggested either a State Bank, which he
seem ed to favor, or a safety fund to solve the problem . The Demo®
era ts , who seem  to have been under "loco-foco" control, although
they again nominated Shannon in January, pushed a bill through
the leg isla tu re  providing that all banks that did not redeem  their
notes would lose their c h a rte rs . They also passed the Lapham
Act establishing a free  banking system . This law was basically  a
"loco-foeoM general banking law that did not embody the principle
of a  bond-secured  (or even a  m ortgage-secured) currency. Safety
was to be provided by capital stock being paid in specie before
opening, individual liab ility  of stockholders and officers* and a
safety fund. Both of these acts w ere passed by s tr ic t  party  votes
73with the Whigs opposing them.
72 W eisenburgery Passing  of the F ron tier, pp. 406-467; Holt, 
"P arty  Politics in  0 h io ," SOCXVtl pp. 518-524; Ohio Statesm an 
December 14* 1841, and January 13* 1842, the quotation is 
from  the la tte r .
73 D ocum ents..» of the State pf Ohio, 1841-1842, Document #1;
W eisenburger, Passing  of the F ron tier, pp. 407-408; Huntington, 
"H istory of Banking and C urrency in Ohio, M pp. 405-406.
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However, no new banks w ere organized under the Dapham 
law even a fte r it was a ltered  in regard  to lim ited liability  in  1843. 
The th irteen  banks whose ch arte rs  expired on January 1, 1843 chose 
not to reorganize wider the new law and closed their doors. A year 
la te r  two other ch arte rs  expired*
The Whigs voted solidly against the amendment to the 
L»apham law. They attacked the Dem ocrats for playing politics with 
the cu rrency  issue and suggested that there  could be no sound 
currency  until the Dem ocrats w ere swept from  office. Some Whigs 
believed that the currency  question was hurting them and should be 
dropped. O thers hoped the issue would split the Dem ocrats. C or­
win wanted to se ttle  the issue  any way practicable on Whig principles
74so that the D em ocrats would be forced to fight on the tariff.
The Dem ocrats continued to b icker among them selves 
over the banking issue. While the rad icals seem ed to have control,
74 Huntingt on, ’’H istory of Banking and Currency in Ohio, " p. 406; 
Holt, "P arty  Politics in Ohio, " XXXVH, pp. 531-2, 539; 
"Selections from  the Follett Papers, II, " Q uarterly  Publications 
of the H istorical and Philosophical Society of Ohio, IX (July- 
Septem ber, 1914), pp. 73-75; Thomas Corwin to Oran Follett, 
November 12, 1842, in Ib id ,, pp. 75-77; Oran Follett to 
Thomas Oorwin, November 18, 1842, in Ib id ., pp. 77-80;
Qran F o llett to V. W. Smith, F ebruary  3, 1842, in D. Belle 
Hamlin, "Selections from  the Follett P apers, HI, " Q uarterly  
Publications of the H istorical and Philosophical Society of
Ohio, X  (January-M areh, 1915), pp. 4-6.
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there  w ere certain ly  enough conservatives to make that control 
unsteady* Shannon continued to advocate m oderation, and as late 
as 1844 some conservative Dem ocrats ■••including Samuel JLahm 
who was personally  in terested  in one of the banks--broke with the 
party  to vote fo r the extension of the ch arte rs  of five hanks. When 
Shannon was made m in iste r to Mexico, his successor was Thomas 
B artley  of the anti-•'bank wing of the party* Me vigorously attacked 
special leg islation  and p ra ised  the Dapham law as a "general law 
of joint stock partnerships* " His position resem bled that of Adam 
Smith whom he quoted. However, his faith in "the laws of trade, 
which regulate and control p rices and currency. . .  /and / a re  as 
searching, as a ll pervading and as i r r e  sis table as the law of 
nature" seem s m ore than his m entor. While he favored general 
laws, he was opposed to a system  with a bank-secured  currency 
as "the m ost objectionable and dangerous.. .  to the independence 
and purity  of the governm ent, and the lib e rtie s  of the peop le .11 It 
would be "a union of bank and S ta te .. .  and incestuous and unholy 
coalition" like the Bank of England a danger to liberty . Only 
"punctual conversion" and the use of short loans "on stric tly  
com m ercial paper" could secure  paper money and prevent its  
depreciation. Dike Smith, he was an advocate of the " rea l b ills"  
doctrine. However, the Whig success in 1843 perm itted  him  only
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7 5to m ake suggestions*
In January, 1844 the Dem ocrats m et and decided on David 
Tod and a strongly anti-bank platform . The Whigs who had been 
successful in 1843 nominated M ordecai Bartley, the father of Demo­
c ra t Thomas B artley, as the ir standard bearer. Although many 
other issues intervened, Tod found himself':: caught in the conflict 
between the factions of his party  and consequently lo st to B artley
7 *who was an adherent of free  banking. °
B artley 's  inaugural address carefully  considered the 
banking question. Of the cu rren t system s of banking he believed 
that State Banks had showed them selves to be little  be tter than 
local banks which gave rise  to corruption and special privileges.
The existing general law was impracticable* Probably the New 
York system  was best, but it was liable to the objection that it 
was controlled by Wall S treet. Thus, he suggested a tightly r e ­
s tr ic ted  free  banking system  with currency secured  by Ohio bonds 
o r Ohio rea l estate* secu rity  was to be protected by the maintenance 
of a  33 1/3% specie re se rv e  against c irculation  as well as the 
stocks. He attem pted to a ssu re  his constituents that its fate would
75 Documents. . .  of the State of Ohio, 1843-1844, Document #1;
Holt, in  Ohio*" pp.* S48-55U W eisen-
burger, Passing of the .F ron tier, pp. 416-417; D ocum ents.. .  
of the State of Ohio, 1844-1845* Document #1, the quotations 
a re  from  pp. 18, EG, and 22.
76 W eisenburger, P assing  of the F ro n tie r, pp. 418-420; Holt* 
P a rty  Politics in Ohio, " ZZXYXl  pp. 552-558.
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not be that of the Michigan law because Ohio land that could be used 
as security  was cultivated and saleable. In the State Senate a bill 
was brought forth  by the Standing Committee on Currency under 
the direction of A lfred Kelley. Kelley was a somwhat conservative 
old Whig who had played a m ajor role in the s ta te ’s canal policies 
and was la te r  im portant in the fight over taxation. The Kelley bank 
bill bore the pragm atic stam p of the type of w estern  developer 
Daniel Boors tin has term ed  the "booster.
It was c lear that the purpose of the bill was both to provide 
"a safe and convenient currency" and to aid in  providing capital 
for "com m ercial and m anufacturing operations. " The Committee 
found that a system  of associated  banks was m ost popular in a reas  
where there  was local capital, and that in capital shy a reas  free 
banking s im ila r to New York was favored. "To reconcile these 
conflicting opinions and to extend to the different sections of the 
State that re lie f  which the people so generally  demand at the hands 
of the G eneral Assembly, " the Kelley bank b ill proposed to establish  
a  State Bank of Ohio and to provide for free  or, as they w ere 
called, independent banks. In th is way security  for the b ill holder 
could be guaranteed, while p roper inducements would be offered 
cap ita lis ts . The State Bank was not a cen tral bank but ra th e r an
77 Documents. . .  of the State of Ohio, 1844-1845, Document #2;
Wieisenbur'ger,"1 Passing  of the F r  oa tie r, pp. 420-422. On 
Kelley see the le ss  than adequate biography, Jam es L. Bates, 
A lfred Kelley: His Life and Work (Columbus, Ohio: P rivate ly  
Printed, 1888).
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association of twelve branches with capital between $100, 000 and 
$500, 000 supervised by a Board of Control. They were required 
to redeem  their notes a t a ll tim es, and the amount of notes was 
lim ited in ration to specie. As added security  each branch was to 
contribute ten per cent of its  notes to a safety fund which was to be 
invested in Ohio stocks, United States stocks, or Ohio rea l estate. 
The independent (free) banks could be sm aller with capital of 
$50, 0G0* The secu rity  for their notes was provided by the deposit 
of stocks of e ither Ohio or the United States equal to its capital 
with the State T re a su re r  who issued the currency. Yearly exam ina­
tions w ere also provided for. The Lapham Act was specifically
78repealed by the new law*
Although the Kelley b ill included a free  banking provision, 
it  resu lted  from  the demand for well secured  banking facilities in 
capital poor a re a s  ra th e r than any belief in the efficacy of the "laws 
of trade. H Kelley specifically warned that the belief that banks 
should be free  as any other business stre tches an analogy which 
too often fails. A well re s tr ic te d  system  ra th e r than free  com peti­
tion was the only way that the community could have the benefits of
79banks without the dangers of inflation.
78 Bates, A lfred Kelley* pp. 132-139; Ohio L egislature. Senate 
Journal, 1845, Appendix, pp* 40-43, the quotation is from  p. 41; 
Huntington, ”A H istory of Banking and C urrency in Ohio, M
pp. 421-426.
79 Ohio ^Legislature. Senate Journal, 1845, Appendix, p. 43.
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The Kelley bill was a Whig party  m easure that ca rried
through the Senate after seventeen days of debate by a s tr ic t  party
vote. It was before the House nine days after which a party  vote
passed the m easure . Although some Whig papers such as the
Xenia T o r c h l ig h t  w ere not satisfied  with the bill, m ost Whigs
saw it as a m easure  necessary  to the welfare of the state. Most
cap ita lists m ust have also  looked with favor upon the bill, because
twenty-one new banks w ere organised by the end of the year. In
his annual m essage B artley  p raised  the new system  and credited
the rising  prosperity  to it. T ruly  a cred it system  was essen tia l
to a free  and en terprising  people*
In those countries where despotism  prevails to the 
g rea tes t extent, and where the laboring classes of 
people a re  m ost oppressed, Banks of issue a re  not 
known. Hence it  is , in these countries, that the 
m an who in indigent in early  life, whatever m ay be 
his native ability  and energy of charac ter, ends a 
tedious existence as he commenced it, SO
The D em ocrats, both in the leg islature  and outside it,
attacked !,The M onster Bank Bill. ” As soon as i t  was passed the
Ohio Statesm an demanded its  repeal, but such an attem pt led in
the House by Charles Eeem elin was defeated by the Whig m ajority .
Statesm an feared  that with the b ill’s passage “a few old bank
80 Ohio L egislature. Senate Journal, 1845, p. 399; Ohio l e g i s ­
la tu re . House Journal, 1845, pp. 534-36; Holt, {5 P a rty  Politics 
in Ohio, 51 XXXVII, p. 562; Huntington, "A H istory of Banking 
and C urrency in Ohio, ” pp. 427-28; Docum ents,. .  of the State 
of Ohio, 1845-1846, Document #1, p. 5.
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hunker nabobs*1 would rule. The Hamilton County Democratic
meeting saw it ass "a m onsterous and dangerous system  of paper”
as did the Cadix Sentinel which equated Kelley with John Law.
It is a m istaken idea that a flood of bank paper will 
add to the p rosperity  and happiness of the people.
Idleness and vice, speculation and rascality , a re  
necessary  attendants upon the excessive em m ission 
of paper money.
In the Senate, David T» Disney an ex -d irec to r of the Ohio Life
Insurance and T ru st Company now seem ed to see the true Jacksonian
light. He believed the b ill m uch too complex for the people to
understand. "No wise, no pure, no sound legislation requires**
the combination of these two different system s. It could only lead
to the rule of the money power and the 11 ruin  of a free  and independent
81people** by flooding the country with paper money.
When repeal efforts failed the Dem ocrats c a rried  the
issue to the people. Through the use of federal patronage, and
because the Kelley b ill was a Whig m easure, the "hards" w ere able
to finally control the party  and didicate it to a "hard  money*1
course. The vociferous Dem ocrats of Hamilton County resolved:
* .. that m etalie cu rrency  has been tested  by the 
experience of the ages. On the contrary  a ll sy s­
tem s of paper currency  ever yet contrived have
81 Ohio Statesm an, January 31, 1845} Ohio Legislature* House 
Journal, 1845, pp. 851-52} Ohio Statesman, F ebruary  I, 1845} 
D em ocratic Meeting of Hamilton County in Ohio Statesm an, 
F eb ruary  4, 1845} Cadix Sentinel in the Ohio Statesman, 
F ebruary  3, 1845} W eisenburger, Passing of the F ron tier, 
p. 424} Disney’s speech is in the Ohio Statesm an, February  5, 
1845.
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failed* and in their inevitable overthrow have 
entailed m ore d is tre ss  and loss, and perpetuated 
m ore robbery and fraud than would colonize a 
continent with convicts and paupers. Nor have 
we seen in the Whig leg islatu re  of la s t year any 
symptoms of a wisdom superior to the paper- 
m ongers who have gone before them --but a 
compound ra th e r of all shallow schem es of their 
p redecesso rs. 82
The Whigs defended the Kelley bill, and a sse rted  that
c red it was n ecessa ry  to the p rog ress of civ ilisation while ’’hard
money” was m onarchial, savage, and a detrim ent to the laboring
c lasses, P or the tim e being the people agreed, and the Whigs
w ere successful a t the polls throughout the rem ainder of the 
83decade.
In each of the sta tes of the Did Northwest a sim ilar pattern  
appeared in the banking argum ent. Gradually the Dem ocrats moved 
from  acceptance of banks to bank refo rm  to the opposition of all 
banks of issue. T heir outlookiwas constantly reg ress ive  searching 
for purity, sim plicity, and virtue. When they advocated free  
banking, it  was generally  out of a faith in the “natural laws of trad e” 
and a desire  to sim plify and purify the governm ental p rocess. Their 
opponents did not stand in d irec t con trast to these ends, but ra ther
82 Holt, “P a rty  Politics in Ohio, “ XXXVII, pp. 562-569; Demo­
cra tic  Meeting of Hamilton County, resolutions a re  reprin ted  
in Huntington, “A H istory  of Banking and C urrency in Ohio, “ 
p. 428, ftn. 13.
83 Ohio State Journal, October, 1845, issues in particu lar.
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em phasized what we today call economic development. Banks and 
bank cred it could serve a dynamic function in this process. Their 
outlook tended to be forw ard looking and em phasized opportunity 
offered by an expanding economy. They moved gradually toward 
acceptance of the idea of free  banking based on stocks. Such a 
system  could provide a safe currency, adequate accommodations 
for business en terp rise , and draw capital into developing a reas .
The contrasting attitudes of the two parties toward banking revealed 
slightly different views of the Good Society which w ere m ore fully 
developed in the constitutional debates of the m id-nineteenth century.
CHAPTER IV
THE DIALOGUE OF PARTIES: FREE BANKING IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, 1846-1851
The banking issu e was debated at length in these state con­
stitutional conventions at m id-century. These debates reveal crucial 
differences between the parties on the issu e of currency which were 
connected with contrasting conceptions of the proper economic 
base for republican government. The Democrats were dominated 
by the ’’radical" faction of their party which wished to return to the 
"only constitutional currency, " specie. This was in line with 
their desire to insure purity and sim plicity in government. Their 
opponents, the Whigs, continued to argue than an adequate currency 
was n ecessary  to stim ulate economic development. They generally  
advocated free banking as the means by which this purpose could be 
achieved without the danger of an unsecured currency. In each 
convention "hard money" proposals were defeated by the Whigs and 
a faction of the Democratic party which was unwilling to give up the 
benefits of bank facilities.
During the period of recovery following the depression, the 
Democracy p ressed  increasingly for alterations of the constitutions 
of the states of the Old Northwest. Between 1846 and 1851 conventions 
m et in Illinois (1847), Indiana (1850), Michigan (1850), and Ohio 
(1850-51) to revise their fundamental law, and two conventions m et in 
W isconsin (1846 and 1847-48) to write that state’s fir st constitution. 
Historians have generally seen  the documents produced by these 
conventions as the embodiment of Jacksonian governmental reform. 
The agitation for such reform  was carried on m ainly by the Demo­
cratic press; and when the conventions met, they w ere dominated by
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the follow ers of Jackson who appealed to the spirit of the Old Hero 
at every turn. In general the principles set forth in these con­
stitutions represented the ideas of the "radicalM wing of the Democracy 
which had come to dominate the party. The '‘radicals" lim ited the 
function of government, particularly in the economic sphere, and 
whittled away the positive powers of the legislature. These a lter­
ations sought to sim plify and make m ore econom ical the governmental 
process by restricting the session s of the legislatures and substi­
tuting general laws for the wide variety of specific legislative enact­
m ents. H istorians have too often failed to see that many of these 
restrictions, the result of the common experience with burdensome 
state debts and cum bersom e demands for special legislation, were 
supported by Whigs as w ell as Democrats. For that matter, both 
parties favored universal white manhood suffrage although Whigs 
tended toward som e relationship between citizenship and voting 
while the Democrats were blatantly anti-Negro. Thus, on m ost of 
the main issu es  to be settled  the parties were reasonably close .
The artic les on banking remain the m ost m isunderstood aspect 
of these constitutions. Here Jacksonian principles were generally  
defeated. Everywhere in the Old Northwest the Democracy stood 
forth on platforms firm ly dedicated to the extinction of banks and the 
return to a "constitutional currency. " Yet, only the 1846 constitution 
for W isconsin, which was soundly defeated at the polls, included this 
demand. In every other case the Whig idea of free banking prevailed.
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The heated debates on this issue give a unique insight into the party 
differences on the banking issu e, and the way this crucial issue  
functioned within the "persuasion” of each party.
Initial attempts to call constitutional conventions in the 
early forties m et with little  su ccess. W isconsin voters who feared  
increased taxes and government interference rejected statehood 
proposals four tim es before 1846. The advocates of statehood were 
the politicians and businessm en, anxious to build up the territory*
In the 1830"s, the Democratic governor, Henry Dodge, had been an 
advocate of statehood, but in the 1840’s the Whigs and Governor James 
Doty led  the campaign. By 1846 when the issue was finally decided, 
the Democrats had swung behind the movement. The fir st  con­
vention m eeting in 1846 was dominated by Democrats and produced 
a "radical" document in line with Democratic doctrine. Leaning on 
the experience of Texas and Iowa, this constitution included a pro­
hibition of all banks and a gradual elimination of notes under $20.
The banking article, and one guaranteeing the property rights of 
m arried women, m et with general disfavor and the constitution was 
defeated. Later that year a second convention, s till dominated by 
the Dem ocrats, but with a stronger Whig contingent, m et and drew 
up a new constitution that was accepted in 1848. This document pro­
vided that a free banking law might be passed if it was submitted to
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the people. *
Voters in Illinois and Indiana showed a sim ilar hesitancy.
In  1842 the  I l l in o is  v o te r s  d e m o n s tra te d  a  g e n e ra l  in d if fe re n c e  by
voting down a proposed convention to revise the constitution. By
184-6 sufficient in terest had been aroused so that a convention was
sanctioned by the voters. A ser ies  of unsuccessful attempts to call
a convention to rev ise  the Indiana constitution preceded the narrow
acceptance of the idea in 1846. Fewer than half the Indiana voters
2
who voted for the governor registered an opinion on the question.
While the Illinois convention m et in 1847, constitutional 
problems and politics delayed Indiana’s for nearly five years. The 
public had exhibited little  in terest in the question, but constitutional 
revision  was pushed by the Democrats and their organ the Indiana 
State Sentinel. About this time the national Democracy, through 
the agency of the Democratic Review called for the revision of the state 
constitutions and laid down the lines to be followed. Although revision
1 Louise Phelps Kellogg, "The Adm ission of W isconsin to State­
hood, n and Frederic L. Paxson, ” W isconsin--A  Constitution of 
Democracy, *' in Milo M. Quaife, e d ., The Movement for Statehood, 
1845-46 (Madison, Wisconsin: the State H istorical Society, 1918), 
pp. 18-29, 30-52.
2 P ease, Frontier State, pp. 407-09; Arthur Charles Cole, "Intro­
duction, M in Arthur Charles Cole, e d ., The Constitutional 
Debates of 1847 (Springfield, Illinois: Illinois State H istorical 
Library, 1919), pp. i-x ix; Charles Kettlebo rough, e d ., Con­
stitution Making in Indiana (Indianapolis, Indiana: Indiana 
H istorical Com mission, 1916) Vol. I, pp. x v -ccx li.
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had not been a party issu e in 1845, the calling of a convention came 
to be looked upon as a Democratic m easure and drew opposition 
from the Whigs. In 1846 the W hig-controlled Indiana legislature  
refused to support the call for a convention on the ground that 
legitim ate doubt existed as to the wish of the people and the con­
stitutionality of such a convention. During the next two years the 
Democrats pushed the issu e. Twice in 1848 Governor James 
Whitcomb advised calling a convention in order to rid the state of 
the ev ils of special legislation  and cut the expense of government.
The Democratic State Convention which m et in early 1849 echoed 
this demand. The opposition from the Whigs was moderate. 
Generally, they argued that there seem ed no indication the people 
wanted change. Here and there were indications that the Whigs 
feared the convention might permit slavery in the southern counties. 
Finally, a new call for a convention passed the legislature in early
1849 with little  opposition, was accepted by the people, and the
3convention m et in 1850.
While the Indiana convention m et, sim ilar bodies convened 
to alter the fundamental law of Ohio and Michigan. The Democratic 
governor of Michigan, Alpheus Felch, led the agitation for reform  of 
the constitution, but the question of a convention was not really  a 
party issu e . In the election of 1849, which returned the tight-fisted
3 Ib id ., pp. xxvi-baaciii.
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John Barry to the governor’s chair, the voters favored the calling of 
a convention by a large margin. What opposition the question received
came from  Whigs, but it appears that m ore Whigs voted for the
4convention than against it.
The fight over the calling of a convention in Ohio was 
m ore a clear cut party contest with the Democrats again leading 
the demands for revision. In 1843 Governor Wilson Shannon 
suggested the calling of a convention, and after the passage of the 
K elley Daw in 184-5, the Democrats increased efforts to get the 
legislature to act on constitutional revision. The Whigs, who feared  
Democratic "ultraism ” and the possible destruction of the banking 
system , were able to block such attempts in 1847 and 1848. Certain 
Ohio Whigs were w orried that the Democrats might institute Negro 
suffrage as w ell as elim inate banks, but the Whig governors,
William Bebb and Seabury Ford, better represented the majority  
of the party when they attacked the '’Black Daws” and accepted the 
idea of constitutional revision. Both the Democratic and Free Soil 
platforms in 1848 endorsed the idea of a convention. Throughout 
the year Samuel Medary’s Ohio Statesman and a weekly special The 
New Constitution kept up the demand for a convention. The following 
year the Whigs gave up their opposition and the voters of the state
4 Frederick W. Stevens, Michigan Constitutional Convention of 1850 
{n. p . , n. d. ).
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5endorsed the calling of a convention.
Within the m atter of four years six conventions had m et
and revised  the constitutions of the five states of the Old Northwest.
The "radical" or as they called them selves " P rogressives1' within
the Democracy led the battle for reform.. Most Whigs took a
"conservative" position on the question of change, and agreed with
the Indiana State Journal:
A change in the fundamental law should not be made 
for triv ial causes. It ought to be made only to 
abrogate some great wrong resulting from its pro­
visions. Frequent changes impair the respect in 
which a constitution to be valuable ought to be held 
by the people. 6
The dichotomy of the "Progressive" Democrats and the "con­
servative" Whigs is alm ost universal in the h istorical literature on 
the period. Too often these labels have been allowed to take on 
twentieth century connotations, and content in the context of the 
1840's is ignored.
The Democrats who took the initiative in the movement for 
constitutional reform  had a fairly w ell defined program in which 
banking reform  played a central role. This set of reform s made 
up the content of " P rogressiv ism ” in its ante-bellum  form.
5 W eisenburger, Passing of the Frontier, pp. 478-79; Roseboom, 
Civil War Era, pp. 124-35.
6 Indiana Journal, January 5, 1847.
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Medary's Ohio Statesman carried on its masthead the basic 
principles of the " P rogressive” Democracy: "The Sovereignty of 
the People--T he Rights of the States, and a Light and Simple Govern­
ment. " The general principle that "that government governs best 
which governs least" was accepted as the only sure guard against 
encroachments on individual liberty. In the m id-forties Medary 
em phasized this interest in the individual:
The true democrat wars against the existing state of 
society  which is built upon the supposition that men 
are of le ss  value than property. The real character 
of the contest of which this country is  the scene is  a 
war between man and money. The dem ocracy 
advocate the right of revolution, of universal suffrage, 
of freedom  of trade, of overthrow of banks, of the 
establishm ent of a constitutional currency. 7
In this there was a m oral imperative which equated money 
with power, and power with corruption. Essentially, it was a secu lar­
ized version  of the conflict between Christ and the anti-Christ. All 
virtue emanated from the people, all corruption from the "money power. " 
The Milwaukee Courier asserted  that men were "able to trace the 
a rtific ia l inequality of wealth, much pauperism and crim e, the low 
state of public m orals, and many of the other evils of society directly  
to this / paper m oney/ system . " Experience with broken banks and a 
debased currency, and the struggles to repay the huge internal im prove­
m ents debts seem ed to dictate sim plicity and economy as the only
7 W estern Review, 1846, p. 208, quoted in Henry C. Hubbart,
The Older Middle West (New York: R ussell and R ussell, 1963),
p. 11.
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proper course. Indiana’s governor, James Whitcomb, warned 
against swelling porsperity that might induce another ’’orgy” of 
speculation. "The sure and only sure remedy against this threatening 
evil, is , the observance of economy and industry, and above all, to__
O
r e s is t  the allurem ents of credit. "
This outlook dictated a certain number of reform s which 
the Democracy agitated for in all of the w estern states. On the 
question of universal suffrage Medary was somewhat at variance 
with his Negrophobia party. In reality the "Progressive" Democracy 
stood for universal white manhood suffrage and they were willing to 
extend this right to resident aliens. Although there was some 
deviation within the party, particularly among the "Old Hunker" 
faction, the Democracy also  advocated the election of all state officials
including judges. This would reform the government to more nearly
9represent the people.
In addition to making the government m ore representative, the 
"Progressive" Democracy wished to check the tendencies toward cor­
ruption and governmental intrusion on individual rights. The target of
8 Milwaukee Courier, November 18, 1846, reprinted in Milo M. 
Quaife, e d ., The Struggle Over Ratification, 1846-1847 (Madison, 
W isconsin: The State H istorical Society, 1920), pp. 200-202; 
Indiana L egislature. Documentary Journal, 1847, Part I,
Document 7, em phasis in the original.
9 The following generalizations are based on numerous issu es  of 
the Dem ocratic newspapers, the addresses of the Democratic 
governors, and speeches made in the conventions. Only specific  
quotations or references w ill be cited.
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of this agitation was the legislature which was held responsible for 
the ev ils of debt, banking, and special privileges. In m ost cases the 
Democrats advocated a strong veto and viewed the executive as the 
representative of the w ill of the people. As the emphasis on the veto 
indicates, the executive’s functions were conceived in negative term s.
His duty was to protect the people's rights from violation by the le g is ­
lature. The Democrats looked upon the legislature as a center of 
corruption rather than as a representative body. It was the arena 
in which the power of money and interest held sway. It was responsible 
for the ruinous internal improvements projects and the depreciated  
currency. It saddled the people with a complex and confusing body 
of "unnecessary laws, " and fostered special privilege. All this was 
done at a tremendous expense to the taxpayer. In order to make the 
leg isla tive process cheaper and rid the states of the inequities of 
special legislation , the Democracy advocated general laws. If this 
reform  was implemented} the legislature would be able to conduct its 
n ecessary  business in much shorter time making biennial or even 
triennial session s possible. This would mean a tremendous saving 
to the taxpayers. By substituting general laws for the numerous instances 
of special legislation , equality, sim plicity and economy could be 
achieved.
.Even with this reform, the tendencies toward corruption had 
to be blocked in certain specific instances. Constitutions were thought
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to protect the people from the excesses of legislatures and, in
particular, should set a lim it on the size  and nature of the public
debt and eliminate banks of issue. The Cleveland Plain Dealer spoke
for m ost of the "Progressive" Democracy when it said,
It must not be left to the corrupt cupidity or caprice 
of future L egislatures to say whether this State shall 
be dotted over with Bank Corporations or cut up 
with Plank and Rail Road Corporations, with such 
tyrannical and exclusive privileges as shall make 
them m asters, we their slaves. 10
While some Democrats seem ed willing to support a well
guarded banking system , everywhere the party as such stood solidly
opposed to any banks. By the m id-forties the Democracy of every
state in the Old Northwest except Indiana had written into the party
platform a demand for the elimination of banks of issu e  and a speedy
return to the "constitutional currency, " The Democratic governors of
Michigan and Illinois echoed these demands in addresses to their 
11leg isla tu res.
In Indiana all of the standard demands for biennial session s, 
general laws, and lim itations on the state debt were aired by the 
governors and the State Democratic convention,but the banking issue
10 Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 27, 1850, quoted in Roseboom, 
Civil War Era, p. 127.
11 For example see: Ohio Statesman, January 8, 9» 1846; Illinois 
State R egister May 5, 1848; Randall, "Gubernatorial Platform s, " 
p. 66} Milwaukee Courier, December 30, 1846, in Quaife, e d ., 
Struggle Over Ratification, pp. 204-207; Fuller, e d ., M essages, 
II, pp. 173-5; Illinois Legislature. House Journal, 1846-47,
pp. 8-17.
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was sidestepped. However, by the late 1840* s the liard money elem ent 
bad considerably increased their power. A lengthy lis t  of Democratic 
demands urged by the Goshen Democrat in late 1848 included the r e ­
vision of the banking system . By 1850 the Indiana State Sentinel was 
listing the abolition of banks of issu e and a return to the "constitutional 
currency" as basic principles of the D em ocracy.12
The m ajority of the party favored the complete abolition of 
banks of issue and the use of an exclusive specie currency, or at 
least one with no b ills  under $20. This was the view put forth in the 
party*s platform s, adhered to by Democrat governors in their addresses  
to the legislature, and championed as the "true test of Democracy!' 
by the leading party organs in every state.
Because the Democrats favored general laws in m ost cases, 
their attitude towards banking should not be confused with an advocacy 
of free banking as it is being considered here. Their ideas are 
vehemently opposed to any type of inflation and are, in fact, harshly 
deflationary. They w ere opposed to banks of all kinds, not m erely  those 
created by special charters. Leading Democrats like John Barry of 
Michigan and Augustus French of Illinois made it clear that free banking 
was no better than any other system . Barry believed the argument 
for a stock secured currency was "as indefensible as others that have
12 Indiana L egislature. Documentary Journal, 1845, Part I, Docu­
ment 4, and 1848, Part I, Document 6; Indiana State Sentinel,
March 19, May 28, 1846, and January 11, 1849; Goshen Democrat, 
December 27, 1848, in Indiana State Sentinel, January 31, 1849; 
Indiana State Sentinel, January 1, 1850.
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preceded it. " While French's 1846 m essage seem s to have been m is ­
understood by some people as favoring free banking, he made it quite 
clear that along with a few, simple, general laws he advocated the 
complete prohibition of banks. In 1849 he saw nothing "to recommend 
the new system  j/free banking/ over the old chartered institutions. " 
Two years later he told the legislature that free banking was only a 
way to cover up the "odious features" of banking by "show. " It would 
seem  that the major sources of Democratic thought agreed with the 
Ohio P ress  which believed that the Democracy would "reform banking
by the entire abolition of all chartered and special privileges and by
13a return to the constitutional currency of gold and silver. "
Because of the two party nature of American politics, it is 
seductive but dangerous to conceive of one party as the antithesis of 
the other. This tendency is encouraged by party rhetoric which 
attempts to picture the opposition as antithetical to the interests of the 
people which they claim  to represent. In the argument over constitu­
tional revision  the Democrats charged that the Whigs opposed the 
in terests of the people by resisting  universal suffrage, advocating an 
irredeem able paper currency and generally defending the interests of 
the privileged m onopolies. Since the Whigs were after all a political
13 Fuller, e d ., M essages, II, p. 173; Orlando B. Fricklin to A.. C. 
French, December 30, 1846, in French MSS; Illinois Legislature. 
House Journal, 1849, pp. 8-17; Illinois Governor, 1846-1853; 
the Ohio P ress , July 23, 1847, quoted in Huntington, "History 
of Banking and Currency in Ohio, " p. 434.
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party contending for power and would hardly admit to these charges, 
the Democrats generally charged that the Whigs tried to fool the 
people. The Daily Lafayette /^Indiana? Courier said of the Whig 
principles, "In relation to the great subject of constitutional reform, 
there appears to be a studied effort to deceive. " While it is not 
hard to see why the Indiana Democracy would make such a charge, 
it is  rather surprising that m ost historians have believed them .14
While the Whigs were on the defensive in the fight over 
constitutional revision  and spent a great deal of time denying the 
Dem ocratic charges, they did present a program for reform. It is  
this program which makes up the content of Whig "conservatism . "
When examined in detail, it proves hardly to be the antithesis of 
Dem ocratic "progressivism . ”
On m ost of the major questions concerning democratic 
government the Whigs and their opponents were very close. Both 
parties advocated electing state officials including judges. Both 
parties favored universal white manhood suffrage. A m inority of 
the Whigs wished to extend suffrage to the Negro population and there 
w ere probably as many Whigs as Democrats who favored fem ale 
suffrage. In any case the number was very sm all in both parties.
The only real difference on this question was that the Whigs usually
14 Daily Lafayette Courier, March 1, 1850, reprinted in Kettieborough, 
e d ., Constitution Making in Indiana, pp. 212-13. The Democratic
point of view is expressed  in the h istories of W eisenburger, Holt, 
Roseboom, Esary, Kettieborough, Pease, Cole, Paxson, Streeter, 
and Hubbart.
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w ish e d  to  l im i t  su f f ra g e  to n a tiv e  and  n a tu r a l is e d  c i t iz e n s .  The 
p a r t i e s  a g re e d  on is s u e s  c o n c e rn in g  s o c ia l  d e m o c ra c y  lik e  the  e l im i­
n a tio n  of im p r is o n m e n t  fo r  d eb t and  the e x e m p tio n  of h o m e s te a d s  
an d  to o ls  in  b a n k ru p tc y  p ro c e e d in g . B oth  p a r t i e s  fa v o re d  p u b lic  
s c h o o ls  a lth o u g h  the  W higs w e re  m o re  e n e rg e t ic  on th is  is s u e  and  
so m e  h ad  o p p o sed  th e  c a llin g  o f a  convention, b e c a u s e  they  f e a r e d  
th e  D e m o c ra ts  m ig h t do aw ay  w ith  the  p u b lic  sch o o l s y s te m . On one 
su c h  is s u e , th e  D e m o c ra ts  w e re  s i le n t  w h ile  th e  W higs took the lead 
in  a t ta c k in g  la n d  m o n o p o lie s . In W isc o n s in  th ey  w ish ed  to r e s t r i c t  
th e  o w n e rs h ip  o f la n d  to 640 a c r e s  so  “ th a t th e  s o il  of the s ta te  m a y
n o t p a s s  f ro m  th e  m a n y  to the  few . a c c o m p a n ie d  w ith  a  la n d e d
«  ISa r i s t o c r a c y  and  o p p re s s e d  te n a n try . n
The  W higs d iffe re d  f ro m  th e i r  opponen ts  on the  ve to  p o w er, 
an d  te n d ed  to  s e e  th e  le g is la tu r e  a s  the t ru ly  d e m o c ra tic  e le m e n t of 
the g o v e rn m e n t. T h is  d o e s  n o t m e a n  th a t the W higs d id  n o t ad v o ca te  
so m e  r e s t r i c t io n s  on the  leg is la tu re* ®  p o w er, T hey  u su a lly  jo in e d  
th e i r  D e m o c ra tic  o p p o n en ts  in  w ish in g  to  s e e  a  l im ita t io n  p la c e d  on 
the  s ta te * s  p o w er to  in c u r  d eb t, s p e c ia l  le g is la t io n  g ive  w ay to g e n e ra l  
la w s , an d  b ie n n ia l s e s s io n s  in  o r d e r  to  s a v e  th e  ta x p ay e rs*  m o n ey .
15 T h e  M ad iso n  E x p r e s s ,  J u ly  28, 1846, reprin ted  in Quaife, ed*,
T he M o v em en t fo r  S ta teh o o d , pp . 154-56 . As w ith  th e  D e m o c ra tic  
a rg u m e n t,  th e  g e n e ra l iz a t io n s  a r e  d raw n  f ro m  a  w ide  v a r ie ty  of 
s o u r c e s  an d  o n ly  s p e c if ic  q u o ta tio n s  o r  r e f e r e n c e s  w ill  be  c ite d .
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Where the two parties came into direct conflict was on the 
question of banking. Here the Whigs took a positive stand that was 
clearly  at odds with Democratic anti-bank Mhard money, ,r positions.
By the m id-forties the free banking elem ent had come to dominate 
the Whigs and, in every state, they stood for expansion of credit and 
the establishm ent of a secure currency through free banking. A 
typical Whig editorial reported, "We voted for a Constitutional con­
vention because we wanted the following changes: Biennial sessions; 
electing of judges and all other officers; a general /Tree/ banking law; 
a homestead exemption law; fines to go to the school funds of the 
township.
State conditions caused some variations in the arguments. 
Where there were no banks, as in Michigan and Illinois, the Whigs 
w ere clearly  and alm ost unanimously in favor of free banking. Ohio 
Whigs stood solidly for retention of the K elley Law which combined 
free banking and a State Bank with branches. In Indiana the party 
split between groups wishing to retain the State Bank which had per­
formed so w ell and those wishing credit expansion through free banking. 
As the convention showed, these factions of the Whig party were not 
entirely at odds.
The situation in 'Wisconsin was complicated because the Whigs 
in powerful Dane County--the county in which the capital, Madison, 
is located--pa.ssed a resolution in favor of "a direct and positive prchi-
16 Quoted in Esary, History of Indiana, I, p. 513, ftn. 10. See also: 
Indiana Journal, January 7 and March 23, 1850.
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bition against the granting by legislature of any charter for banking
purposes, or the passage of any law whereby any monopoly or any
special exclusive rights and privileges may be conferred for private
purposes. " Several days later the Whig paper, the Madison Express,
explained that they agreed with the rest of the Whig party that a
m ixed currency was essential to national prosperity and that it was
only at that particular time that successfu l banking in W isconsin faced
a number of obstacles. The situation was compared with that of
Michigan in the 1830’s and banking should wait until the public was
secured against a sim ilar failure. Other Whigs in the state took a
m ore positive attitude toward free banking. In particular the dynamic
young John H. Tweedy urged the adoption of a free banking system
like that in New York. The Milwaukee Sentinel and Gazette also took
this position, and in the 1846 convention it was the Wliigs who attempted
unsuccessfully to have free banking principles written into the consti- 
17tution.
Failing in their attempt to have free banking accepted by the 
convention, the Whigs organized the opposition to the constitution and 
defeated it. During the fight over the 1846 constitution one of the m ost
17 Madison E xpress, July 28 and August 4, 1846, and the Milwaukee 
Sentinel and Gazette, October 9, 1846, in Quaife, e d ., The Move­
ment for Statehood, pp. 154-56, 157-59, and 209-10; Paxson, 
nW isconsin--A  Constitution of Democracy, pp. 38-40; Milo 
Quaife, e d ., The Constitution of 1846 (Madison, Wisconsin: The 
State H istorical Society, 1919), pp. 185-186, for Tweedy's attempt 
to include free banking, and Appendix 1, roll call #17, for vote 
defeating this m easure.
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avid opponents of banking, Edward Ryan, wrote a fellow  Democratic 
leader:
The opposition may talk about m arried women and 
exemption, but here along the Lake shore, at all 
events the real opposition is to the restrictions  
against banks, internal improvements and state 
debt. A new convention, elected as it would be by the 
opponents of the present constitution if they succeed  
now, would give us the old brood of corruption.
Another Democrat believed that the opponents of the constitution in
the eastern  part of the state were openly "declaring and preaching
for banks. " The Whig press spoke clearly  in favor of free banking.
When the second convention m et the Whig influence was increased and
a free banking provision was accepted in the new constitution which in
other ways did not alter the 1846 document. It seem s clear from the
preconvention agitation of the question that the Whigs stood for free
banking against the Democratic demand for the complete prohibition 
18of banks of issu e.
In the course of the convention debates the appeals of the 
two parties were fully developed and the strength of the various 
factions within the parties revealed. The Democrats had m ajorities 
in a ll the conventions, and nearly complete control of those of W isconsin 
and Michigan. As a consequence of this, m ost of the oratory came 
from  the Jacksonians and not a little  of it was directed as much to
18 E. G. Ryan to M oses Strong, February 8, 1847, and J. G. Knapp 
to M oses Strong, March 21, 1847, quoted in Paxson, "W isconsin-- 
A Constitution of Democracy, " pp. 46, 47.
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their constituents as to their fellow  convention m em bers. However,
the issu e gave r ise  to intra-party feuding which caused John Palm er,
an Illinois Democrat, to praise the Whigs for having 11 shown so much
judgement and d iscretion as to keep silent, and leave this war entirely
19in the hands of the ‘harmonious' dem ocracy.. . . ”
Regardless of the intra-party strife it engendered, the
banking debate did reveal the ideas of the Democracy on the subject.
If one had to pick a single document embodying the m ost widely
accepted Democratic views it would be the Majority Report from the
Committee on Banks and Currency in the Ohio convention. This
report was presented by John Harwell, a merchant from Wayne County
and an avowed "hard money” Democrat. It was signed by the other
three Dem ocratic m em bers of the com mittee with the only dissent
20
coming from the Whigs.
This report suggested that the constitution prohibit the form a­
tion of any new banks of issue, and forbid the "circulation /_ of_/ any
bank notes or paper of any description” by any corporation or a sso c i­
ations then in existence. In defending this total prohibition of banks
19 Cole, e d ., Debates of 1847, pp. 169-70. As above only specific  
quotations and references w ill be cited.
20 J. V. Smith, reporter, Report of the Debates and Proceedings
of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the
State of Ohio, 1850-51 (Columbus, Ohio: S. Medary, Printer to 
the Convention, 1851), I, pp. 707-708. This w ill be referred to 
as Debates of Ohio.
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and paper money the Report made five arguments which had been
p ressed  by Democrats in every state.
According to the Ohio Report, "The great objection to the
policy of the paper money banking system , consists in its corrupting
and dangerous political tendency and the stupendous frauds, and the
occasional extensive d isasters fco which invariably, sooner or later,
resu lt from  it. " In establishing the m oral case against banks of
issu e, the Democrats appealed to the authority of Jackson, whom
one called  "a man of as remarkable sagacity as ever lived, 11 and
built upon the arguments and rhetoric which had evolved in the course
of the previous decade. To the fiery  editor o£ the Detroit Free P ress,
John S. Bagg, the issu e was clear:
Our government is  based upon equal rights--banks 
upon fraud and corruption; and no man dare deny 
that they are unequal in their practices; a bundle of 
absurdities, of hypocrisy and incongruity, from  
their commencement ot their death; and in justice  
to equal rights let us have no banks. 21
In the destruction of equal rights, the banking system  per­
m itted the growth of a monied aristocracy with no productive economic 
function. Most Democrats: believed that, "All wealth is  the result of
Debates of Ohio, I, p. 70S; H. Fowler, reporter, Report of the 
Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of 
the Constitution of the .State of Indiana. 1S50 (Indianapolis, Indiana: 
A. H. Brown, Printer, 1856), p. 221; Report of the Proceedings 
and Debates in the Convention to Revise the Constitution of the 
State of Michigan. 1850 {JL-ansing, Michigan: R. W. Ingals,
State Printer, 1850), p. 692. These w ill be referred to as 
Debates of Indiana and Debates of Michigan*
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labor, yet, strange enough the man who does the labor never has
the wealth. " This was because "the whole system  of paper money
is a tax upon labor, produce and com m erce. " Wealth created by the
producing c la sse s  was shifted "to a class who produces nothing* " the
22m o n ie d  a r i s to c r a c y .
However, this monied aristocracy was not sim ply destructive
to republican equality* It represented the source of corruption of
the entire political system . In every convention the Democrats
brought forth the argument that the constitution had to prohibit banks
and paper money in order to protect the people from the reckless
actions of leg islatures easily  corrupted by the "money power, " In
W isconsin Edward Ryan* the leading "hard money” Democrat declared:
Constitutions are made to restr ict and restrain  
leg isla tu res, as well as to protect the c it iz e n .. . 
who can tell when there w ill be a ‘soft1 leg is la ­
ture ?. . .  I fear the 'softs. 1 They cannot be 
killed. The hundred heads of the hydra might be 
lopped off, but the 'softs' have no heads. They 
spring up at every hand; they sway and govern 
leg isla tu res.
Zadoc Casey, a leader of the Illinois Democracy and president of 
his state's convention defended his demands for a sm aller legislature  
with the biennial sess io n s lim ited to sixty days on the grounds that 
all the evils of the state could be traced to the leg islative branch. "If 
we had no L egislature for the la st Twelve years we would now be a 
happy and prosperous state. ” The m ost obvious example of corruption
22 D ebates of Indiana, pp. 1459, 1501.
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was in the chartering o£ banks in opposition to the interest of the
people. " The legislatures were the instruments by which the bank
frauds were perpetrated. Robert McClelland explained that the
people could not trust the legislature, because while its m embers
w ere opposed to banks when "fresh from the people, " they underwent
some unaccountable changes" in the course of the session . In this
way banks and paper money could be viewed as the source of all
political, social, and personal corruption, Ma gangrene on the body
23politic" that m ust be exorcised.
The Democratic denunciation of banks embodied m ore than 
m oral condemnation. It also asserted  that state banks of issue were 
unconstitutional. Here the m ain argument was, as the Ohio Report 
said, that "Gold and silver  coin, the constitutional currency, has 
been thrown out of circulation by the paper medium. " It was common 
parlance for Democrats in all the states to refer to the "Constitutional 
currency" of gold and silver . This was in line with the dogma of 
str ict construction which asserted  that because only gold and silver  
are mentioned in the Constitution, they were the currency dictated 
by the Founding Fathers. This seem s to have been based on a con­
fusion of sections 8 and 10 of A rticle I. The form er gives to Congress 
the power to coin money, and regulate its value; and the latter prohibits 
the states from emitting b ills of credit, and making anything but gold
23 Guaife, e d ., Convention of 1846, p. 85; Cole, e d ., Debates of 
1847, p. 124; Debates of Michigan, pp. 582-83, 581.
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2 4and silver  legal tender.
The Ohio Report also included a more sophisticated argument 
tha». was heard in the Illinois and Indiana conventions, and fully 
developed in the Ohio convention. Usually it was combined with the 
strict constructionist view that saw specie as the only constitutional 
currency. The argument began from the position that bank notes 
were b ills  of credit, and as such, came within the scope of the Con­
stitutional prohibition. If the states them selves could not emit b ills  
of credit, agencies created by the states could hardly have this 
power. In this light the creation of banks of issue by the states was 
na derogation of the true intent” of the Constitutional prohibitions 
against creating b ills  of credit and making something other than gold 
and silver  legal tender. This argument forced the Democrats into 
som e unusual positions for a party opposed to centralism . To defend 
the Democratic position, William S. Groesbeck, a Cincinnati lawyer, 
appealed somewhat loosely  to "the opinion of /th e / eminent whig 
judges, " John M arshall, Joseph Story, and John McLean, While 
this argument had nationalist overtones, Charles Reem elin declared  
"the power over the standard value, belongs to the General Government, 
and no other authority, " it was not a call for "greenback" inflation but 
rather a demand for a return to exclusive use of the only "constitutional 
currency, " gold and silver . Reem elin, who went further than m ost
24 Debates of Ohio, I, p. 707.
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Democrats in the acknowledgement that Congress had some control
over the value of gold and silver, was first and forem ost a "hard 
25money" man.
Aside from being unconstitutional and m orally dangerous, 
the Ohio Report also asserted , "The policy of a system  of paper money 
is condemned alike by sound principles of political economy, and by 
the history of paper money banking in every country in which it has 
been in use. . .." Certainly the argument from experience and history  
was one of the m ost powerful put forth by the Democracy, and in the 
states of the Old Northwest could not have but fallen on fertile  ground.
In every convention the long train of bank frauds and failures was 
detailed. It seem ed to m ost of the Democratic historians that the 
periods devoid of banks were those of the greatest prosperity while 
those which w itnessed the m ultiplication of banks of issu e were also  
the periods of greatest chaos and economic d istress. Most Democrats 
seem ed to agree with Scates who said he "had often heard of well 
regulated banks, but he never knew one of that character. " His own 
state’s experience with banks had been "fraught with ruin and disorder. " 
However, these arguments were lim ited to neither exclusively state 
nor Am erican experiences. In nearly every convention some reference
25 Cole, e d ., Debates of 1847, pp. 251-2, 266, 274-76; Debates of 
Indiana, p. 202; Debates of Ohio, IX* pp. 396, 404, 406, 525-33. 
These are exam ples of the argument. The use of the phrase 
"constitutional currency" occurs far too many tim es for citation.
165
to til© Bank of the United States was made to bolster the argument from  
experience, and ’'Whig paper money” were likened to the assignats 
issued  during the French Revolution and the ”Continentals” which 
depreciated during the Confederation period. In the Michigan con­
vention A. H. Hanscom declared ”all system s of banking are but 
m odifications of the gigantic schem es for swindling, /that are 
revealed by/ the history of the South Sea bubble, of John Law*s 
M ississipp i banking schem e, and the old bank of the United S ta tes .. . . ” 
Reem elin argued that republicanism and ”hard money” went together 
in Europe as the example of Switzerland proved. He also concluded 
from  his experience as a "merchant on two continents” that "those 
of our m erchants who acted upon the hard money principles have 
been the m ost successfu l. ” He continued, ”1 know that our trade, 
our business, our wealth, our prosperity, our happiness and /that/
of the generation after us, is jeopardized by the creation and use of 
26paper money. ”
Generally the "standard authors on political economy” were 
appealed to in order to chastize bank monopoly and condemn all 
relation between the state and banking system . These authors were 
also som etim es called upon to attack paper money inflation. In general 
it was argued that paper lacking intrinsic value did not p ossess the
26 Debates of Ohio, I, p. 708; Cole, e d ., Debates of 1847, pp. 88, 
255-62, 268V Debates of Michigan, pp. 569-70; Debates of Ohio, 
II, pp. 795-800.
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stability and uniformity necessary  for a sound currency. In fact, 
it tended to drive sound currency out of circulation. Rather than to 
defend Democratic doctrine, these authorities were generally called  
upon to "explode” the "fallacies" that paper currency was convenient, 
that banks created capital, that an increased amount of currency 
stim ulated productivity, and that there were inadequate supplies 
of gold and silver  for a circulating medium. The W isconsin Argus 
clearly  enunciated the Democratic argument in defending total pro­
hibition of bank currency,
But, says the advocate of bank paper, if you drive 
these ones and threes and fives from circulation, 
there w ill be just so much le ss  money in circulation, 
and farm ers cannot se ll their wheat, no merchants 
their goods. Well, all we can at present say to 
this is that the objection betrays a m ost lamentable 
ignorance of the laws which regulate trade and 
currency. Drive paper money or any portion of it 
from  circulation in Wisconsin, and an equal amount 
of specie would as certainly take its place as that 
water w ill seek its level; and a political econom ist 
would as soon think of objecting to the navigation of 
the ocean on the ground that water displaced by a 
ship on its course would never close up as to raise  
such an objection against the rejection of paper money. ^7
Since it was clear to the Democrats that the "standard authori­
ties" counseled the prohibition of banks of issue, they believed that 
those who advocated banks and paper money were either "blinded by 
in terest or prejudice, or. . . superficial observers who looked only upon 
the surface of things, and never examine into the philosophical principles
27 Madison W isconsin Argus, November 24, 1846, reprinted in Quaife, 
e d ., The Struggle Over Ratification, pp. 155-56.
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by which they are governed. H Reem elin summed up the argument 
against the supposed value of banks:
11 Regulate the currency, “ should read disorder  
the currency, --" create capital” means destroy it,
"bank fa c ilit ie s” should be bank difficulties, in 
facts short, banks bring about results directly the 
reverse  of what is  claimed for th em .. .  28
While just who these authorities were, is  not always clear
at various tim es Democrats referred by name to Gallatin, Gouge,
Cobbeit, McCulloch, Say, Wayland, Macaulay and Smith. It is not,
then, unusual that the opposition to banks should have been cast., in
la isse z  fa ire term s. Everywhere banks were seen as Ha monopoly”
repugnant to the teachings of c la ss ica l economic & The chartering
of bank© and the ownership of bank stock by the state were just the
kind of governmental interference that prevented the natural functioning
of the laws of trade. In Illinois, Bosbyshell insisted  that, ”The
regulation of currency and the regulation of credit are both affairs of
trade. Men want no laws on the subject except for the punishment of
fraud. They want no laws except such are n ecessary for the protection
of equal rights. n To him this meant the complete prohibition of all
banks of issu e and paper currency. Because of the existence of the
State Bank of Indiana, the convention in that state involved a lengthy
debate over the wisdom of the affiliation between the state government
and the Bank. The m ost nradical” Democrats equated the relation
28 Debates of Ohio, I, p. 708, and II, p. 800,
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between the two with the "union of Church and State. " As such it was
a danger to republican society. But more important:
All the evils that have heretofore flowed from the 
business of banking may be traced to one source: 
that of governments interfering with the natural 
laws of trade, by selecting this business out from  
the ordinary occupations of mankind, and by 
charters placing it above competition with exclu­
sive rights and immunities not allowed to any other 
business, and of becoming stock jobbers them­
se lv es. 29
L a issez -fa ire , anti-monopoly arguments led a few Democrats
to advocate m erely  the destruction of special charters, and the
implementation of general laws. In some cases such laws were to be
a radical application of the principles of la issez -fa ire  to business
with the only checks on issue to be unlimited liability. One plan
would have made banking free under general laws but allow the banks
to issu e notes on a dollar for dollar basis in relation to specie in
their vaults. In Ohio and Indiana, som e Democrats joined with the
Whigs in advocating free banking on the model of New York. The
arguments put forth in defense of these plans were anti-monopoly
arguments that emphasized equal rights rather than the inflationary
30aspects of banking under general laws.
The m ost important aspect of these proposals was the violent 
denunciation they received from  m ost Democrats. Universally Democrats
29 Cole, e d ., Debates of 1847, p. 654; Debates of Indiana, p. 1481.
30 Debates of Ohio, I, pp. 260, 158-62; Debates of Indiana, pp. HOO­
TS, 1511-1517.
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agreed that the true policy o£ their party was the elimination of all
banks of issu e be they established by special charter or general law.
After G. Yolney Dorsey, an Ohio Democrat from a Whig D istrict
proposed that the constitution embody the free banking principle,
M. H. M itchell, from strongly anti-bank Knox county, "rose to add a
remark by way of protestation on behalf of the democracy, against
the insidious and deceptive theory here put forth in the shape of a
dem ocratic theory. " He did not thinkM was necessary  for Mr. Dorsey
to sustain the argument for "the gentlemen on the opposite side of the
House. " He later presented a petition signed by sixty-two of his
constituents which stated:
We are aware that certain m em bers of your body, 
elected under the hard money issue, are about to 
prove recreant to their constituents, or to their 
duty. We beg leave respectfully to remind those 
m em bers of the fate of Judas, and the doom of 
Arnold.
In Illinois the proposal of Mr. Sherman, a Chicago mechanic for 
free banking m et sim ilar abuse. His plan was chastized as "wild, 
ambiguous, and dangerous" and "the m ost consumate system  for 
swindling purposes that the ingenuity of the Convention could devise. " 
Mr. Davis believed it would be better to keep the old system  of 
special charters than "allowing the creation of these m onsters all over 
the state, leaving its im press on the properity of the people forever. " 
Faced with a defection to free banking within Democratic ranks during 
the Michigan convention, A. H. Hanscom attacked the New York system
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of free banking as the worst and m ost dangerous system  ever 
attempted! and he predicted it would end by "beggaring the people. n 
Horace Carter told his colleagues in the Indiana convention that,
’The main difference between free banking and any other system  is  
that it only opens the door to le t the 'stealings, ' become general, 
to fifty or one hundred monopolies instead of fifteen or twenty. "31 
In making this argument that was heard in the other con­
ventions, Carter revealed the reason why a significant number of 
Dem ocrats in that state defended the State Bank's monopoly against 
free banking. The conservative policies of the State Bank, particu­
larly  its general policy of lending to farm ers and produce and 
stock dealers instead of "merchants and speculators, " and its 
lim ited expansion of note issu e, appealed to many Democrats who
O  O
feared the inflationary tendencies of free banking.
The Democracy was split on the banking issu e, but the 
m ajority stood solid ly opposed to banks in any form. In every con­
vention the Democrats proposed the complete abolition of banks and 
paper money. Everywhere they charged that banks violated the basic  
republican principle of equal rights, corrupted the leg islative process, 
conflicted with the Constitution, and stood in opposition to the dictates 
of experience and "true philosophical principles. "
31 Debates of Ohio, I, p. 162, 475; Cole, e d ., Debates of 1847, 
pp. 654-56, 327-28; Debates of Michigan, pp. 569-70; Debates 
of Indiana, p. 1442.
32 Ibid. , pp. 1440-44.
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On many issu es in these conventions, the Whigs were not 
far separated from their opponents, but on the money question m ost 
of the party defended paper money and banks. Outnumbered in every  
convention, they were much le s s  vocal than their opponents, and they 
tended to show much m ore unity on this question than the Democrats.
A portion of the Whig argument in favor of banks and paper 
money was defensive and designed to counter the arguments of their 
opponents. In the Ohio convention where the question of the constitu­
tionality of banks of issu e  was d iscussed  at length, John Green made 
a point by point refutation of Groesbeck's argument. At the same 
tim e Green represented a general Whig tendency to deny Democratic 
charges that the Whigs were the "bank party" and turn these on 
their opponents. A third aspect of the Whig argument that was 
directed at their opponents concerned the possib ility  of the elimination  
of paper currency. Here, Whigs argued that experience showed that 
specie moved to the financial centers through the course of trade 
leaving the w estern  areas without any currency to carry on day to 
day affairs. Since some sort of currency f^rould be necessary, the use 
of "foreign" notes of the lea st trustworthy character and private 
issu es like "George Smith's money" would result. Prohibition could
not work and would in fact be an abdication of the government responsi-
33bility  to protect its citizens.
33 Debates of Ohio, II, 539-45, I, 708-709. The latter includes the 
Whig Minority Report on Currency and Banking.
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This complaint about the possible consequences of Democratic 
policy signaled a difference between the parties concerning the 
proper function of the state. The Democrats tended to fear the state 
as a danger to individual freedom and they took a negative view of 
the functioning of the state. This was typified in their emphasis on 
the veto power. Within liberal thought there was a tendency toward 
anarchism  which conceived of the state as a n ecessary  evil at best.
In political economy this tendency led toward a radical la isse z  faire  
that set itse lf  against public education and even government owner* 
ship of the post office. The Democrats represented this tendency. 
However, within the bonds of liberal thought one might question an
absolute faith in la isse z  faire as, in fact, Adam Smith and many of
34 -the early c la ss ica l econom ists did.
In general, it was this tendency within liberal thought to 
which m ost of the liberal Whigs subscribed. There was no denying 
that governmental power represented a threat to liberty. In the Indi­
ana convention William Dunn argued that such powers were dangerous, 
but all "useful powers" were dangerous in proportion to their value. 
These decisions m ust be left up to the people, otherwise the consti­
tution would "deprive them of the exercise  of their free w ill. " Most
34 On c la ss ica l political economy see the suggestive studies, Lionel 
Robbins, The Theory of Economic Policy in English C lassical 
Political Economy (London: MacMillan and C o ., Ltd;;, 1952) 
and Jacob Viner, "Adam Smith and L aissez F a ire , " in John 
Maurice Clark, et a l. , A-dam Smith, 1776-1926 (Chicago: Univer­
sity  of Chicago P ress , 1928).
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Whigs agreed with James Rariden that, "Vvre must delegate power to 
guarantee individual rights and to protect public liberty. !T However, 
Rariden feared free banking and it was more typical of his party to 
see this idea as m ost compatible with free banking. Hiram Allen 
used alm ost exactly the same argument to defend free banking. It 
was the duty of the state government to protect the rights and privi­
leges of the citizens through the passage of "direct and wholesome 
law s. " Other than these few laws he would trust to individual enter­
prise . One of the leading Whig advocates of free banking in Indiana, 
John N iles, agreed that men should usually be permitted to follow  
their own in terests, but "the business of issuing paper to circulate 
as money is of a widely different character, and m ust be govorned / s ic /  
by stringent rules. " Such laws which would insure security to the bill 
holder were the "indispensable prerequisite to free competition. " 
Except in its details this argument varies little  from that of Adam 
Smith, and in one of the few Whig appeals to authority, Orthniel 
Clark argued that free banking was "demonstrated as the only true 
system  of banking by Adam Smith, who was the fir st expounder of the 
true doctrines of political economy. " Within the bounds of liberal 
thought the Whigs em phasized the m ore positive functions of the 
state in area where individual action would have been futile. To see 
them as Burkean conservatives or neo-m ereantilists, or for that 
matter advocates of the modern welfare state is to misunderstand
1 74
4*  35them.
In line with these ideas, they were as violently opposed to 
monopoly as their opponents, but did not agree with the Democratic 
definition of a bank as a monopoly. The Whigs defended free banking 
as a republican system  which rests on "our notions of free govern­
ment and equal rights. ” Monopoly was seen as the source of fraud 
and oppression. "By making the system  general, " .Mien stated,
"and extending to all the same rights under it, we not only obviate 
this obvious odious feature, but we invite into the field  the same 
saiutory and wholesome competition in banking which now exists in 
all the other departments of trade and occupations of life. " Niles 
explained his opposition to the State Bank of Indiana so lely  on the 
grounds that:
It does give to a few citizens exclusive privileges 
which are denied to others. Such monopolies should 
be created only on the ground of absolute necessity  
for they are inconsistent with the doctrine of equal 
rights. And if it can be shown that another system  
may combine the principle of free competition and 
equality of rights with safety and usefulness, that 
circum stance alone w ill be a strong argument in 
its favor. 36
35 Debates of Indiana, pp. 690, 648, 1474-78, 1647, 1436-40. Examples
contrasting views of Whig policies are: Sidney Fine, Laisseg  
Faire and the General-W elfare State (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The 
U niversity of Michigan P ress , 1956), pp. 3-25; Louis Hartz, The 
Liberal Tradition in A m erica (New York: H arvest Books, 1955),
pp. 89-142; and Dexter Perkins, "William H. Seward, " New York 
History, XY (April, 1934), pp. 160-74.
36 Debates of Indiana, pp. 1475, 1646.
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Accepting the need for a paper currency and the responsi­
b ility  of the government to protect the rights of the citizens, the 
Whigs were faced with the decision of how to best provide a safe 
and adequate currency. For m ost Whigs the price of monopoly was 
too high to pay for security if any alternative existed. Most Whigs, 
along with N iles desired "to see / a systen i/ established which shall 
combine the principles of free competition and of security to the bill 
holder. ” Free banking with stock collateral to secure the bill
holder seem ed to be such a system , and the example of New York
37showed that such a system  might work.
Only in Indiana did any sizeable group of Whigs argue for
the maintenance of a single institution and then on the grounds that
this was the only way to provide a secure currency and control the
’’money power” in the public interest. In Indiana, James Rariden
asserted , ”1 have no objection to allowing men of capital to associate
their wealth for banking purposes but I do not want them to acquire
38a power paramount to the State. ”
The Whigs believed that this would be the result of Democratic 
policy. It was generally held by Whigs that under such a. policy the 
’’power" of money would rule unchecked and that prohibition of banks 
”would make the rich man m ore wealthy and the poor man poorer, and
37 Ibid. , p. 1647.
38 Ibid. , p. 647.
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the debtor c la ss  would be entirely ruined. " "Hard money" would 
mean low prices for the farm er and an economy in which the poor 
man, lacking the facilities of credit, could look only to continued 
existence in the lower strata of society. "In its way it would be like 
dispensing with labor saving machinery. 51 The "money power" 
uncontrolled by the state would dominate the economy and make the
39people "serfs and tillers of the ground for the profit of others, . . . "
F ree banking seem ed the best way to supply the currency 
and credit necessary  for continued com m ercial growth and at the 
same tim e assure the b ill holders against lo ss .
Fortunately the votes on various issues in these conventions 
can give us some idea of the relative s ize  of factions in the two 
parties on this question and serve to underline the statements made 
concerning the position of the parties on this question. It is clear 
from the voting in the Wisconsin, Elinois and Ohio conventions that 
in these states nearly every Whig favored free banking, while a 
m ajority of the Democrats stood true to the party's "hard money" 
position. In W isconsin the Democracy broke ranks only after the 
defeat of the fir st constitution at the polls. As it was, the bank 
article in the 1848 Constitution passed by a slim  margin of five votes. 
The "hards" in the Illinois convention were referred to as the "fifty- 
eight. " F ifty-three of these were Democrats, accounting for a little
39 Debates of Ohio, I, 709; Debates of Indiana, p. 1646, 1539.
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le s s  than 60% of the party. What is surprising in the light of generally 
held views is that of the remaining 40%, all but an insignificant number 
(less than 1% of the Democrats) w ere opposed to free banking. By 
the end of the convention two-thirds of this group were willing to 
join the ’’fifty-eight” original prohibitionists to send a "hard money" 
article separately to the voters. If they could hold their ranks 
together and maintain normal attendance, they could carry the issue. 
But this is just what they failed to do. The final attempt at prohi­
bition was defeated by one vote, sixty-eight to sixty-nine. On the day 
of the vote ten of the "fifty-eight" were absent including some of 
the m ost vociferous anti-bank men in the convention such as Davis 
and Dement. The Whigs carried the day by holding their troops 
together and getting out the vote. Prohibition was defeated by the 
Whigs aided by a sm all group of Democrats who either favored free  
banks or wished to retain the special charter system . Among the 
Whigs 75% of the party voted for free banks with about two-thirds 
of the remainder favoring the old system , and a very sm all group 
(about 7. 5% of the party) opposed to all banks. One of the m ost 
significant things about the Illinois vote was the degree to which "bard 
money" sentim ent was confined to the southern and west central parts 
of the state. This had also been true of W isconsin where the older 
areas settled  by Southerners such as the "lead region" and the counties
178
on the M ississipp i supported the true Jacksonian dogma. 40
The geographic pattern in Ohio is not at all clear, but the
party positions are. Again a large m ajority of the Democrats stood
for prohibition and were beaten,by a combination of Whigs and "bank
Dem ocrats. " Here, over 80% of the party voted to prohibit the
chartering of banks of any kind and were beaten in a tie vote. The
Whigs voted solidly (94%) for a proposal to allow the voters to choose
between free banking and "no banks. " The inflationary nature of the
Whig concept of free banking can be seen in their unanimous opposition
to a Democratic "free" banking proposal which prohibited bank notes
of le s s  denomination than the m ost valuable coin issued  by the federal
government and failed to provide any other security other than un- 
41lim ited  liability.
The m ost com plicated situation was in Indiana where the 
su ccess of the State Bank confused the party alignments. Both parties 
were split by the issu e. With one exception the Whigs stood for bank­
ing of som e kind. Slightly m ore than half of the party seem s to have 
preferred a State Bank with a sizeable m inority (47%) advocating free 
banking. The Democrats w ere divided into three factions. About half
40 Quaife, e d ., Convention of 1846, Appendix I, roll ca lls, 15, 17, 
and 19; Milo M. Quaife* e d ., The Attainment of Statehood 
(Madison, ‘Wisconsin: the State H istorical Society, 1928), 
Appendix I, roll call, 108; Cole, e d ., Debates of 1847, pp. 101- 
103, 808.
41 Debates of Ohio, II, 412-13, 423-24.
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of the party opposed all banks at the outset. A sm aller group, per­
haps one-fourth of the party, favored a State Bank. As the convention 
progressed, the free banking elem ent grew to number slightly le ss  
than a m ajority of the party. When it appeared that no one faction 
could carry its principles, a com promise was worked out permitting 
both free banking and a State Bank with branches providing that the 
state had no connection with it. The only opponents of the com promise 
"were two "hard money1’ Democrats, and a dozen Whig advocates of 
a state owned State Bank. While the desire to produce a constitution 
led to the com promising of Jacksonian dogma, the early votes revealed  
a sectional split like that in Illinois. The area from the national
road south--the oldest part of the state, settled m ainly by Southerners- -
42produced 80% of the ’’hard money” votes.
The positions taken by the parties on the banking question 
are usually explained as appeals to the class interests which formed 
the basis of the parties. The Democrats were "the party of the 
ordinary run of c itizen s” and in the West received support from ”the 
frontiersm en and sm all farm ers. ” Their opponents "tended to be 
townspeople of substance- -bankers, lawyers and businessm en. ”
Some variant of this division of the parties along c lass and occupa­
tional lines is accepted by practically everyone who has written on
42 D ebates of Indiana, pp. 1446-47, 1524, and 1526.
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the period and is used to explain the Whig adherence to banks and 
43paper money.
On an occupational rather than strictly  class basis there is 
an elem ent of validity to this. Most businessm en were probably 
Whigs, particularly m erchants, manufacturers and non-specialized  
entrepreneurs. But it is not so clear that this was true of bankers. 
While there is no reason to doubt that m ost bankers were Whigs, 
there is no good evidence that this was the case. No system atic  
study of the party allegiance of bankers has been done. At best, 
historians have repeated the charges from the partisan press which
43 The above descriptions of the economic and occupational base 
of the parties are from Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era, pp. 
92-93; and Emma Lou Thornbrough,, Indiana in the Civil War 
Era 1850-1880, vol. Ill, The H istory of Indiana (Indianapolis, 
Indiana; Indiana H istorical Bureau and Indiana H istorical 
Society, 1965- ), p. 43. L iterally every book on the subject 
accepts this c la ss  explanation for party action, these examples 
are given to show the acceptance of this by the m ost recent 
scholarship. In all fairness to m ost authors, it m ust be said 
that they usually hedge, Alfred Holt says of the Whigs that 
they were "essentially  conservative” and "generally men of 
wealth and standing in their communities. " Except on the 
questions concerning Negro rights, they were the party of the 
"status quo. " However, he also says, "But not a ll m em bers of 
the Whig party were reactionary. A large portion consisted  
of farm ers and day laborers, and the party in its appeal for 
support throughout the decade, had never lost sight of the needs 
of the common man. " ("Party P olitics in Ohio, " XXXVII, pp. 
589-90,)
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44m ust be doubted until verified.
The standard contention, originating in New York to explain 
Dem ocratic lo sse s  in the late 1830’s and accepted alm ost completely  
by historians, is that growing ant:i*bank attitudes of the Democracy 
drove the bankers from the party and accounted for Whig su ccesses  
in 1840. Leaving aside the im plicit adm ission that before 1847 
bankers and their power were in the Democratic party and, by 
reverse  logic, were responsible for the victory of Jackson and his 
follow ers, one can doubt the importance of this shift of the bankers. 
Certainly som e bankers changed parties, but then, so did a great 
number of people of all c la sses  and economic groups. Particularly  
in the west, party allegiances were just forming in the late thirties, 
replacing a personal politics and factionalism  among Jackson backers 
who were not actually a party in the modern sense.
44 Lewis E. Atherton, ’’The Pioneer Merchant in M id-America, 11 
The University of M issouri Studies, XIY (April 1, 1839), pp. 
23-26; and Alexandra McCoy, ’’Political Affiliations of American 
Economic E lites: Wayne County Michigan, 1844, 1860, As a 
Test Case, ” (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Wayne State 
University, Detroit, 1965) are the only quantitative studies 
concerning the affiliations of businessm en. An examination of 
the law yers in the constitutional conventions shows a slightly  
larger percentage of lawyers among Whigs, but the difference is 
too sm all to be at all meaningful. Further study might show 
that those law yers who m ainly dealt with businessm en tended to be 
Whigs while those who dealt with large land holders tended to be 
Dem ocrats. A sim ilar suggestion is made by Charles Sellers in 
’’Who Were the Southern W higs?” American H istorical Review, 
LIX (January, 1954), pp. 335*46.
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In contrast to this traditional interpretation, there is a good
deal of im pression istic  evidence to show that the Democrats who
were involved in banking deserted neither their party nor their
occupation. In Indiana after 1843 the control of the State Bank fe ll
into the hands of the Democrats.
The only quantitative study to bear on this point tends to
contradict the traditional hypothesis. Floyd Streeter's study of
Michigan politics argues that the growing radicalism  of the Michigan
Democracy after 1837 alienated a large number of the state's "well-
to-do" men. " He quotes as evidence for this a letter from John R.
W illiams to William Woodbridge. The im pression is left with the
reader that bankers and wealthy men in general trooped into the
Whig party and helped account for the Whig su ccess of 1840. While
this may have been true to some degree, banker W illiams was not
one of the defectors, and he remained loyal to the Democracy for the
rem ainder of his life . Alexandra McCoy's study would indicate that
this was a lso  true of other bankers. In her study of the economic
elite in 1844 she found m ore bankers among the Democrats in her
sample than among the Whigs, and bankers made up a higher percentage
of the sample of Dem ocrats. It is  important to note that in 1844 the
„ 45Michigan Dem ocracy was violently anti-bank.
45 Streeter, P olitical Parties in Michigan, p. 20j John R. W illiams 
to Woodbridge, August C  1838, in the Woodbridge MSS;
McCoy, "Political A ffiliations of American Economic E lites, " 
Chapter V, Chart 10, unfortunately her sample is  extrem ely sm all.
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In this entire discussion there is a certain amount of per­
spective needed. In the fir st place there were not very many bankers 
in the Old Northwest in the 184G,s> and there is no good reason to 
believe that the Whig party was controlled by the bankers, even if 
it could be shown that all the bankers were Whigs. Among the party 
leadership there was little  c lass and occupational difference between 
Democrats and Whigs. While the Whigs were le ss  successfu l at the 
polls than their opponents, the base of their electoral strength was 
sufficiently broad and pluralistic to preclude the hypothesis of the 
domination of banker in terests. In the United States as a whole, the 
Whigs and the splinter anti-slavery groups which were composed 
mainly of ex-W higs received m ore popular votes than the Democrats 
in 1840, 1844, and 1848 (in this case the Whig elem ent of the Free 
Soil party plus the Taylor vote made up a majority. ) The national 
trend was m irrored  in the Old Northwest. Taking individual states, 
one might cite Illinois as an example of a state without the "corrupt­
ing influence" of banks which retained its Democratic purity. Yet, 
he would s till have to explain how the Whigs managed to attain 49% 
of the total vote in 1840 and 44% in 1844 in a state where there were 
no banks. He would also have to come to term s with the fact that 
Michigan, which was nearly denuded of banks in the depression and
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had none sound enough:to exert much of a ’’corrupting influence" 
reflected the national trend.
In the conventions both Democrats and Whigs appealed to 
the same economic groups. The Democrats echoed the old Jack­
sonian appeal to the "producing classes"  who were the m ost hurt by- 
depreciation of bank notes. However, they made explicit appeals to 
the m erchants and businessm en on the grounds that a specie currency  
was the only proper basis for a sound economy. They violently  
opposed any kind of inflation and assured the farm er that his interests  
were best served  by honest labor and beneficial effects of competition. 
For their part, the Whigs prom ised the farm ers and the merchants 
higher prices and economic expansion. By providing adequate 
currency and inexpensive credit the banking system  worked to the 
advantage of the farm er and the laborer as well as the businessman. 
The nature and scope of the Whig appeal can be seen in a ser ies  of 
rhetorical questions posed by the Milwaukee Sentinel and Gazette:
The agricultural in terest is the great interest of
W isconsin and this is which is suffering and will
46 Lawrence Howard Sabbath, "Analysis of the Political Leadership  
in Wayne County Michigan, 1844, " (Unpublished M. A. Thesis,
Wayne State University, Detroit, 1965). There is a need for quanti­
tative studies of the political leadership in all states. The conclu­
sions of Sabbath’s study conform with those of Lee Benson (Concept 
of Jacksonian Democracy, pp. 64-85) and Grady Me Whine y ("Were 
the Whigs a Class Party in Alabama?" Journal of Southern History, 
XXHI /Novem ber, 1957/, pp. 510-22). The election returns are 
from W. Dean Burnham, Presidential Ballots, 1836-1892 (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins U niversity P ress , 1955), pp. 246 and 248.
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continue to suffer m ost by such A'hard money"? 
legislation  as Mr. Ryan of Racine proposes to inflict 
upon us. How many settlers are there now in our 
territory who have been compelled to borrow money 
with which they bought their lands, at fifteen, twenty, 
twenty-five, aye fifty per cent interest? Do they 
think that money would command such exorbitant 
rates if we had good banking institutions here and the 
increase of capital which such institutions bring in 
their train? How many farm ers are there who are 
now daily com pelled to se ll their wheat at three, 
five, and som etim es ten cents a bushel below its 
actual value because money is scarce and Wheat 
buyers in order to get it m ust pay ten, twelve, or 
fifteen per cent in terest?  Does the wheat buyer suffer 
by such a state of things ? Not he; for whatever rate 
of usance he pays he takes good care to leave a 
wide m argin in his dealings with the farm er. How 
many m echanics and workingmen are there in our 
territory who have to take pay for their work in 
trade or orders or who m ust put up with low wages 
because m oney is scarce and only to be obtained at 
high rates of in terest?  Is it the m aster builder, the 
manufacturer, the merchant, or the forwarder that 
suffers m ost from this circum stance ? Not they; 
for whatever the rate they pay for the money which 
they m ust borrow from time to time to carry on their 
business, a proportionate reduction is made in 
the remuneration allowed to the men in their employ. 
Can it be n ecessary  to multiply these illustrations to 
show that this pretended war against capital and 
currency is in fact a war upon labor ? That however 
the money lender may profit by it, the mechanic, the 
farm er, and the laborer are equally and deeply 
injured? That is, in short, legislating for the rich  
at the expense and to the detriment of the poor? Is 
there anything just, w ise, or democratic in such a 
policy ? 47
47 Debates of Ohio, I, p. 709, and H, pp. 795-800; Cole, ed. , Debates 
of 1847, pp. 270-72, 274, 280, 653; Debates of Michigan, pp. 560, 
569, 57 5-76, 691-92, 734; Debates of Indiana, pp. 689, 694,
995, 1440, 1452-53, 1456, 1471, 1490, 1503, 1525; Milwaukee Sentinel 
and Gazette, October 17, 1846, reprinted in Quaife, ed. , The 
Struggle Over Ratification, pp. 177-79.
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It would seem  clear that the parties made their appeal to
the same economic groups; and the available studies of voting
behavior indicate that ethno-religious factors rather than class were
the prime determinents of party affiliation. However, it is also
clear that the parties differed markedly on economic questions,
particularly the banking issu e. This difference is revealed by
Glyndon Van Deusen;
In the Ohio Valley, the pushing, ambitious, go-ahead 
bankers and businessm en, canal prom oters, land 
owning in terests, lawyers with an eye to the main 
chance, and farm ers anxious for internal im prove­
m ents were m ore apt than not to be found in the 
Whig ranks.
The occupational groups described are unimportant since there is 
little  evidence that Whigs dominated any group other than businessm en,
and a great deal that "land owning interests" tended to be Democrats.
48The way in which they are described is important.
The Whigs were future oriented and appealed to those men 
who put their faith in economic progress, regardless of c la ss . By 
this they meant the progress of com m ercialization of the society.
To the Whigs the Good Society was an expanding com m ercial society  
in which agriculture, labor, and industry were alike benefited. No
48 Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era, p. 96. The studies of Benson, 
McCoy, and Ron P. Form isano, "The Social B asis of American  
Voting Behavior; Wayne County, Michigan, 1837-1852, As a Test 
Case, " (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Wayne State University, 
Detroit, 1966) c learly  demonstrate the importance of ethno­
religious factors.
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better example of Whig com m ercial-m indedness than Thomas Corwin's 
complaint to "William Green about Democratic opposition to internal 
improvements:
. . .  as out Democracy prefers to pay money for 
blowing out brains, rather than for blowing up and 
getting around rocks, that impede the progress 
of the m ost efficient c iv ilizer of our Barberous 
race—com m erce—we m ust for the present submit. ^9
As Marvin M eyers has shown, the Jacksonians tended to be
agrarian-minded, and they "wanted to preserve the virtues of a sim ple
agrarian republic without sacrificing the rewards and conveniences of
modern capitalism . " To these agrarian-minded Democrats, the state
was itse lf  dangerous and was best lim ited to a minimum of police
functions in order that society might develop in a "natural" manner.
To this way of thinking com m ercial and urban society was by its
nature corrupt. Banks were sym bolic of the corruption of the virtuous
agrarian republic by com m ercial development. The banking issue
carried socia l and psychological inferences that transcended sim ple
49 Corwin to Greene, June 16, 1846, reprinted in L. B. Hamlin, e d ., 
"Selections from the William Greene Papers I, " Quarterly 
Publications of the H istorical and Philosophical Society of Ohio, 
XIII (January-March, 1918), pp. 15-16. A sim ilar argument is  
presented by Van Deusen in "Some Aspects of Whig Thought and 
Theory In the Jacksonian Period, " American H istorical Review, 
LXIII (January, 1958), pp. 305-22. The concepts of "com m ercial­
mindedness" and "agrarian-m indedness" are developed by Lee 
Benson in Turner and Beard (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free 
P ress , I960), pp. 214-28. I have used them like Benson not to 
"denote c la sses , socioeconom ic status groups, or occupations- -  
/b u t / . . . ways of thinking" (p. 216).
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economic interest. It became the focal point for grievances directed
against the com m ercialization of American life . In a period of
swift economic and socia l change, those groups least able to adapt
to new conditions and, thus, m ost threatened by change could direct
their animus toward the institutional symbols of the type of society
50which threatened their status.
The com m ercial-m inded Whigs took a m ore positive a tti­
tude toward the function of the Good State in creating the Good 
Society. Government was conceived as a tool which the society might 
use to create the n ecessary  conditions for com m ercial--and m o ra l--  
progress. The banking issue was much m ore a real and le ss  a 
sym bolic issu e for the Whigs. Banks w ere an economic necessity ,
50 M eyers, Jacksonian Persuasion, p. vii. The conception of
Jacksonian attitudes on economic affairs presented in this book 
is s im ilar to what Richard Hofstadter calls "status politics, " 
and suggests that rather than periods when "status politics" is  
dominent, certain issu es  may be "status issues"  for one group 
and "interest issues"  for another at the sam e tim e. On the con­
cept of "status politics" see: Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid 
Style in Am erican P olitics and Other Essays (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1965), and Daniel Bell, e d ., The Radical Right 
(Garden City, New York: Double day and Company, In c ., 1963).
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providing the lubrication for the wheels of com m erce. At the state 
level, free banking was their key to economic progress and the
51
creation of a com m ercial society.
51 Since the Whig party was built on a Yankee-Protestant social 
base, it is quite possible that their w illingness to have the 
government play a positive role in the economy grew out of 
the Puritan w illingness to use the government positively in 
religious and m oral affairs. Clifford S* Griffin, Their Brother’s 
K eepers (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University 
P ress , I960) sheds some light on this question.
CHAPTER V
FREE BANKING TRIUMPHANT, 1851-1852
In the early 1850's four of the states of the Old Northwest 
passed free banking laws. Economic expansion required credit and 
currency; and free banking was the way in which certain elem ents of 
the community attempted to answer these needs. In every state, 
it was the Whigs who took the initiative in the fight to establish these 
laws and solidly supported them. The main body of the Democracy 
opposed them in line with traditional Jacksonian opposition to all 
banks and paper money. However, a faction of the Democrats joined 
the Whigs and enabled the passage of these laws* Those Democrats 
who broke with party orthodoxy were generally from rapidly develop­
ing areas inhabited by settlers from New England and New York 
whose econom ic view s conformed c lose ly  to those of the Whigs.
The period between the end of the severe depression of the 
late 1830*s and early 1840's and the onset of economic troubles in 1857 
was one of spectacular growth and expansion. With the exception of 
two tem porary setbacks in 1847-48 and 1854, each year brought 
increases in production and trade. Although such rapid growth, 
particularly in the c ities, created new social problems, the standard 
of living in the country was rising, and per capita real income was 
on the increase. A growing population, an improved transportation
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and communications network, and a gerry—built credit system  
sparked this boom. ^
In the Old Northwest free banking became the predominant 
credit and currency arrangement. Despite its faults, it provided 
adequate facilities for an unprecedented boom. It is  both futile and 
im m aterial to speculate about what might have been had some other 
system  been adopted. The Am erican people of the mid-nineteenth 
century chose to place certain lim itations on their institutional 
development in this area. Within these lim its, Am ericans of the day 
struggled to establish institutions to answer the needs created by 
econom ic change.
Probably no other section experienced such rapid growth as 
the Northwest. Nationally this period was one of a great boom in 
railroad building. By 1850 there were about 8, 500 m iles of track in 
the United States. In only seven years this had grown to nearly 24, 000, 
and investm ent in railroads had risen  from $372, 000, 000 to approxi­
m ately $1, 000, 000, 000. The Old Northwest was the major area of
X The general development of the American economy in this period 
is treated in Taylor, Transportation Revolution, pp. 345-351, and 
Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States, 
1790-1860 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, I n c ., 1966), 
pp. 206-215. While Taylor (pp. 392-95) comments on 11 Wealth 
and Income, " an extensive analysis is presented in Ralph Andreano, 
"Trends in Economic Welfare, 1790-1860, " New Views on American  
Economic Development, e d ., Ralph Andreano (Cambridge, 
M assachusetts: Sehenkman Publishing Company, In c ., 1965), 
pp. 131-167.
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this expansion. Although the le ss  developed states in the area, 
Michigan and W isconsin, ranked fourteenth and eleventh in m iles  
of track in 1860, the older states Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana stood 
first, second, and fifth. In all cases the growth rate was phenomenal. 
Ohio which had thirty nine m iles of track in 1840 had nearly 3,000 by 
1860. The population of the area went from four and a half, to nearly 
seven m illion  during the decade of the 1850*8. In that time Illinois, 
which was a reasonably large state by 1850, m ore than doubled its 
population to become the fourth m ost populous state in the Union.
By the end of the decade Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana were three of the 
top four corn producing states in the country. Again Illinois led  
this expansion with growth in output from 22, 634, 000 bushels in 1839 
to 115,174, 000 bushels in 1859. ^
Even Michigan, a relatively backward state, made extensive 
advances. Its population grew from 212, 267 in 1840 to 397, 654 by 
1850 and 749,113 by 1860. During the decade of the fifties its railroad  
m ileage increased  from 349 to 779 m iles . At m id-century Michigan 
farm ers produced 5, 500, 000 bushels of corn and slightly le ss  than
2 Taylor, Transportation Revolution, p. 79, a table on "Railroad
and Canal M ileage by Decades, 1830-1860;" Paul W. Gates, The 
Farmer* s Age, Vol. Ill of The Economic History of the United 
States, e d ., Henry David, et. al. (10 v o ls . ; New York: Holt 
Rinehart and Winston, 1945 - ), pp. 156-199, and p. 171, the
table on ’’Corn Production in Leading States;" North, The Economic
Growth of the United States, pp. 135-156.
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5, 000, 000 bushels of wheat. Oats, wool, potatoes, butter and 
cheese were all being exported in large quantities. During the next 
decade a copper mining boom, the fishing industry, and the begin­
nings of the lumber business led Michigan, as W illis Dunbar would
3
have it, "Out of the W ilderness. "
Under these conditions, a ready supply of credit and 
currency was n ecessary  to move crops and provide increased capital 
fa c ilit ies . The "revulsion against banks" of the 1840’s left the Old 
Northwest without adequate legal sources of currency and credit. 
Maurice Ross has compiled indices of the growth for capital stock, 
discounts, notes issu e and has compared this with the growth of 
population, property evaluation, and improved acreage. These show 
quite clearly  that in Indiana the legal circulating medium did not keep 
pace with the population growth and economic expansion. Much the 
same thing can be said for Ohio. Michigan represents an extrem e 
example of the dearth of legal local currency. In 1850 the state's 
four banks had paid in capital of $392, 530, or about $0* 98 per capita 
for the state. At the same tim e the per capita share of bank capital 
in the whole nation was $9. 37. The same is true of both circulation  
and deposits. The per capita share of notes in Michigan was $1. 57 
and of deposits was $0. 67, both figures only fractions of the national
3 W illis Dunbar, Michigan (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 349-391.
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4averages. Illinois was com pletely without banks of issu e.
A variety of unauthorized and extra-legal issu es filled  the 
currency vacuum. Some of these, like "George Smith*s money" 
which circulated throughout Illinois and W isconsin on a par with 
specie, were sound; but too often they were of dubious value. These 
conditions gave r ise  to demands in all of the states of the Old North­
w est for increased banking facilities that were legally  controlled and 
to prohibition of unauthorized and foreign issu es.
In the late forties Michigan had forced its few banks to supply 
bond security as collateral for their issu e, but the earlier experience 
with free banking made Michigan legislators reluctant to enact 
sim ilar legislation. The intractable John Barry was again governor, 
and his attitude regarding banks had not changed. He praised the new 
constitution for removing the monopoly status from banks and 
attempting to insure the security of their notes. However, he d is­
trusted free banking as a schem e of the bankers who were biding their 
time until there would be a shift in public opinion in favor of banks.
He continued to believe that paper money would only aid the bankers 
in their struggle to secure wealth without labor. The w orst aspect 
of free banking for Barry was that it perpetuated public debt.
If banks, then, in the failure of all other schem es, 
can have no safe foundation, but in the evidence of
4 R oss, "Commercial Banking in the State of Indiana, " pp. 57-58; 
Huntington, "History of Banking and Currency in Ohio, " p. 346; 
Gantz, "A H istory of Banking Legislation, " p . 74.
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public m isfortunes, traceable to their own pernicious 
effects, it affords at least presumptive evidence 
that the ev ils of the banking system  are so far in­
herent and inseparable, that little hope can be enter­
tained of results m ore favorable in the future. 5
There is  evidence that the opposition to banking, even in 
Michigan, was weakening. In 1851 the House of Representatives con­
sidered a free banking bill, and enough Democrats joined with the 
Whigs to bring it within a single vote of passage. The "Old Jack- 
sonians" were fighting a holding action. In Michigan they held off 
"progress, " but this was not so in the other states of the Old North­
w est. During the fir st two years of the decade Ohio, Indiana,
6Illinois, and W isconsin established free banking laws.
While the Ohio constitutional convention was meeting, per­
haps because it was believed that the convention might outlaw banks, 
the legislature enacted a free banking law on March 21, 1851. The law 
Was, a typical free banking act, but it included a provision for 30% 
specie reserve, and a unique com promise on the question of liability.
If there w ere fewer than six  stockholders, they were to be individually 
liable; in other cases liability was lim ited. This law was a product 
of the widespread demand for currency and credit, and it revealed  
the split among Democrats on the banking question. Although Jacksonians
5 Gantz, "A History of Banking Legislation, " pp. 67-69; Fuller, 
M essages, II, pp. 180-206, the quotation is  from p. 185.
6 Gantz, "A History of Banking Legislation, " p. 85.
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dominated the leg islature, enough of that party voted with the Whig
m inority to secure passage of the bill. However, this was definitely
a m inority of the Democratic party. Most of the Democratic papers
in the state opposed the law and denounced it in typical Jacksonian
terms once it had passed. The Stark County Democratic Convention
came out for general laws, but opposed any kind of bank currency.
The Democrats who did not fight for a "Constitutional currency" were
chastised along with the Whigs, The leading "loco-foco" in the state,
Samuel Medary, would only accept free banking if it prohibited all
notes under $20, When it passed without the provision, he attacked
it and assured his readers that if the people voted on the law, "they
7would have knocked it into a cocked hat. "
The su ccess of the State Bank of Indiana did not keep that 
state from  experiencing the free banking mania anymore than the 
Kelley lav/ had held back Ohio. Even before the charter of the State 
Bank was to expire there was a widespread demand in the state for 
Ma new shuffle and deal concerning banks. " A free bank bill was intro­
duced into the Senate on December 19, 1851; and a sim ilar b ill orig i­
nating in the House finally passed. The committee reporting the b ill 
free ly  admitted that if was based on the earlier New York law and was 
intended to provide adequate new facilities in the safest possible  
manner. In the debate on the b ill R. N. Hudson, a Terre Haute Whig,
7 Huntington, "History of Banking and Currency in Ohio, " pp. 436-38; 
Ohio Statesman, March 3, 4, and 22, 1851.
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used F illm ore’s Report to argue that free banking was the safest way 
to provide the sound, sufficient currency necessary  to economic 
progress. Lack of such facilities, he believed, forced down prices  
and acted as a check on "growth and prosperity. "8
While the b ill was being considered* m eetings in Cass County 
and Indianapolis called for a system  of free banking to provide adequate 
sound currency, because the state was being flooded with unsound 
"foreign" paper. Many areas of the state not served by the State 
Bank were com m ercially held back. A free banking system  would
drive out spurious "foreign" notes, extend credit throughout the state,
9
and draw active businessm en and capital to Indiana.
Historians of Indiana have viewed this free banking law as a 
product of Jacksonian opposition to bank monopoly. A careful analysis 
leads to quite a different explanation of this law. The Democrats 
clearly  placed them selves in favor of general laws. Among the eighteen  
Dem ocratic principles se t forth by the Indiana State Sentinel was: "No 
grants of exclusive charters and privileges by special legislation  to 
banks. " Also, the demands for additional currency were bipartisan. 
Alexander F. Morison, a Democratic merchant from Marion chaired  
the Indianapolis m eeting of "businessm en and other citizens" to demand
8 Esarey, "State Banking in Indiana, " pp. 278-281; Indiana Legislature. 
House Journal, 1851, I, pp. 803-808; Indiana Journal, February 27, 
1852.
9 Indiana Jou rnal, F e b ru a ry  2 and 9* 1852.
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a free banking law at which the secretary was John Defrees, the Whig
editor of the Journal. The committee that reported the bill included
ten Democrats and four Whigs. When the bill passed large numbers
of Democrats voted for it. Finally, Democratic governor, Joseph
10Wright allowed the bill to become law.
Yet, this hardly proves the contention that the b ill was a 
product of anti-monopoly Democrats. In order to promote free  
banking, which after all did create banking corporations which issued  
paper currency based on government debt, Democrats had to violate 
two of the State Sentinel's ’’principles'': "A gradual return from the 
paper credit system , " and "No swindling corporations. " It was 
Defrees who fir st introduced a free banking b ill during the 1851-52 
session , and his newspaper, the organ of the Indiana Whig party, 
was a consistent advocate of free banking. A lso, the vote on the bill 
has been m isinterpreted. Most historians have followed Logan Esarey  
who argued that the Senate vote showed a general tendency of Demo­
crats to favor the b ill and for Whigs to oppose it. Yet, he is  le ss  
than half-right. A m ajority (twenty of thirty-four) of the Democrats 
did vote for the b ill in the Senate, but contrary to Esarey, the woe­
fully outnumbered Whigs did not oppose the bill. Six out of the nine
10 Esarey, "State Banking in Indiana, " p. 281; Ross, "Commercial 
Banking in the State of Indiana, " p. 59; and Roger Van Bolt, 
"Indiana in P olitical Transition, 1851-1853, " Indiana Magazine 
of History, XLIX (June, 1953), p. 142; Indiana State Sentinel, 
February 2, 1850; Indiana Journal, February 9* 1852; Indiana 
Legislature. House Journal, 1851, I, p. 340, for com mittee, 
and II, p. 1058, for vote, and Indiana Legislature. Senate 
Journal, 1851, pp. 1018-19, for vote.
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known Whigs voting favored the bill. The house vote, ignored by
Esarey, directly conflicts with his view. There the final vote showed
the Democrats splitting with twenty-two favoring and twenty-four
opposing the bill. On-the other hand twenty-five Whigs, or 86% of
the Whigs voting, favored the bill. In the house where they had
significant strength to reflect party attitudes the Whigs provided an
absolute m ajority of the votes for free banking. The Indiana, free
banking b ill was basically  a Whig m easure supported by a large number
of Democrats in opposition to the party’s general position on banking.
The various arguments in favor of the law indicate that it was the
product of a desire for an expanded supply of currency and credit
with som e guaranteed security rather than anti-monopoly agitation
11against the State Bank.
It is interesting to note that the Democrats who supported 
free banking tended to come from the northern and central counties 
of the state which were settled by Ohioans, New Yorkers and New 
Englanders and which were econom ically the m ost dynamic areas. 
Eighteen of the twenty-two Democratic votes for free banking came 
from this area while only nine of the twenty-four opposing votes did*
The demand for banks in the new state of W isconsin also  
brought forth a free banking law that was overwhelmingly accepted by
11 Indiana State Sentinel, February 2, 1850; Indiana Legislature.
Senate Journal, 1851, p. 320; Indiana Journal, January-April, 
includes a number of editorials and articles favorable to free  
banking.
200
the people in November, 1851, by a vote of 31, 289 to 9,126. As in 
Indiana, the Democrats found that the old anti-bank position was now 
hurting them in the rapidly developing areas of the state newly 
settled by immigrants from the northern states. In 1852 a combina­
tion of bank Democrats and Whigs acted together to give that tradi-
12tionally Democratic state a Whig governor.
The struggle for a free banking law in Illinois clearly  shows 
the Whig leadership of this movement and the nature of the coalition  
of Whigs and Democrats which brought success.
Following the constitutional convention, the Illinois Democrats 
showed no sign of altering their orthodoxy concerning banking although 
the convention revealed splits within their ranks. In 1848 they renom i­
nated Governor French, a known opponent of all banks. That year 
their platform declared "hostility" to all banks "authorized by either 
general or special laws. " French set forth this position clearly  
in his m essage in January, 1849. He opposed flooding the state with 
bank paper and believed that a few5"foreign" notes "viewed with 
prejudice" were a le sse r  evil. He echoed old Democratic fears that 
bank paper would drive out specie, and that banks would only aid the 
few. A state which was "mainly agricultural" did not need a paper 
currency based on credit. Experience had showed French that banks 
were "wrong in principle" and led  only to disastrous fluctuations.
12 Wright, "Early L egislation Concerning W isconsin Banks, " p. 161; 
and Hilderman, National and State Banks, p. 109.
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French concluded this Jacksonian tour de force in typical fashion:
A currency resting upon credit, upon m ere prom ises 
to pay, while it is the m ost seductive, as holding 
out inducements to the idle, the cunning, and the 
profligate to enrich them selves without labor, is  
likew ise the m ost uncertain fluctuating and fallacious 
ever devised to cheat the toiling industrious m ass 
of mankind out of the fruits of their labor, and, 
next to the immediate interposition of Providence, 
to thwart the expectations of industry, the m ost to 
be shunned and deplored. 13
Although French represented the southern part of the state 
and its agricultural in terests in contrast to the m ore com m ercial 
northern half, he was joined in his opposition to banks by the editor 
of the Chicago Democrat, John Wentworth. Between 1846 and 1851 
Wentworth led  the anti-monopoly, anti-bank agitation. Aside from  
banks he attacked grain “m onopolists'1 and steamboat combinations. 
He was also in the forefront of the opposition to land monopoly in the 
early fifties. Like French he emphasized agriculture and exaulted 
the producer c la sse s . He identified his anti-monopoly position with 
the Democratic opposition to banks and associated  banks and land 
m onopolies with the Whigs. In March, 184-8, Wentworth praised the 
Specie Circular, because, "It broke up the speculators, the land 
m ongers, and drove them out of the country. Banks are made for 
speculators, and not for the industrial c la sses . " By "industrial 
classes"  Wentworth meant producers, not workers in industry. His
13 Illinois State R egister, May 5, 1848; Illinois Legislature. House 
Journal, 1849, pp« 8-1? for French’s m essage.
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attacks on bankers, m onopolists, speculators and businessm en as 
parasites and robbers resem bled William Cobbett's opposition to 
industrial development in England. It was part of a romantic 
Jeffersonain assault on the developing industrial and com m ercial 
world. He bitterly attacked the rising cities and associated them  
with the Whig policies of banks, tariffs, and m onopolies. As his 
biographer, Don E. Fehrenbacher, asserts  that Wentworth believed, 
"Cities th em se lv es ,. .  .w ere  but Whig creations, where speculative 
c la sses  conspired to enrich them selves at the expense of the country­
side. " Wentworth in the north, and French and Ms followers in the 
south represented a reactionary economic outlook that characterized
the Democrats of the 1850's and was out of step with even their own 
14in terests.
Many, including Democrats, did not accept this reactionary 
view. They believed that expanding currency and credit resources  
were n ecessary  and, at the same tim e, saw their state as "overrun" 
with "foreign" issu es  of dubious quality. Private currency was supple­
mented by Ohio "red backs" and Indiana "shin-plasters. " Nearly a
14 Jones, "Anti-Bank and Anti-Monopoly Movements in Illinois, " 
pp. 67-76; Weekly Chicago Democrat, March 21, 1848 quoted in 
Ibid ., p. 76; Fehrenbacher, Chicago Giant, pp. 73-74, the 
quotation is  from  p. 73. Neither Wentworth nor French was a 
poor man, and both were large land speculators. As Fehren­
bacher notes (p. 112-113), "In the very period that the Democrat 
cried  out m ost angrily against 'land monopoly’, its editor was 
laying the foundation of a large fortune by purchasing land for 
speculative purposes. "
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half a m illion dollars issued by St. Louis banks circulated throughout 
Illinois in 1S50. George Smith’s wide flung interests led to the circu­
lation of notes issued by his Georgia banks. To these men economic 
progress was being sacrificed  to outdated "scruples about banking.5,15
As soon as the constitution had been ratified by the people, 
a com mittee of the Chicago Board of Trade set out to draft a free  
banking act in line with the requirements of the new constitution.
On December 23, 1848, its suggestions were printed in the Chicago 
Daily Journal. The com m ittee recommended a standard free banking 
law with provision for liability  of the stockholders for all debts and 
a prohibition on the use of real estate as capital or as collateral for
loans. A group of Chicago’s leading businessm en petitioned the
16legislature at the same time for sound banking legislation.
A free banking bill was introduced on January 9, 1849, but 
was defeated in the House. The vote revealed the same sort of 
split in the Dem ocratic ranks that had appeared in the convention, 
a split that would widen in the next few years. The main backing for 
the law came from  the Chicago Daily Journal and the business 
community of that city, although more conservative businessm en  
such as Walter Newberry feared the ideas of stock security and indi­
vidual liability. When the bill was defeated, the .Daily Journal charged
15 Cole, Era of the Civil War, pp. 94-95.
16 Jones, "Anti-Bank and Anti-Monopoly Movements in Illinois, " 
pp. 77-79; P ierce, History of Chicago, II, pp. 118-19.
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that the Democrats were standing in the way of letting the people 
vote on the bank issu e. In the northern half of the state popular 
sentiment in favor of some kind of banking lav/ worried Democratic 
leaders who hoped that the issue would not split their party. William  
Reddick wrote French explaining the predicament of the Democrats 
in that area. He claim ed that the situation was m ore difficult than 
in the south because the largest part of the population was from  
states such as New York "where Banking is tolerated. " For politi­
cal reasons he believed the Democrats should at least allow this 
to be voted upon.
There is  the Whig party in a body for Banks--the  
Abolitionists m ostly and about one fourth of the 
Democrats and if the Whigs up here could place 
us as opposed to even permitting a vote to be 
taken on the bank question, I am sure we would be 
defeated. . . .  17
Throughout 1850 the Chicago Daily Democrat and the Illinois
State R egister attacked all banking plans as unsuited to agricultural
communities and charged with danger. One of these petitions to the
legislature opposing such legislation  argued,
We had thought our form er experience in banking 
was sufficient to satisfy  any citizen  that banks 
were a curse to the Mechanic the Farmer and the 
Labouring Man and that Capitalist / s i c /  needed no
17 Jones, "Anti-Bank and Anti-Monopoly Movements in Illinois, " 
pp. 79-83; W illiam Reddick to French, November 27, 1848, in 
French MSS.
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special Priv ileges to bring them an Equality 
with the rest of the community. That money had 
sufficient influence to hide the m ost of the views 
of its p ossessor  without banding them together in 
a sou lless Corporation. 18
However, many more petitions were received favoring a 
free banking lav/ than opposing one. The leading Whig papers in 
the state pushed for a free banking lav/ during 1850 as the election  
approached. The Rock Island A dvertiser complained that, "The pre­
sent system  has driven capitalists from the state to invest their 
wealths elsew here, and dom estic enterprise hobbles about on crutches, 
being forced to pay the unlicensed usurer twenty and twenty-five per. 
cent, interest, for the poor privilege of moving at a snail's pace. "
The Tazewell M irror and the Illinois State Journal joined in the demand 
that Illinois be allowed to control circulation within its boundaries 
and that local capitalists be permitted to profit from it. The Whig 
convention to choose a candidate for state senator from Kane, Dekalb, 
Lee and Ogle counties in the northwest adapted a resolution favoring 
a free banking law. A sim ilar Whig meeting for McHenry, Boone and 
Winnebago counties opposed "the wild destructive course" of the 
Democrats that had "cramped the energies of our industrious popula­
tion, and driven capital into neighboring states. " As a consequence
18 Elinois State R egister, June 27, 1850, in particular; petition 
of W. C. Mathews and Theodore Grant quoted in Jones, "Anti- 
Bank and Anti-Monopoly Movements in E linois, " pp. 86-87, 
em phasis in the original.
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chey supported free banking in order to aid the ''rapid growth and
permanent welfare 01 out otate" while providing adequate security
to the b ill holders. In calling for the election of legislators who
favored a banking law the F ree  Soil Chicago Tribune summed up the
argument for a free banking lav/:
It is  a m atter of deep regret, that while the 
Eastern c ities  have a good currency, and business 
m en are supplied with temporary loans at a fair 
interest, to m eet extraordinary em ergencies, 
our city and State labor under the m ost biting 
stringency, have a currency composed of rags 
and shinplasters, from every part of the Union 
and Canada. We have heretofore adverted to 
this and pointed out the remedy in the organiza­
tion of a Free Banking system  in our State based  
on our State Stocks. 19
The new legislature was dominated by the Democrats, and 
Governor French met the legislature with a standard anti-bank 
m essage charging that the use of bonds to secure the note issue was 
m erely  "show" to cover up the "odious features" of the system .
".« . No good can follow the application of ill timed and unnatural 
stimulants -which may serve to infuse into the spirit of trade a tem ­
porary, feverish  impulse to be succeeded by a corresponding
19 Ibid. , p. 86; Rock Island A dvertiser in Illinois State Journal, 
January 3, 1850; Tazwell Mirror in the Illinois State Journal, 
October 12, 1850; Illinois State Journal, January 3, October 12, 
November 23, December 19, 1850; King, "East Years of the 
Whig Party in Illinois, " p. 128; Chicago Tribune in Illinois 
State Journal, October 12, 1850.
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depression. " Although he was in favor of general laws in m ost
2 0cases, his banking views remained unchanged.
Although the legislature had Democratic m ajorities in
both houses, there were indications that those from the northern
part of the state would yield to the demands for banks. The Peoria
Democratic P ress  came out in favor of free banking in late December
as the only ’’way to regulate the currency. ” The paper mainly
em phasized the need for sound currency rather than an expansion of
credit. Along with the Illinois State Journal, the Peoria Democratic
P ress attacked the governor's m essage. Even Wentworth's Daily
Democrat came to the position that if any banking law had to be
passed, it might best be based on the New York free banking act.
E. Wilcox of Elgin wrote French that the Democrats were being
"assailed at every corner" by people demanding a free banking law.
In his opinion it would be best to let such a law go to the people if
passed by the legislature so the Whigs could not say he was "inter-
21posing" h im self between the people and the ballot box.
The Illinois State Journal argued that the initiative lay with 
the Democrats since they controlled the legislature, and it was a 
group of Democrats who steered  the free banking b ill through. Early
20 Illinois Governor, 1846-1853.
21 Peoria Dem ocratic P ress in Illinois State Journal, January 3, 
January 17, February 22, and March 17, 1851; Jones, "Anti- 
Bank and Anti-Monopoly Movements in Illinois, " p. 88; E.
Wilcox to French, January 27, 1851, in French MSS.
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in the sess io n  Thomas Dyer engineered the election of Sidney 
B reese as Speaker of the House and was rewarded with the chairman­
ship of the Committee on Banks and Incorporations. On January 14, 
1851 he reported the b ill from committee, and it was passed by the 
House on February 8 and the Senate five days later. However, the
bill was returned to the legislature on February 15 with the gov- 
22ernor's veto.
French offered five reasons for returning the bill: there 
was no specific specie reserve and thus gold and silver were "vir- 
tually dispensed with”; there was not adequate liability of stock­
holders; it offered no safeguard against speculation; no check was 
placed on foreign circulation; and no general election was to be 
held in November, 1851, so the b ill could not comply with the consti­
tution. He believed that in general free banking was a dangerous
23experiment, and had not been proved in New York.
With little  change in the vote the b ill was passed over the 
governor's veto on February 15. An analysis of the vote, particularly  
the House vote, on this b ill shows two things. It was basically  backed 
by Whigs; and it found its greatest support from legislators repre­
senting d istricts north of Sangamon County. When the bill was before
22 Illinois State Journal, January 10, April 21 and 24, 1851; Jones, 
"Anti-Bank and Anti-Monopoly Movements in Illinois, " pp. 88- 
89; Illinois .Legislature. House Journal, 1851, pp. 62, 292-93; 
Illinois Legislature. Senate Journal, 1851, pp. 330-31.
2*3 Illino is L e g is la tu re . House Journal, 1851, pp. 474-77.
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the legislature, the Democratic organ, the Illinois State Register 
attacked the law and the Whig Illinois State Journal supported it.
The parties split rather evenly in the Senate, the Whigs in the House 
supplied a m ajority of the votes favoring the law with more than 
80% of that party voting for free banking. The law passed because 
a large m inority of the Democrats in the House and a slight majority 
in the Senate favored it. Looked at sectionally over 80% of the 
northerners favored, and nearly 70% of the southerners opposed the 
bill. Even avowedly anti-bank representatives from northern con­
stituencies such as E. B. Ames and Peter Sweat supported the law 
because of the demands of their constituents and the belief that it
was politically m ore expedient to set the question before the people
24than to allow it to divide the party.
The bill enacted -was a broad free banking law allowing the 
use of any state or federal bonds with a discrim ination against 
Illinois stocks, no personal liability, and no specific specie reserve. 
There was a bank com m ission and the banks were to publish quarterly  
statem ents. A provision which later caused some problems lim ited
24 Illinois Legislature. House journal, 1851, pp. 478-79; Illinois 
Legislature. Senate Journal, 1851, p. 421; the exchange in late 
February and early March between the Illinois State Register 
and the Illinois State Journal; Jones, "Anti-Bank and Anti- 
Monopoly Movements in Illinois, " p. 91; King, "Last Years of 
the Whig Party in Illinois, " p. 129; S. B. Ames to French,
April 12 and December 16, 1851, and Peter Sweat to French, 
December 22, 1851, in the French MSS.
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in terest to 7%. ^
The b ill could not become law until voted on by the people; 
and as French pointed out, there was to be no general election in 
1851. To solve this objection a b ill was forced through the le g is ­
lature removing all of the county treasurers and requiring an
26election to fill the vacancies on November 4, 1851.
During the summer and fa ll the banking question was 
violently debated in the partisan press with the Whigs carrying the 
fight for the law and the Democrats opposing it. Sectional splits 
com plicated the situation. The Chicago Daily Democrat remained 
neutral. Wentworth explained that, ’’There is a perfect mania in 
this area for banks and the man who says a word against this is  
bound to be run over. ” There is some evidence that southern Whigs 
supported the law le ss  ardently than their northern counterparts.
The usually partisan Alton Telegraph remained neutral, and one of 
French’s admittedly prejudiced correspondents asserted  that in 
B ellev ille  both parties opposed the bill. However, the opposition 
was b asica lly  partisan coming from ’’radical” Democrats north and 
south. Speeches against the b ill were given by Sidney B reese,
William H. B isse ll, John Reynolds, Gustave Koerner, James Shields, 
and Jam es C. Allen, all leading Democrats. R allies damning the
25 Dowrie, ’’The Development of Banking in Illinois, ” pp. 135-38.
26 Ib id ., p. 138.
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bill were held in eleven southern, but staunchly Democratic,
counties. The Peoria Democratic P ress continued to back free
banking, but other leading Democratic papers, the Illinois State
the Joliet oignal, the Galena Jeffersonian, the Benton
Standard, the Charleston Globe, and the B elleville  Sun, remained
violently anti-bank* The Rock Island Weekly Republican was formed
to advocate a return to "a constitutional currency as the circulating 
27medium. "***
In general these papers echoed the governor's veto and the 
traditional anti-bank arguments, asserting that all bank "schemes"  
inevitably led to "disastrous contractions* " As usual the Democrats 
asserted  that the passage of the bill was accomplished by fraud 
and engineered by "the Chicago money oligarchy. " Uri Manly, a 
southern Democrat* chastised the Democrats of the north for devoting 
"them selves entirely to the serv ice of the Mammon God. " The 
Benton Standard added a new twist to the old arguments by connecting 
the free banking law with free so ilism . It believed that the Democratic
27 Jones, "Anti-Bank and Anti-Monopoly Movements in Elinois, " 
pp. 90 -102; Chicago Daily Democrat, May 8, 1851, quoted in 
Ibid ., p. 88, ftn. 66; Rock Island Weekly Republican, October
8, 1851, quoted in Ibid ., p. 91* W. H. Woodward to French,
May 7, 1851, in the French MSS. Aside from the Illinois State 
R egister and other papers mentioned by Jones, articles from  
the Benton Standard, the Joliet Signal, and the Charleston Globe 
reprinted in the Illinois State Journal, March 10 and 21, 1851, 
show these papers opposed the law.
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party should be divested of:
Those Bank Mongers who have so far been a curse 
to it, and. *. those who would destroy this glorious 
Union, for the purpose of severing the relation  
of m aster and servant in the Southern States, and 
we declare our increasing hostility to banks--to  
freesoxlism  and freeso il men, wherever and 
whenever they present them selves. 28
The argument, however, was basically old and fam iliar.
It was concisely  stated by the Galena Jeffersonian on the eve of the
election:
On the question to be submitted to the people at 
the next November election, * Banks or no Banks, 1 
we shall assum e the old and safe Democratic 
ground, of opposition to the establishm ent of all 
moneyed corporations, having the power of loan 
and discount. Our reasons are those that have 
influenced us in the opposition we have carried  
on against such institutions for years p ast--  
reasons that now hold good against this particular 
form, nay all form s of banking, by legislative  
charter; and reasons, we think, that are im preg­
nable. We are opposed to Banks as wrong in 
principle- -as injurious to the interests of the 
m a sse s --a s  favoring the accumulation of capital 
in a few hands, where it may be, and is , wielded for 
the oppression of the many. We oppose them as 
aristocratic and anti-republican, in their tendencies 
and purposes. They build up a favored and distinct 
c lass in the community. Those who compose it, 
without labor, live by legal, but not just privileges, 
off the sweat and toil of the unfavored many.
Banks add not a cent to the sum total of the 
productive industry of the country. --T hey produce 
no wheat, they dig no m ineral--but furnish facilities  
to the speculator to live from the wheat and lead  
that others have reaped and dug.
28 Uri Manly to French, March 2, 1851 in the French MSS; Benton 
Standard in Illinois State Journal, March 10, 1851.
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Banks derange the natural and universal 
currency of the world, by giving a ficticious 
value, or an unnatural depression, to the precious 
m etals. By their expansions and contractions, 
they hold the property and labor of the country at 
their control. . . . They have no sympathies with 
the people. They are selfish , tyrannical, and 
soulless. Banks are a cu rse --a  legacy that the 
aristocratic tendencies of a by-gone age has left, 
as a means to fill the place of baronial usurpation, 
and feudal exactions. They are the engine of a 
new form of oppression. They are the working 
machine of a new feudalism --a  feudalism  in which 
bank notes serve, instead of hired and m ercenary  
cut-throats. . . .  It is now the tyranny of capital 
over lab or--a  tyranny that the aggregation and 
m ultiplication of cap ita l--its  special immunities 
and exem ptions--called  banking, is striving to 
extend and perpetuate.
Civilization has too far advanced, for the con­
tinuance of the evil engendered and kept alive 
by this monstrous system . The Democratic party 
has fought it too long, not to recognize in the bill, 
now under discussion by the people an old and 
w ell known enemy. . . .  29
The advocates of the free banking b ill tried to picture the 
question as a non-partisan one. Judge William Thomas wrote to the 
Morgan Journal that no test of Whig principle was involved and the 
question was thus up to the Democrats. The Chicago Daily Journal 
reminded its readers that the b ill was introduced by a "locofocon 
com mittee and passed by a ’Tocofoco'1 legislature. The Illinois
29 Galena Jeffersonian quoted in Jones, nAnti-Bank and Anti-Monopoly 
Movements in Illinois, ” p. 98, ftn. 88, emphasis in the original.
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State Journal referred to the law as the "Democratic Bank L aw ,1,30 
There even seem s to have been some vocal Whig opposition. 
The Chicago Commercial A dvertiser revealed a strain of Whig 
opposition to free banking that might be equated with the minority  
Whig view in Indiana that supported the State Bank. This view which 
does not seem  to have been widely accepted, represented conservative 
distrust of a bond secured currency and the desire for a return to 
the old system  of banking on capital with adequate checks against 
fraud.
Yet, for all this it is clear that the main argument in favor
of the law was carried by the Vfhigs. Judge Thomas, an old line
Whig, was defending the b ill when he insisted  the Democrats would
decide the question. If the Alton Telegraph remained neutral,
main organs in the central and northern parts of the state, the
32Illinois State Journal and the Chicago Daily Journal, did not.
30 Judge William Thomas to the Morgan Journal in Illinois State 
Journal, February 22, 1S51; Chicago Daily Journal in Illinois 
State Journal, April 21, 1851; Illinois State Journal, August 7,
1851.
31 Chicago Commercial A dvertiser in Illinois State Journal, March 3, 
1851.
32 Illinois State Journal, January-April and September-October, 
nearly every issue; two artic les from the Chicago Journal in 
the Illinois State Journal, February 22 and April 21, 1851; 
two artic les from the Morgan Journal in the Illinois State 
Journal, March 18 and 19, 1851.
The argument in favor of the law included the usual 
recrim inations and charges of m isrepresentation. French's veto 
m essage was rebutted, and the State Register was attacked for 
being unwilling to trust "the honest judgement of the people. " The 
superior security of the b ill and the fact that it gave local control 
over the currency were emphasized in all the papers. In the Illinois 
State Journal a fam iliar Whig theme appeared. The free banking 
law would lower interest rates by extending the supply of credit 
thus enabling m echanics to compete with wealthy men in business. 
Expanded credit and a reasonably sufficient money supply aided all 
c la sse s  by providing for increased business and "healthy and rapid 
growth. " Illinois, the State Journal argued, had all the disadvan­
tages of banks and none of their advantages. In particular it 
em phasized that free banking would make "the poor man equal to 
the rich, by putting the credit and enterprise of the one on par 
with the money bags of the man of wealth, (true democracy that). "
A ser ie s  of artic les by "Mechanic" pointed out the evil effects of 
an inadequate currency and high interest rates which he believed  
would be alleviated by the free banking law. This led to an exchange 
with the editor of the Illinois State Register in which "Mechanic" 
argued that by stimulating the economy and making credit available, 
banks extended opportunity. In each of these artic les the self-m ade  
man rising from  his position as a poor but industrious mechanic
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wag eulogized. As the election came closer  the State Journal took
on a m ore non-partisan stand, and defended the b ill as providing a
33sound, well secured currency.
Although a number of Democrats predicted the b ill’s
defeat, and northern politicians assured their southern compatriots
that they personally would vote against it, the free banking act was
carried by a vote of 37, 573 to 31, 321. The northern Democrats
who had broken with party orthodoxy seem  to have represented the
w ishes of their constituents. Only four counties north of Sangamon
turned in anti-bank m ajorities while in the southern part of the
state the law was overwhelmingly opposed in all except traditionally
Whig strongholds. French’s correspondent in Chicago who assured
him hardly anyone favored the ’’bank project" was indulging in
wishful thinking, for that area turned in m ajorities from 85% to
95% in favor of the law. The Alton Telegraph explained the stand
of the southern counties in term s of their sparse population devoted
to agriculture "having little relish  or aptitude for speculation or
adventure" and not feeling the need "for banking facilities experienced
34by those men imbued with the spirit of ’go-aheaditiveness.
33 Illinois State Journal, February 24, April 9, 11, 16 and 19, 
September 11, 12, 13 and 18, 1851.
34 Cole, Era of the Civil War, pp. 96-97; Alton Tri-W eekly T ele­
graph, November 20, 1851, quoted in Jones, "Anti-Bank and 
Anti - Monopoly Movements in Illinois, " p. 105.
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Most leading Democrats from Stephen Douglas on down 
opposed the law* but there seem s to have been a consensus among 
northerners that politically it was best that the question was out of 
the way. .Ames and Sweat warned French that the Illinois Democracy 
had to be careful not to be defeated "purely by the cursed bank 
question, " and pointed to the examples of M issouri and Wisconsin. 
Douglas believed that the combination of Whigs and "bank-Democrats" 
could pass any m easure, and, thus, it was politically inexpedient 
to "carry the question into the next general election /and/ enable
the combination to carry not only that m easure but the Legislature
35and the state Government. "
By the end of 1852 Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and W isconsin 
had implemented free banking laws, and a sim ilar m easure was 
defeated in the Michigan House by a single vote. In each ease these  
laws w ere carried by a coalition of Yvliigs and Democrats. While 
historians have generally noted this, they have overem phasized the 
part played by the anti-monopoly Democrats. The concept of 
"Agrarian Radicalism" which has served to connect the Jacksonians
3 5 Douglas to Charles H. Lanphier, December 30, 1851, in 
Johann sen, e d ., Letters of Stephen A. Douglas, p. 235;
J. McRoberts to Koerner, December 6, 1851, in Greene, e d ., 
"Letters of Gustav Koerner, " pp. 241-43; Elam Rust to French, 
November 27, 1851, E. B. Ames to French, December 2, and 
December 16, 1851, and Peter Sweat to French, December 22, 
1851, in the French MSS.
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with the currency reform ers and opponents of monopoly in the late 
nineteenth century has confused the interpretation of ante-bellum  
m onetary conflicts. Clearly, this is a misreading of the situation 
influenced by subsequent events. ^
No faction within the Democratic party in 1850 was demand­
ing inflation to aid the debtor in terests. The party and its leading 
spokesm en stood for quite the opposite and warned of the dangers 
of rising prices induced by inflated currency. The debtor was looked 
upon as m orally  suspect and a social consequence of banks and 
paper money. In their policy toward interest rates, the Democrats 
opposed "usury" laws which would set a legal rate of in terest as 
vehemently as they opposed inflation and attacked the Whigs for 
advocating these p olicies.
The Democrats were split into two factions on the bank 
question. The m ajority of the party echoed the old Jacksonian
36 This is seen clearly  in R oss, "Commercial Banking in the State 
of Indiana, " p. 59. Typical examples of the use of some form  
of the "Agrarian Radicalism ' concept to connect the Jacksonians 
with reform  elem ents in the post war period are: Horace S. 
M errill, Bourbon Democracy of the Middle West  (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana: Louisiana State University P ress, 1953); Frank L. 
Klement, "Middle W estern Copperheadism and the Genesis of 
the Granger Movement, " M ississipp i Valley H istorical Review, 
XXXVIII (March, 1952), pp. 679-94; and Stanley L. Jones, 
"Agrarian R adicalism  in the Illinois Constitutional Convention 
of 1862, !t Journal of the Illinois State H istorical Society, XLVIII 
(Autumn, 1955), pp. 271-82, Chester McArthur Destler, 
Am erican Radicalism , 1865-1901 (New York: Octagon Bocks, 
1963 ed. ), m odifies this, but connects the Jacksonians with 
post war radicalism .
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distrust of banks and paper money. Their fear of government debt 
further caused them to oppose free banking laws at the same time 
they favored free corporation laws in other areas. A m inority 
group in the party split with the m ajority to back free banking laws 
as the safest way to supply a sound w ell decured currency. In 
general, this group represented the more newly settled areas of 
their states and those with the greatest economic potentiality. These 
areas in contrast to the older ones, harbored populations heavily 
from New England and New York; and the Democrats found it 
politically  n ecessary  to split with Jacksonian dogma concerning 
banks. Neither group took a very dynamic view of the economy, but 
a large number of the no bank group were '‘agrarian" reactionaries 
opposed to the industrialization, and com m ercialization of American 
life . This antipathy was neither complete nor ideological, but 
represented a carry over of traditional Jacksonian rhetoric and 
resentm ent of older areas that were being econom ically overshadowed.
The fight for free banking was carried on by the Whig press  
and m ost of the votes for the laws came from Whigs, but the bank 
question also split their ranks. Historians have generally implied  
that the Whigs, since they opposed the anti-monopoly Democrats, m ust 
have favored "monopoly. " Yet, this was hardly the case. There was 
a conservative m inority in the Whig party that opposed free banking 
as a danger to economic stability and preferred to establish some 
kind of State Bank or return to the old system  of leg islative charters.
220
In the parlance of the day this made them m onopolists. What is 
important about this group was how sm all it was. While there is  
no reliable way to judge the size  of this group among the rank and 
file , the votes in the state legislatures indicate that fewer than 
twenty per. cent, of the Whig politicians represented these views. 
This percentage was undoubtedly sm aller among the rank and file . 
The vast m ajority of the party and the leading party organs in every  
state stood solidly opposed to ’’monopoly" and in favor of free 
banking. The views of this m ajority group were m odernist and in 
tune with the economic changes taking place at the time. They 
conceived of the economy in dynamic, expansionist term s; and cast 
their appeal to the benefits to be derived for all groups from this 
expansion. The keynote of their policy was equality of economic 
opportunity. While they were not pure and sim ple inflationists, 
and em phasized the idea of convertability, it was this faction of 
the Whig party which advocated increasing economic activity and 
raising farm  prices by expanding the money supply. On the question  
of in terest this group usually advocated legal lim its, and one power­
ful argument for free banking was that the competition of new banks 
would hold the rates down. From  this all em erged a positive con­
ception of the role of government that was in conflict with the views 
of m ost of their opponents.
CHAPTER VI
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS, 1852-1857
The panic of 1854 caused the advocates of free banking to 
attempt, over the next several years, to reform the system s in 
order to alleviate the problems brought forward by that c r is is . The 
attempts at such reform  reveal a continuity between the Whigs and 
Republicans on the banking question. The new party continued Whig 
attempts to supply adequate credit and currency through the use of 
free banking. It a lso  took over the Whig emphasis on the creation 
of opportunity through economic development. The Democrats con­
tinued their traditional opposition to banks of any kind.
The passage of the free banking laws brought neither the 
financial utopia envisioned by their friends nor the disaster fore­
told by their enem ies. There were both su ccesses and failures, but 
the dominant note of the period between 1852 and 1857 was experi­
mentation as each state modified and altered its banking laws to 
m eet its needs for credit and sound currency.
Entrepreneurs moved quickly to organize new banks under 
the free banking law s. Twelve new banks appeared in Ohio during 
1851 and another was organized in early 1852 before the attorney 
general ruled that further organization would be of doubtful legality  
under the new constitution. Ninety-four free banks were organized 
in Indiana in the three years following the passage of the new law.
To the w est, the prospective bankers were slow to organize hoping 
that their state’s law would be liberalized  and the discrim ination
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against Illinois banks removed, but by the end of 1852 there were 
seventeen new banks in the state. Within two years this number had 
grown to thirty-one, ten of which were located in Chicago. With 
W isconsin undergoing a sim ilar expansion, it is not surprising that 
the years between 1852 and 1854 saw an increase in economic activity  
in the Old Northwest. A careful student of economic trends during 
this period, Thomas S. Berry, has written, "It is not inaccurate to 
say that capital was m ore abundant than any time on record. " In a 
single year between 1853 and 1854 loans and discounts in the West 
increased 37%. ^
Unfortunately a great deal of currency and credit upon which 
the expansion came was from  illega l and extra-legal sources. Private 
bankers and brokers continued in business, because of provisions 
concerning maximum interest rates embodied in the free banking laws. 
In line with Whig desire to hold down interest rates, Illinois free  
banks were lim ited to charging 7% and Ohio banks were lim ited to 6%. 
Neither figure coincided with the rates received by other institutions 
or the ’’natural" rate determined by the market. As a consequence the 
free banks did not usually go into the discount business and loaned 
their entire issu e to private brokers who avoided the in terest ceiling  
and taxes on discounts. In Ohio a law pushed through by the Democrats
1 Huntington, "A H istory of Banking and Currency in Ohio, ” p. 438;
Hammond, Banks and P olitics, pp. 617-622; Jam es, Chicago Banks,
I, pp. 215-218; and Berry, W estern P rices, p. 510.
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raised the maximum rate of in terest on special contracts to 10%.
This law, designed to draw capital into the state, undermined the
lim itations established by the free banking laws, and led to an
increase of private uncontrolled banks of discount. Although the
branches of the State Bank could not be connected with these private
bankers and brokers, this was not the case with the free bankers.
By 1854 there were fifty three private banks in Ohio alone. The
general resu lt was to undermine a sound currency as these brokers
2
searched for the cheapest money available to lend at high rates.
In Michigan the need for added currency was m et with a 
device which was used to a le s se r  degree in the states with free  
banking laws: the resuscitation of dormant institutions whose charters 
had not expired. Five of the old chartered banks that had gone down 
in the depression of the late 1830‘s reappeared am id storm s of pro­
test in the 1850fs. Thus brokers kept in terest rates up and drew in 
questionable foreign notes while extra-legal and resurrected in sti­
tutions supplied an adequate but hardly stable or secure currency. By
1854 the number of free banks had grown, but it was apparent that
3the condition of the currency had not m easurably improved.
Each state attempted to correct the problems of unauthorized 
banking and untrustworthy foreign notes* In Illinois a drastic m easure
2 Jam es, Chicago Banks, I, pp. 232-38; and Huntington, “A History  
of Banking and Currency in Ohio, " pp. 443-446.
3 Gantz, “A H istory of Banking Legislation, ” pp. 79-82.
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made it a felony to issue or receive on deposit any currency not 
issued  by banks legally  established in Illinois or some other state. 
Similar restrictions in Ohio were undermined by the 10% law, and 
attempts of Michigan to restr ict unauthorized banking were flagrantly 
violated. J2ven le s s  successfu l was the Ohio law of 1854 which forbade 
the circulation of all foreign notes under $10. The advocates of free  
banking tended to support the laws against unauthorized banking 
while prohibition on sm all notes received the support of the Demo­
crats and was opposed by the Whigs. ^
Following the passage of the free banking laws, the Whigs 
defended the new system  while the Democrats were either silent or 
sharply critica l. Democrats from northern Illinois were generally  
happy to have the issu e settled, but an active effort was made to 
revive the no-bank issue and repeal the free banking law. Joel 
Matteson received  the nomination for governor in 1852 only after 
assurances that he was really  opposed to banks. The following year 
the anti-bank Democrats pushed a repeal b ill through the Senate, but
4 Jam es, Chicago Banks, I, pp. 224-31; Huntington, "A History of 
Banking and Currency in Ohio, " pp. 446-447; and Gantz, UA 
H istory of Banking Legislation, ” pp. 77-78.
225
* Cit was lost in com mittee in the House.
Indiana's Democrats were skeptical about free banking.
Governor Wright predicted the law contained insufficient restrictions
against abuse. He warned of the problems of inflation and of business
fluctuations which aided speculators, but hurt the "producing c la sses . "
He believed that unless the law was modified, a sound currency could
not be provided. He would lim it the denominations to le s s  than "five
or ten dollars, " create a bank com m ission and a special office to
control currency, lim it the security to Indiana stocks or real property,
6and require directors to be residents.
The Democratic attorney general of Ohio undermined the 
state's free banking law in 1852 by ruling that the law was unconstitu­
tional. During the same period the bank question became involved 
with the revision  of the state's tax system . The Whigs had passed the 
Revenue L.aw of 1846 over Democratic opposition so that "every citizen  
/would pa^/ an equal share of the public burden in proportion to his
5 Elam Rust to French, November 27, 1851, E. B. Ames to French, 
December 2, 1851, and December 16, 1851, Peter Sweat to French, 
December 22, 1851, P. B. Wake (?) to French, December 27,
1851, Sidney B reese to French, January 5, 1852, and (?) to 
French, January 21, 1852 in the French MSS; Douglas to Charles 
H. Banphier, December 30, 1851, in Johansen, e d ., Betters of 
Stephen A. Douglas, p. 235; J. Me Roberts to Koerner, December 
6, 1851, in Greene, e d ., "Betters to Gustav Koerner, 1837-1863," 
pp. 241-243; Jones, "Anti-Bank and Anti-Monopoly Movements in 
Illinois, " pp. 121-124.
6 Indiana Begislature. Documentary Journal, 1852, Part I, 
Document 2 /m islab led  Part II, Document TJ.
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ability to sustain i t . . . . " The Whigs claimed it was a system  of
equal taxation while the Democrats saw it as aid to the hanks which
w ere based on state stocks. Mr. Eger ton believed that state stocks
should be allowed to depreciate "because the banks are based upon
7those stocks, and if the State stocks go down so m ust the banks. "
The Democrats continued to argue that the banks were 
being favored in relation to other forms of property, and in their con­
vention in 1850, the party favored taxing the banks in the same way 
"the people" were taxed. In 1851 and 1852 Democratic tax laws were 
passed extending bank taxes to all form s of bank "property": notes 
issued, b ills discounted or purchased at a profit, and average amounts 
of money loaned. The institutions were not allowed to deduct their 
debts from their a ssets . The banks took the issue to the courts 
where they were upheld, and the laws of 1851 and 1852 were declared  
unconstitutional. While this litigation was in progress, a final 
Democratic m easure called the "Crow Bar Lav/” was enacted p er­
m itting county treasurers to break into the vaults of protesting banks
8and se ize  unpaid taxes plus penalties and incurred costs,
Whigs, Free Democrats, and a few bank Democrats opposed 
these law s. They tended to view this as an attack on the banks rather
7 Bates, Alfred Kelley, pp. 143-171, Kelley is quoted on p. 153, 
and Egerton on p. 151, em phasis in the original.
8 Ohio Statesman, January 10, 1850; Huntington, "A History of 
Banking and Currency in Ohio, " pp. 459-461; and Roseboom, 
The Civil War Era, pp. 136-137.
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than as a system  of ’’equal taxation. ” They did not oppose taxing 
the hanks hut m erely  the unconstitutional and overly-hard taxes 
imposed by the .Democrats. In 1850 the Whigs and Free Soilers had 
strengthened the provisions of the 1846 law and provided for taxing 
banks on their capital and surplus. The new Republican adm inistra­
tion in 1856 enacted the Kelley Bank Tax Law named for the author of 
the 1846 act who had gone into the new party. This taxed capital, 
surplus, contingent fund, and undivided profits. ^
The free banking system  received its fir st economic trial 
during the brief economic downturn of 1854. The upswing of the early  
years of the decade had featured an increased investm ent in railroad  
construction along with a general r ise  in prices. This was aided in 
1853 by a crop failure and the outbreak of the Crimean War. However, 
the war proved a shock to foreign investment, and the sale of both 
railroad and state secu rities declined. Since the railroads badly 
needed construction capital, they entered the m id-w estern market 
causing in terest rates to climb and a money stringency dampened 
business. A continual r ise  in the rates of New York exchange from  
1853 until November of 1854 precipitated a run on the Ohio free banks 
in May that soon spread to Illinois and Indiana. At the same time, 
eastern bank notes, which still composed a large percentage of western  
currency, were being withdrawn leaving only the w estern currency,
9 Huntington, "A H istory of Banking and Currency in Ohio, " pp. 458, 
462; and Roseboom, The Civil War Bra, p. 138.
228
which was being undermined by declining stock prices and the runs on
the banks1 coin supply. In August the Cincinnati banks refused to
take Indiana free bank notes and confidence in the free banks was
shattered. Indiana was severely  hit with m ost of her new institutions
failing. Ten of Ohio’s banks and eight of Illinois’s new banks also
fe ll although the system s of the two states suffered the shock 
10reasonably w ell.
The Panic of 1854 was m ainly financial and rather quickly 
gave way to a renewed boom from  1855 to 1857. This boom was particu 
larly  felt in the w est and demands for currency increased amid a m ild  
revival of anti-bank attitudes. In all of the states credit facilities  
had to be provided and alterations in the free banking system s had 
to be made in the light of the experience of 1854.
The year 1854 brought not only a break in economic expansion, 
but a lso  a disruption of the party system  which caused a realignment 
of political groups and in terests. The new Republican party replaced  
the Whig party which soon com pletely disappeared from the scene.
At the same time the Democratic coalition was altered. The process  
of party re-alignm ent was not an immediate but an on-going one 
during the m id-1850's. Some early leaders quickly fell away; others 
who would later become leaders held back.
10 Som ers, ’’The Perform ance of the American Economy Before 1860, 
pp. 334-35; M argaret G. M yers, The New York Money Market: 
Origins and Development (New York: Columbia University P ress, 
1931), p. 140; and Berry, Western P rices, pp. 510-517.
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The two issu es m ost responsible for this political upheaval
were the r ise  p-f nativism  and the question of the expansion of slavery
revived by the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. While both
parties were affected by both issu es, it was nativism  that "choked"
the Whigs, and the Nebraska question that splintered the Democrats.
The Whigs had been losing steadily to anti-slavery third parties
which bit le ss  deeply into the Democratic electorate. Traditionally
the Whigs had been the party of native Protestants, and the strange
combination of political reform and anti-for eignism  which arose in
the early fifties appealed to many m embers of the older party. This
spirit increased after it appeared that ithe votes of immigrants were
11
responsible for P ier ce ’s victory of 1852.
In the Old Northwest nativism  tended to be anti-Catholic 
rather than anti-foreign and, in this form, served to break some
11 Most suggestive on the rise  of the Republican party are Andrew 
Wallace Crandall, The Early History of the Republican Party, 
1854-1856 (Gloucester, M assachusetts: Peter Smith, I960);
Henry C. Hubbart, The Older Middle West, 1840-1880 (New York: 
R ussell and R ussell, In c ., 1963), pp. 1-29, 88-116; Streeter, 
Political Parties in Michigan, pp. 100-253; Roseboom, The 
Civil War Era, 2 55-312; Tho mb rough, Indiana in the Civil War 
Era, pp. 1-84; Charles Zimmerman, "The Origin and .Rise of 
the Republican Party in Indiana from 1854 to I860, " Indiana 
Magazine of History, XIII, (September and December, 1917), 
pp. 211-269, 349-412; a ser ies  of articles by Roger Van Bolt, 
"Indiana in P olitical Transition, 1851-1853, " Indiana Magazine of 
History, XL.IX (June, 1953), pp. 131-160, "Fusion out of 
Confusion, " Ibid ., XLIX (December, 1953), pp. 353-390, and 
"The R ise of the .Republican Party in Indiana, 1855-1856, " Ibid. , 
LI (September, 1955), pp. 185-220; Cole, The Era of the Civil 
War, pp. 101-152; and Don E. Fehrenbacker, Prelude to 
Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850’s (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1964), pp. 1-47.
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Germans away from the Democrats. The nativist spirit was strongest 
m Indiana and w eakest m Michigan and Wi s cons in. A struggle 
developed within the movement between the "Jonathans'1 who were 
anti-Catholic and anti-slavery and the "Sams11 who tended to avoid 
the slavery  issu e and were m ore anti-foreigner. While system atic  
studies have not been done, im pressionistic evidence indicates that 
m ost of the "Jonathans" eventually went into the m oderately nativist 
Republican party. The "Sams, " who were financed and exploited-- 
in Illinois at lea st--b y  the Democrats, served as a refuge for con­
servative Whigs who eventually either joined their form er opponents
12or dropped from the scene.
The Nebraska question took its main toll among the Democrats 
who split with their traditional party for a variety of reasons. Some 
genuinely opposed slavery, but the majority were bothered m ost by 
the pro-southern aspects of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Either they 
came from  areas whose economic interests on issu es of land and 
improvement leg islation  were being sacrificed  by the "Doughface"
12 Aside from the above mentioned books, the issue of nativism  is  
treated in detail in Sister M. Evangeline Thomas, Nativism  in 
the Old Northwest (Washington, D. C. : Catholic University, 1936); 
Carl Fremont Brand, "The H istory of the Know Nothing Party In 
Indiana, " Indiana Magazine of History, XVIII (1922), pp. 47-81, 
177-206, 266-306; and John P. Senning, "The Know Nothing 
Movement in Illinois from  1854-56, " Journal of the Illinois State 
H istorical Society, VII (April, 1914), pp. 7-33. Don E. Fehre- 
backer’s "Illinois Political Attitudes, 1854-1861" (Unpublished 
Ph. D. D issertation, University of Chicago, 1951), is generally  
helpful, especia lly  the pages on nativism , pp. 165-182.
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Democracy or they m erely  resented the personal power and arro­
gance of the Southern politicians in their party. The Nebraska issue
13served as a rallying point for anti-Southernism in both parties.
The bank question was not intimately connected to these 
issu es, and it could be easily  assum ed that no continuities on this 
matter can be found. Certainly during the 1854-1857 period neither 
party talked much about the banking question. Both sides wished to 
play down old, divisive issu es. The fir st Republican platform of 
Michigan favored "postponing and suspending all differences with 
regard to political economy. " Similar sentiments were expressed  
in the other states as the Republicans attempted to draw away anti­
slavery Democrats; and the party of P ierce, Douglas, and Buchanan 
tried to lure the m ore conservative elem ents of their form er oppon­
ents. This strategy, further, seem s to have confused the situation 
as anti-Nebraska D em ocrats--m any of whom were anti-bank 
rad ica ls--w ere given positions of power to draw support from their 
form er follow ers. It would seem  that any party that included Salmon 
Chase, Lyman Trumbull, John Wentworth, and Kinsley Bingham in 
major positions of power would also embody their opposition to banks.
13 The economic aspects of this question are em phasized in Madison 
Kuhn, "Economic Issues and the Rise of the Republican Party in 
the Northwest, " {Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of 
Chicago, 1940), pp. 1-132. The anti-southern rather than anti­
slavery aspects of the Kansas-Nebraska Act are indicated by 
Fehrenbacker in his biography of John Wentworth, as w ell as 
the two works cited in footnotes 11 and 12.
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However, this was not the case. The new party took over the 
economic views, including free banking, of the m ore progressive  
Whigs. This is  clearly  revealed in the actions of the state le g is ­
latures in their attempts to cope with banking problems in the
14period of party transition.
The nearly com plete collapse of the free banking system  in
Indiana combined with the expiration of the charter of the State
Bank in 1859 to make some sort of action imperative. This n ecessity
eventually resulted in the chartering of a new, privately owned Bank
of the State of Indiana and a reformation of the sta te’s free banking
system . While confused even m ore than usual by personal cupidity,
these actions tend to reveal a continuity of opposition to banks
among Democrats and an extension of Whig attitudes through the
Fusion movement into the Republican party.
Indiana’s new constitution prohibited recharter of the State
Bank. It® d irectors .were determined to wind up the Bank’s affairs
in line with the constitution, but a "syndicate*1 of politicians was
determ ined to obtain a charter for a sim ilar institution to take the
place of the old State Bank. If Hugh McCulloch’s m em ory is accurate,
this “syndicate” began working for its end in 1854 before the panic
15undermined the free banking system .
14 Randall, e d ., "Gubernatorial Platform s, ,r p. 113,
15 McCulloch, Men and M easures, pp. 127-28.
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According to McCulloch the "syndicate” was made up of 
a number of active and influential politicians of both parties. ” 
However, while there were a few important 'Whigs in this group, 
the "syndicate" was dominated by Democrats with Judge Thomas 
L. Smith as its moving spirit. Of the seven m embers of the "syn­
dicate" serving in the legislature, five were Democrats. It appears 
that the "syndicate" made careful use of the situation and a few well 
placed "bribes. " Very little effort was wasted on Fusionists who 
would probably have voted for an extension of currency and credit 
in any case. Of the thirteen "bribes" reported by Logan Esarey  
ten w ere offered to Democrats which accounts in part for the six  
representatives and one senator from that party who opposed free  
banks but favored the Bank of the State of Indiana. Otherwise the 
bill was supported alm ost entirely by Fusionists and opposed entirely  
by Dem ocrats. Governor Wright vetoed the bill on the grounds that
it was dangerous and unnecessary, as w ell as unconstitutional, but
16it was passed over his veto.
16 Ibid ., p. 128; Esarey, "State Banking in Indiana, " pp. 288-296, 
tries to unravel the question, but is unconcerned with the party 
affiliation of the men involved. The above conclusions resulted  
from a check of the party affiliations of those he names as part 
of the "syndicate" and his l is t  of those to whom "bribes" were 
offered. Some of the "bribes" were m erely  prom ises of a branch 
for their d istrict or an extension of an opportunity to purchase 
stock. Indiana Legislature. House Journal, 1855, p. 764, and 
and Indiana Legislature. Senate Journal, 1855, p. 551, for the 
votes. Wright’s veto is in the Senate Journal, pp. 713-716.
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Clearly, this was a straight business deal on the part of the
m em bers of the "synica.te" who allowed neither ideology nor ethics
to interfere with their course. Quickly the politicians cashed in
by selling their newly acquired stock to the stockholders and
directors of the old State Bank who assum ed the management of the
new institution. All in all the incident was a curious example of the
workings of American politics and shows the degree to which politics
itse lf  can be a business. The m em bers of the "syndicate” never
intended to becom e bankers, and probably they had thought to do
nothing m ore than "bend" the law, for they actually defrauded no one.
In the long run their actions were easily  justified, because the new
17bank continued the sound policies of its predecessor.
The reformation of the free banking system  demonstrates 
the continuity of ideas from  the Whigs to the Republican party. 
Although the panic had seriously  undermined confidence in free  
banking and even the Indiana Journal joined the State Sentinel in 
opposing the system , a revision of the old law was carried through 
the sam e Fusionist legislature which created the Bank of the State 
of Indiana. ^
17 Esarey, "State Banking in Indiana, " p. 297; and McCulloeh, Men 
and M easures, pp. 128-130.
18 Indiana Journal, February 7 and 17, 1855, shows a shift against 
free banking that may have reflected the new publisher’s attitudes 
rather than a shift in party principle.
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After the onset of the panic, the state auditor called for
reform  of the system . He favored enforcing a permanent location
for each bank and uniform banking hours. He explained that, "It is
suggested, as to location, to prevent the practice of selecting remote
and unknown situations, that no bank should be located at any point
which does not contain from two to three thousand permanent c iti-
sens. " He also suggested a specie reserve of 20% to 25% and a
19universal redemption center at the state capital.
Most Democrats took the opportunity to express their
opposition to free banking in principle and make their bows to
traditional Democratic anti-bank rhetoric. The editor of the State
Sentinel reaffirm ed that as, "a democrat of the radical stripe we
have always opposed Banking on any basis whatever. " Ke reminded
his readers that the State Sentinel had stood against free banking
since the constitutional convention and had worked against the passage
of the law. Governor Wright joined in the Democratic chorus of "I
told you so, ,f and warned:
We shall always have revulsions, expansions, con­
tractions, and derangement in the whole business 
of the country, so long as we foster any system  
that m akes prom ises to pay, money, instead of gold 
and s ilver . If the inferior circulation were this 
day withdrawn, I have no doubt we should find a 
sufficient amount of constitutional currency among 
our people for all ordinary purposes*
19 Indiana Legislature. Documentary Journal, 1854, Part I, Document 
2, the quotation iS from  p. 84.
236
Yet, none of these Democrats was willing to do away with the system
20and all called for reform  along the lines of the Auditor's suggestions.
The election of 1854 had produced a legislature with a
House controlled by the Fusion party and a Senate evenly divided
between the Democrats and the new group. As was so often the case,
the Fusion party carried the fight for free banking. The ex**Whig
advocate of free banking, R. N. Hudson, introduced a new version
of the free banking law which provided for regular hours, a central
redemption center in Indianapolis, and the establishm ent of banks in
towns of 1000 inhabitants to eliminate "wildcats. " It was easily
carried  through both houses of the legislature with opposition from
the Democrats and a sm all group of Fusionists who preferred a 
21
State Bank.
Wright decided that the bill did not conform to his suggestions; 
and he vetoed it. He combined his old critic ism s of the law with his 
beliefs that free bank currency was le ss  valuable than gold or silver, 
and that free banking system s in general had lo st the confidence of the
20 Indiana State Sentinel, August 22, 1854; and Indiana Legislature. 
Documentary Journal, 1854, Part I, Document 5, the quotation 
is from p. 84.
21 Esarey, "State Banking in Indiana, " pp. 286-287; Hammond, 
Banks and Politics, p. 621; Indiana Legislature. House Journal, 
1855, pp. 230-231, for introduction of bill and p. 614 for vote, 
anc* L egislature. Senate Journal, 1855, p. 616, for the
vote. In both houses twenty-one Democrats (40%) opposed banks 
of any sort and seven m ore opposed free banks but voted for
the Bank of the State of Indiana. Among the Fusionists five 
(7%) opposed all banks and fourteen others opposed free banks 
and voted for the Bank of the State of Indiana.
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people. Although Wright’s argument moved seven Democratic
senators to change their votes, the legislature passed the b ill over
his veto. Date in the session  an attempt to repeal the free banking
law failed. The vote revealed much more clearly than the earlier
vote a Democratic tendency to oppose free banking* Seventeen
Fusionists (80%) and nine Democrats (40%) favored free banking with
22four Fusionists and thirteen Democrats opposed.
Once the 1855 revision  of the 1852 free bank law had been 
passed m ost Democrats accepted it. Even Governor Wright told the 
legislature in 1857 that he was convinced that the changes in the 
law amply secured the currency and entitled the bill to the people's 
confidence. Typically he found the freedom from  monopoly the m ost 
noteworthy feature of the law.
Ohio Democrats held tenaciously to their anti-bank stand in 
the face of demands for increased banking facilities. Charles 
R eem elin's report to the governor on "The Condition of the Ohio 
Stock Banks” was basically  a hard money, anti-bank document although 
it accepted the existence of the state's banks. It took a strong stand 
against all paper currency as ”one of the two great social and political 
evils of the republic, " and chastised the banks for failing to provide 
a sound currency. Reem elin's report opposed free banking and praised
22 Esarey, ”State Banking in Indiana, " pp. 286-287; Indiana D egis- 
lature. Senate Journal, 1855, pp. 721-24, for veto, and p. 720, 
for vote to table repeal of free banking. The party affiliations 
of two men opposed to free banking are not known.
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the attorney general’s opinion on the constitutionality of the 1851 law.
He saw no need for m ore bank capital and the scarcity of currency 
could be attributed to bank paper which drove specie out of the country. 
The report concluded with twelve recommendations to patch up the 
laws. They included the traditional Democratic demand for prohi­
bition of all notes under twenty dollars, and a recommendation 
that the in terest laws be made rea listic . Governor William Medill 
praised the Reem elin report in his m essage to the legislature in 
1856 and warned that "the opinion was fast obtaining ground that
23neither com m erce or credit is benefited by legislative interference. " 
The new Republican party did not turn its back on demands 
for increased banking fac ilities. Hidden beneath m ore volatile  
issu es  in the gubernatorial campaign of 1855 were Republican 
prom ises for better banking facilities. The new governor, Salmon 
P. Chase, had earlier favored "free principles, in land, currency, 
trade, £c men. " In his inaugural address he clarified his view s. He 
believed the best currency would be one of coin and large b ills , 
but that the variety of state laws made such a currency available only 
through Congressional action. To answer the public demand for 
increased fac ilities, he proposed a law that provided for convertible 
currency, guarded against abuses of power, and extended its benefits
23 Documents. . . of the State of Ohio, 1853-1854, Document 9, and 
D ocum ents.. .  of the State of Ohio, 1855-1856, Document 1.
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to "all who w ill give the ample securities and guarantees which you 
w ill doubtless require. " Chase made it clear that his position was 
closer to that of the form er Whigs than the Democrats and insisted  
that he did not object to a convertible currency but ''mere paper 
money system s. " He fravored free banking and a lowering of interest 
rates.
The Republican legislature provided a law sim ilar to the 
K elley law designed "to increase the number of banks, " but it
25failed to receive a m ajority of votes cast in the election of 1856.
The problem of added banking facilities was alleviated by 
the State Supreme Court which ruled in 1856 that contrary to the 
earlier opinion of the attorney general, the new constitution did not 
abrogate the free banking act of 1851. This led Chase to recommend 
the use of the 1851 act rather than the passage of a new law. Again 
he argued that federal action was necessary  and insisted  that any 
banking law should offer the "most liberal extension of the franchise, 
with such restrictions upon its exercise  as w ill effectively protect
24 Roseboom, The Civil War Era, p. 310; Chase to Mr. Sutliff, 
December 20, 1850, in "Diary and Correspondence of Salmon P. 
Chase, " Annual Report of the Am erican H istorical A ssociation  
for the Year 1902 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1903), II, p. 226; D ocum ents.. .  of the State of Ohio, 1855-1856, 
Document 4.
25 Roseboom, The Civil War Era, p. 314; and Huntington, "A 
History of Banking and Currency in Ohio, " p. 465.
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the community against a. m ere paper money currency.
The need and desire for banking facilities in Michigan 
finally led to the passage of a new law in the original home of the 
"wildcats. " The dearth of currency led to a variety of unauthorized 
banks and a resuscitation of a number of dormant institutions. An 
1853 law lim ited unauthorized banking, but the problem of a currency 
composed of the issu e of "foreign" banks over which Michigan had 
no control s till plagued the state. The governor reported in 1853 
that of the $4,100, 000 in circulation in the state $3, 000, 000 was 
supplied by banks outside the sta te’s jurisdiction. As in the other 
states of the Old Northwest, a bipartisan movement spearheaded by
the Whig-Republican Daily A dvertiser arose demanding a free bank
. 27law.
Democratic governor Robert McClelland made his bows to
the anti-bank wing of his party in his m essage in 1853, but he did
note that the constitution provided for a well secured general law.
Perhaps such a law would be better than the "flood" of dubious
"foreign" currency. He added that at lea st if local banks were
28established the state could tax them.
26 Ibid., pp. 465-66; and D ocum ents.. .  of the State of Ohio, 1856- 
1857, Document 10.
27 Gantz, "A History of Banking Legislation, " pp. 77-78, 85; and 
Fuller, e d ., M essages, II, pp. 238-39* Detroit Daily Advertiser, 
December 15 and 16, 1852, January 6, 1853, and January 1, 1855.
28 Fuller, e d ., M essages, II, pp. 221-242.
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Although a number of Democratic papers, including the
Free P r e ss , favored free banking, acting governor Andrew Parsons,
who was serving out McClelland’s term, gave notice in 1855 that
anti-bank sentiment s till dominated the party. In old Jacksonian
rhetoric* he warned that experience showed that even stock secured
currency was not entirely safe. The best suggestion he could offer
to solve the state’s problems was a prohibition of all notes under $5
SO that such w orthless " tra sh ” would not drive specie "beyond the
reach of our producing c la sse s . ” If all the states adopted such a
provision, "over bank issu es, expansions and contractions in the
money market, would to a great extent be checked, and the raging
and dangerous spirit of speculation so common to the people of our
29country, be much guarded against. "
Many of the same sentim ents were expressed in the inaugural 
of the new Republican governor Kinsley S. Bingham who had been a 
leading "loco-foco. ” Both past and present history argued Bingham, 
proved that banks were responsible for depreciation of the currency  
and wild fluctuations that bore m ost heavily on the laboring c la sses . 
Thusfar Michigan had luckily escaped the free banking mania which
29 Detroit Free P ress , May 27, 1853 and April 25, 1854; Lansing 
Journal in the Detroit Free P r e ss , April 30, 1854; Ionia Gazette 
in the Detroit Free P ress, May 3, 1854; and Fuller, e d ., 
M essages, II, pp. 281-301.
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grasped Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and W isconsin and which had pro­
duced such disastrous results in Indiana* He too believed that specie 
would spread through the country if sm all notes were prohibited.
Yet, the idea of a free banking law was not com pletely rejected by 
Bingham; and there were indications that a properly secured law 
would receive his approval. ^
Evidently the law passed by the 1855 legislature did not 
m eet the governor's standards, and he vetoed it. At the time he did 
not write a veto m essage, but in his m essage to the legislature in 
1855 he explained that he s till worried that the establishm ent of banks 
in rem ote places and the possib ilities of failure and fraud, endangered 
a sound currency. He suggested that banks be forced to pay out only 
their notes so that quick redemption was assured and circulation  
would be lim ited to the local area, and that sm all notes be prohibited. 
He believed that the California gold would make this possible. Under 
such a system  the "poorer classes"  would be protected from lo sses
because of depreciated paper, and the business c la sses  would secure
31
the benefits of banks.
During 1856 and early 1857 pressure mounted for a free  
banking law. The M arshall Statesman and the Monroe Commercial
joined with the .Daily Advertise in demanding such legislation. The
30 Fuller, e d ., M essages, II, pp. 281-301.
31 Gantz, "A H istory of Banking Legislation, " pp. 85-86; and
Fuller, e d ., M essages, H, pp. 302-321.
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new legislature was m et with two petitions from Berrien County 
including seventy-nine nam es, and a m onster petition sponsored by 
C. A. Trowbridge of Detroit which included three hundred and 
forty -six  names* The main opposition to the law came from Demo­
cratic papers that feared a repetition of Michigan’s previous
32experience with free banking.
Republicans J. B. Beebe and L». G. Berry sponsored another 
free banking bill in 1857 which was passed by the Republican le g is ­
lature. The House votes showed 75% Republicans favoring the bill 
with a m ajority of Democrats opposing it. In the Senate an even 
larger percentage of the Republicans were joined by four of the six  
Democrats* Bingham signed this b ill and later praised it as one of 
the important m easures of his administration although it included 
neither a prohibition of sm all notes nor a provision forcing banks to 
pay out Gnly their own notes. The people approved the b ill by a vote 
of 41, 006 to 19# 865 in an unspirited contest. Although the vote does not 
lead to an easy party interpretation, heavily Republican counties such
32 Detroit Daily Advertiser, November 26, 1856; Monroe Commercial 
in the Detroit Daily !Advertiser, December 22, 1856; Marshall 
Statesman in the JDetroit Daily A dvertiser, December 25, 1857; 
Michigan Legislature. Senate Documents Accompanying Journal, 
1857, Documents #2, #15, and #16; Ann Arbor Argus in the Detroit 
F ree P r e ss , December 15, 27, 1856. While it cannot be called  
conclusive evidence a com parison of the names on the "monster" 
petition and the men listed  in Mrs. McCoy’s study yields the 
political affiliations (for 1860) of thirty-four of the signers; 
twenty-two Republicans, six  Democrats, one Constitutional Union, 
and five no-party men.
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as Branch, Calhoun, H illsdale, Kalamazoo, .Kent, Lenawee, St. 
Joseph and Washtenaw voted for the b ill with ratios sim ilar to those
9  9
seen in the vote for governor at the same election. J
Illinois, whose free banking system  survived the Panic of 
1854, altered and perfected her system  during these years. Following 
the Panic, the bank com m issioner had suggested the abolition of the 
7% ceiling on interest in order to draw more capital to the free banks 
and to discourage the unregulated brokerage houses which the pro- 
vision  had spawned, fife also suggested that a specified specie  
reserve be required for redemption. Democratic governor Joel 
Matteson, busy organizing the largest banking chain in the state, 
praised the system  and suggested that the legislature consider the 
com m issioner’s recommendations. Although two minor b ills were 
passed during the session , there was no major revision of the system  
in 1855. In the following year the system  was expanded to include 
sixty-one banks with a total circulation nearly twice that of two years
33 Michigan Legislature. House Journal, 1857, pp. 339, 512-13;
Michigan Legislature. Senate Journal, 1857, pp. 25, 248; Fuller,
e(** * M essages, II, p. 340; and Gantz, "A H istory of Banking
Legislation, M pp. 142-143, lis ts  the vote for governor and on 
the banking law. It should be noted that two Democratic counties, 
G enesee and Wayne, turned in large votes for the bill. Genesee 
was generally Whig and then Republican although it turned in a 
m ajority for Democrat Charles Stuart in 1858. Wayne was the 
m ost rapidly developing com m ercial area and became a Republi­
can county in I860. For the long run affiliations of the counties 
see: W. Dean Burnham, Presidential Ballots, 1836-1892 
(Baltim ore; The Johns Hopkins P ress , 1955), pp. 191-193.
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34earlier.
The election of 1856 brought the new Republican party to 
power in the state. William B isse ll, the new governor, was an 
anti-Hebraska Democrat who had opposed the free banking law when it 
was fir st passed. His new association had moderated his views, 
and his inaugural praised the law. At the same time he argued 
that amendment of the b ill could strengthen the system  and add to the 
security of the note holders. The Republican legislature complied 
with B is se ll1 s request by a major revision of the law. To eliminate 
true nwildcats, " the law provided that business could only be trans­
acted at the office specified in the certificate of incorporation and 
that the office had to be in a community of over two hundred people.
The act made provisions concerning capital and the redemption of 
notes m ore stringent and removed the prejudice against Illinois bonds. 
Finally, the maximum legal in terest rate was raised to ten per cent. 
Each of these changes which m irrored suggestions in other states 
helped stabilize the free banking system , but further defects would
be revealed in the years of economic chaos that preceded the Civil 
3 5War. J
34 Jam es, Chicago Banks, 1, pp. 238-39; Dowrie, "Illinois Banking," 
pp. 144-45; and Illinois. Governor, 1853-1S57.
35 Illinois. Governor, 1857-1860; Dowrie, "Illinois Banking," 
pp. 148-149; and Jam es, Chicago Banks, I, pp. 241-43.
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The continuity of emphasis on credit and currency expansion, 
and, in particular, the advocacy of free banking from the Whigs to 
the Republicans can be explained easily . In the fir st place m ost 
people who had been Whigs became Republicans. Lincoln estim ated  
in 1856 that, "Nine tenths of the anti-Nebraska votes have to come 
from  old Whigs. H Although historians have denied the validity of 
this estim ate, an examination of voting percentage shifts tends to 
confirm Lincoln’s estim ate. Such an examination also shows that 
in the states of the Old Northwest 80% of the Whigs went into the 
Republican party in 1856 and that by 1860 w ell over 90% of the Whigs 
had joined the new party. Further, it appears that the m ost con­
servative m em bers of the older party avoided the new organization 
unless their religious and ethnic background determined an interest 
in reform ism . Lincoln saw this tendency in Illinois; and studies of 
Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio argue that the m ost conservative Whigs 
clung tightly to the Native Am erican party in 1856 and either became 
politically inactive or joined their former opponents at the end of the 
decade. The system atic study of the economic elite of Wayne County, 
Michigan shows an increase in non-participation among this group. 
When M rs. McCoy’s findings are compared with general voting shifts, 
it is  clear that the percentage of '’elite" Whigs who went into the new 
party was somewhat lower than the percentage of form er Whigs from
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the entire voting population who joined the Republicans. 36
Examinations of the leadership of the new party also show
continuity between the Whigs and the Republicans. In the formative
years of the party the old Whigs took basically backstage roles
making the m ost strategic use of the Democrats who joined the new
organization to draw voters from the old party of Jackson. They
consciously avoided controversial issues; but, as the party grew,
played an increasingly dominant role in policy making. The policies
instituted by the new party, particularly in its 1860 platform, were
clearly  an extension of the policies of the m ore progressive elem ents 
37of the Whig party.
The Republican party in its support, its leadership, and its 
policies was much m ore a continuation of the Whig party than h is ­
torians have been willing to admit. It found its greatest strength in 
econom ically dynamic areas and among the New England and New York
36 See: Appendix on "Voting in the 1850’s. "
37 See especially  two essays by Mildred C. Stoler, "The Democratic
Elem ent in the Republican Party in Illinois, " Papers in Illinois 
History and Transactions for the Year 1942 (Springfield, Illinois: 
Illinois State H istorical Society, 1944), pp. 32-72, and "The 
Democra.tic Element in the New Republican Party in Indiana* ” 
Indiana Magazine of History, XXXVI (September, 1940), pp. 185- 
207; and Van Bolt, "The Rise of the Republican Party in Indiana, "
p. 209. Orth to Colfax, July 4, 1854, and Orth to Colfax,
November /_ 1854, in J. Herman Shauinger, ed. , "The
letters of Godiove S. Orth, Hoosier American, " Indiana Magazine 
of History, XL (March, 1944), pp. 54 and 56, give some insight 
into Whig attempts to remain in the background at first without 
giving up control.
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"Yankees. " Nearly every county in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio which
shifted from Democratic to Republican could be distinguished by its
economic dynamism and the "Yankee" rather than Southern origins
of its population. Quite the opposite was the case in the few Whig
counties that becam e Democratic. In the fights for free banking it
was the areas such as northern Illinois and central Indiana where
Democrats were pushed behind these laws by their constituents. The
"Yankee elem ent gave to these areas an acceptance of com m ercialism
and a quest for "improvement" that was le ss  prevalent in the older
areas dominated by Southerners. The Ohio State Journal believed
"the m ost enlightened and enterprising" portion of the state backed
the Republicans. Samuel Brim blecom  of Ogle County in Northern
Illinois wrote Eiihu Washburn:
When we move into a territory and find people 
there from Penna., Indiana, Ohio, or New York, 
we find a c lass which joins us in making all the 
improvements of those states. We build school 
houses & churches, educate our children, build 
railroads and in a thousand things consult the com ­
fort of all people, and soon draw around us society  
congenial to our habits and tastes. But what is our 
condition, if we find the working population Slaves, 
labouring under the taskm aster ? The white popu­
lation is  so scarce that we cannot combine for the 
establishm ent of a general system  of education, 
and make the various improvements n ecessary to 
our comfort and happiness; our society is 
lim ited;--perhaps we lie  under the ban of society, 
being non-slaveholders; --our children grow up
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in ignorance; and* from association with a race, 
degraded by force of unequal laws, and kept 
ignorant from policy, --becom e vicious. 38
The contrast in the interest in "improvement'1 can be seen
in the illiteracy  rates for Indiana and Illinois that show these skills
m ore widely spread in "Yankee" areas. It seem s that these were
39the areas with "go-aheaditiveness. "
The new Republican party was the party of reform as w ell 
as "improvement. " It was, as its opponents said, the party of "ism s, " 
and one that should have been included was "boosterism . " It took 
over the economic attitudes of the m ost progressive Whigs and accepted 
with them a dynamic conception of the economy. Key to this had been 
the notion of expanding economic opportunity and the prom ise of 
su ccess. The symbolic center of their appeal was not the yeoman 
farm er but another kind of self-m ade man who worked his way from  
lowly origins to a position of power in the new com m ercial-industrial
38 Burnham, Presidential Ballots, pp. 176-80 and 208-10, on 
voting shifts of Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio counties; the Ohio 
State Journal, November 24, 1856; and Samuel A. Brimblecom  
to Elihu B. Washburn, January 24, I860, quoted in Kuhn, 
"Economic Issues and the R ise of the Republican Party in the
Northwest, " p. 30.
39 Esarey, A History of Indiana, II, pp. 604-608, and Richard Lyle 
Power, Planting Corn Belt Culture (Indianapolis, Indiana:
Indiana H istorical Society, 1953), pp. 40-42, on literacy rates. 
The Power book which is subtitled, "The Impress of the Upland 
Southerner and Yankee in the Old Northwest, " is extrem ely  
suggestive, but is m arred by an unclear definition of "Yankee" 
and by the author's refusal to try to verify his im pressions.
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world. Henry Clay had originated the phrase "self-made" man,
and his d isciple, Abraham Lincoln exploited it to draw the laboring
man into the Republican coalition. The idea of free banking con-
40tinned to fit into this general frame of reference.
40 Griffin, Their Brother*s Keepers, pp. 219-41, adds a dimension  
to understanding Republican attraction to the I'isms. " A m ost 
insightful essay  by Richard Hofstadter, "Abraham Lincoln and 
the Self-M ade Myth, " in the American Political Tradition, 
pp. 93-136, has helped me formulate my interpretation of the 
Whigs and Republicans.
CHAPTER VII 
CRISIS, 1857-1862
The period between 1857 and 1862 saw two economic cr ises  
which forced further revision of the free banking laws. The fir st  
of these was strictly  financial. The second was precipitated by the 
political situation of 1860 and secession . The free banking system s  
of the Old Northwest weathered the storm  of 1857 in much better 
fashion than m ost historians have supposed, but they collapsed  
during the 1860-61 c r is is . The Democrats attempted to use these 
cr ise s , particularly that of 1860-61, to reconstruct their party around 
the traditional Jacksonian issu es and refused to participate in con­
structive reform. The Republicans continued to try to provide a 
sound and adequate currency through reform  of the free banking laws 
and, after I860, the establishm ent of state institutions like that of 
Indiana.
By 1857 the situation seem ed to be stabilizing. Although 
Michigan’s law still had to be ratified by the people, all of the states 
of the Old Northwest had accepted free banking as the solution to 
money and credit problems. The experience of 1854 had pointed out 
the needs for certain restrictions implemented by Illinois and Indiana 
who altered their laws to eliminate the ’’wildcat” elem ent from free  
banking. Also the political situation was becoming clear. The 
Republicans em erged from the chaos of the m id-fifties as the opponents 
of the Democrats for state and national power. In the economic sphere 
the new party carried on in the Whig tradition supporting free banking 
while the Democrats remained split on the issue. However, the 
im pression  of stability that early 1857 seem ed to convey proved
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illusory, and the period from 1857 until 1862 was one of continued 
economic and political c r is is .
The tremendous boom of the 1850's had been an international 
phenomenon spurred by the output of the California m ines after 1849, 
and the depression that came in 1857 had international roots. The 
Crimean War adversely affected the French economy which, at the 
same tim e, suffered from the twin evils of over-population and low 
agricultural production. The situation forced the Bank of France to 
draw specie from  the Bank of England, resulted in a high bank rate 
in London, and, in turn, adversely affected B ritish investment in 
Am erican secu rities. Frauds in railroad management and the fa il­
ure of many roads to produce hoped for returns combined with the 
rising bank rate to bring about a reversal in the flow of British  
capital and a subsequent decline in the market for American stocks 
and bonds in 1856 and 1857. This decline undermined the a ssets  of 
many Am erican banks and financial institutions weakening their 
ability to withstand any strong shock. The entire banking system  
lacked overall policy and even primitive cooperation between banks. 
The dominant position of New York as the money market caused  
"county1 banks" to keep deposits in New York* These deposits repre­
sented the "county banks" reserves in case of em ergency while the 
New York banks used this money in the call loan market. In good
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tim es this was advantageous for ail involved, but during the cr is is  
of 1857 it proved extrem ely dangerous. ^
The seasonal drain of funds from New York precipitated  
the c r is is . Without warning one of the nation's leading financial 
concerns, the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, closed its 
doors on August 24. As the banks scrambled to fortify their position 
and secu rities prices plummeted, other failures followed. Continual 
runs on the banks eventually resulted in the suspension of specie  
payments in October. By this time com m erce and industry were at 
a standstill, and unemployment mounted.
The financial cr is is  passed quickly, but the depression hung 
on. During this period which lasted in some areas until 1860, the 
Old Northwest was particularly hard hit. The suspension of naviga­
tion during the winter of 1856-57 led to a r ise  in the rate on Eastern  
exchange. Throughout 1857 the money market remained tight, and a 
continuous stream  of specie flowed eastward. The flow of capital 
into the West which had supported the boom of the m id-fifties was 
reversed . According to Thomas S. Berry, "The backbone of specu­
lation was broken in 1857, judging from the fact that prices of
1 Unless otherwise noted the m aterial on the Panic of 1857 is from: 
George W. Van Vleck, The Panic of 1857 (New York: Columbia 
University P ress , 1943); Charles Franklin Dunbar, Economic 
E ssays, e d ., O. M. W. Sprague (New York: The MacMillan 
Company, 1904), pp. 266-294; and Taylor, The Transportation 
Revolution, pp. 345-351.
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com modities and secu rities failed to .respond fully to the prevailing 
easiness of money and credit /after 1857/. " The downturn of that 
year was preceded by extensive land speculation geared to the ex­
pansion of the supply of money and credit. With the drain of funds 
the land bubble burst. A w estern correspondent of the New York
Herald wrote, "Nine-tenth 8 of our people owe, and have no Immediate
2way to pay* .Everything in the shape of property is low. "
The farm ers faced a combination of bad crops and extensive 
debt. Crops were poor in Michigan in 1856, and the severe winter of 
1856*5? hit at the livestock. The three seasons from 1857-1859 
brought crop failures throughout the whole Northwest. The weather 
oscillated  between extrem es. “Overabundant rainfall and rot in 1858, 
drouth and burning in 1859, winter killing and frost, blight and the 
arm y-worm , each made their contribution toward low yields which 
farm ers experienced at the close of the decade. " Still, in 1859, an 
Illinois paper could comment that "There is  not grain enough in the 
country to pay debts contracted before the hard tim es commenced. " 
Many farm ers had overbought land, and tax sa les increased during 
these years, but also  many had speculated in railroad securities. The 
Washington County (W isconsin) Democrat reported, "It is  said that
Z Berry, W estera P r ices, pp. 517-529; Kuhn, "Economic Issues 
and the R ise of the Republican P arty  in the Northwest, " pp. 133- 
154; and. Streeter, Political Parties in Michigan, pp. 257-261, 
deal with the econom ic impact on the Old Northwest. The 
quotations a re  from  Berry* p. 528; the New York Herald,
January 4, 1858, quoted in Van Vleck, p. 84.
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from 2, 000 to 3, 000 farm s are thus mortgaged to railroads in 
W isconsin, that the railroads cannot pay, and to release their farms 
w ill strip nine-tenths of them of the hard earnings of many years. H
3In northern Michigan there were even cases of starvation reported.
In the cities business failures and the decline in capital
resources led to w ide-spread unemployment. The Grand Rapids
Enquirer and Herald reported that in Detroit "Most of the large
establishm ents have discharged their em ployees, by which a larger
number of persons are thrown out of employment than at any former
tim e .. . the sm aller m echanics have been com pelled to reduce their
force of operatives, and their merchants have cut down their force
of clerks to the low est possible number. At a low estim ate there
are five thousand persons out of employment in the city at the present
tim e. " In Chicago alone 204 failures were recorded in 1857. Only
Cincinnati among the c ities of the West seem ed to escape the ravages 
4of depression.
In the face of this the performance of the banking system  
was better than might be expected or than historians have often believed.
3 Kuhn, "Economic Issues and the R ise of the Republican Party in 
the Northwest, ” p. 134; the Bureau County Republican, September, 
15, 1859, quoted in Kuhn, p. 134; and the Washington County 
Democrat, December 20, 1857, quoted in Van Vleck, Panic of 
1857, p. 84.
4 The Grand Rapids Enquirer and Herald, December 16, 1857, 
quoted in Streeter, P olitical Parties in Michigan, p. 260; and 
Jam es, Chicago Banks, I, p. 207.
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Bray Hammond’s statement that the Indiana free banks were "choked 
off" by the Panic of 1857 is contradicted by the evidence of Governor 
Ashbel P. Willard who in 1859 praised the 1855 amendment to the 
free banking law whioh had permitted only one failure in four years.
The Bank of the State of Indiana, of course, proved itse lf one of the
nation’s strongest banks during the cr is is , and was one of the few
5not to suspend specie payments.
A sim ilar situation existed in Ohio where the failure of the 
Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company had its greatest impact. That 
institution was so intim ately connected with the state government and 
the State Bank that George W. Van Vleck calls it, "The nursing 
mother to all the financial institutions of Ohio. " The collapse, 
precipitated by the em bezzlem ent of nearly its entire a ssets  by its 
New York cashier, staggered the State Bank and left it in a shaky 
condition in late 1857* However, the State Bank soon managed to 
stabilize itself, and throughout 1857 the banks of Ohio along with those 
of Indiana did not form ally suspend specie payments during the cr is is . 
Taken together only seven of Ohio's authorized banks including the 
Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company closed their doors, and of 
those two failed before the panic and two had not been active since 1854. 
Governor Chase noted in his m essage of January 4, 1858, that Ohio
5 Hammond, Banks and P o litics , p. 621; and Indiana Legislature. 
Documentary Journal, 1859, Part II, Document 5.
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6had fifty-four functioning banks.
Although in late August the Illinois banks suspended specie  
payments to all but a few favored custom ers, the free banks of 
that state came through the c r is is  reasonably well. Six banks out 
of fifty-four failed and of these all but one fully redeemed their 
notes. The cr is is  was brief and recovery nearly complete by the 
opening of 1858. In January, 1859 the Bank Com m issioners praised  
the free banking system  for its performance during two years of 
financial c r is is  and depression. Governor B isse ll joined in the
7
praise of the system  which had lim ited lo sses  to "a m ere trifle. ”
The free banking system s of the Old Northwest had stood 
up fa irly  w ell during the Panic of 1857, and m ost of the failures 
w ere unauthorized private banks or old banks such as those of 
Michigan and the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company which 
existed  under specia l charters passed before the free banking era.
If the cr is is  caused the failure of only a few banks it did 
reveal a serious weakness in the system ’s inability to maintain 
currency at par. In mid-1857 the notes of Indiana's free banks began
6 Van Vleck, Panic of 1857, pp. 64-66, the quotation is  from p. 65;
Huntington, nA History of Banking and Currency in Ohio, ”
pp. 471-77; Documents. . .  of the State of Ohio, 1857, Document 8.
7 Cole, Era of the Civil War, p. 100; Dowrie, ’’The Development 
of Banking in Illinois, " pp. 151-54; Illinois Governor, 1857-1860.
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to go a t a discount, and the c ris is  accentuated their depreciation. 
Illinois and W isconsin experienced sim ilar difficulties. The funda­
m ental problem  was the quality of securities. Nearly half of 
Illinois currency  was secured by the bonds of the state of M issouri 
which declined after early  1857. The Wisconsin Bank Com ptroller 
explained the predicam ent faced by the bankers which accounted for 
large  holdings of the less safe securities:
It is obvious that the safest bonds, via: of states 
that a re  in the m ost prosperous financial condi­
tion, and rela tively  the least encum bered with 
debt, do not secure the highest ra te  of in terest, 
and if libe ra l in te res t is paid on them they can 
not be bought at low prices. No banker, th e re ­
fore, buys TJ. S ., New England or New York 
bonds as security  for his circulation, but mainly 
such as a re  in fact m ore or less depreciated, 
confiding in his own good luck and in the future 
development of the resou rces of the States of 
which he has become the c re d ito r .. . As the law 
stands we effectually encourage the bankers to 
buy as security  the lea s t safe class of bonds or 
stocks, and put obstacles in the way of p u r­
chasing the best.
This problem  went unsolved in the period following the Panic of 1857,
and rem ained the g rea tes t weakness of the free  banking system s of
8the Old Northwest.
i860 was a very good year for the fa rm ers  of the Old North­
west and the economic situation began to right itself. The la s t years
8 B erry , W estern P rices , p. 521; Jam es, Chicago Banks, I,
pp. 264-268; W isconsin Bank Com ptroller, Report, 1860, quoted 
in M erk, Economic H istory of Wisconsin, pp. 190-191; and 
Dunbar, Economic E ssays, pp. 322-324,
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of the 1850's had w itnessed an increase in the number of banks and 
cred it was easily  available in m ost states. While Michigan's free 
bank law produced only one new bank, the West as a whole increased 
its banking facilities by twenty per cent. By 1860 Wisconsin had one 
hundred four banks. Its southern neighbor, Illinois had gone from  
thirty-nine banks in 1858 to seventy-four by I860 and one hundred four
by 1861. In the period between the Panic of 1857 and the economic
9c ris is  of 1861 the total circulation of Illinois doubled.
In the states of the Old N orthw est--particu larly  Illinois and 
W isconsin--free banking made possible this increase  in cred it and 
circulation. The situation was, however, a dangerous one, because 
inadequate refo rm  m easures had been instituted concerning the 
quality of stocks which backed this currency.
The uneasy political situation paralyzed business and p re ­
cipitated a decline in the value of southern securities which struck 
at the basis of free  currency. Between July and December of I860, 
the price of the bonds of several southern states declined 20 to 25%. 
M issouri bonds fell from  eighty to sixty-one. During October the 
secu rities of Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee averaged an 
8% drop. The bonds of these states were widely used in the Old North­
w est to secure  the free  bank currency, and the decline in their value
9 Dowrie, "The Development of Banking in Illinois, " p. 155;
Jam es, Chicago Banks, II, pp. 270-72, Tables V and VII, 
pp. 259-60; Gantz, UA History of Banking Legislation, " p. 90; 
and Dunbar, Economic Essays, pp. 296-298, 316.
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. . 10precip itated  a banking c ris is .
In general, Ohio and Indiana suffered less than either 
W isconsin or Illinois. Most of Ohio's banks were branches of the 
State Bank ra th e r than free  banks. The free banks of Indiana were 
forced to make good the loss through the M issouri and Louisiana 
bonds, and as a re su lt a sm all number were forced to suspend, 
while sixteen withdrew their c irculation entirely.
The situation in Illinois and W isconsin was one of u tter 
collapse. Two thirds of the bonds used by Illinois' banks to secure 
the ir currency  w ere obligations of southern sta tes. As prices began 
to sag, the Bank Com m issioners called on the banks to deposit 
additional secu rities to support their note issues. In November a 
sim ila r demand resu lted  in the liquidation of seventeen banks. Chicago 
bankers began to refuse country bank notes based on southern bonds.
By 1861 faith in Illinois bank currency had cracked and the notes of 
only tw enty-three banks were accepted at par* Hoarding of the good 
notes made the situation in tolerable. In April, 1861 the Chicago banks 
refused to accept the notes of any country banks, precipitating a 
sectional fight among the bankers and m erchants of the state. A month 
la te r  an attem pt was made by Chicago m erchants to stabilize the situ ­
ation by an agreem ent to accept a t par all notes of banks on the lis t
10 "The C risis  of 1860" is discussed a t length in Dunbar, Economic 
E ssays, pp. 294-314.
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drawn up by Chicago bankers. This and several other attem pts 
failed. By the sum m er of 1861 the Bank Com m issioner declared a ll 
but seventeen banks insolvent. Things got worse with the failure of 
Scammon's M arine Bank. The circulation of Illinois banks had 
fallen from  $12, 000, 000 to $3, 000, 000 in October, 1861 and finally 
to $566,163 by the end of 1862. The collapse of free banking in
11Illinois was complete and the state was left with hardly any currency.
W isconsin faced many of the sam e problem s. Of the 
$5,133, 565 of secu rities which supported the currency of W isconsin's 
free  banks* $3, 658, 000 w ere in bonds of M issouri, Virginia,
Tennessee, North Carolina, and Louisiana. Most of these w ere 
obligations of M issouri. As in Elinois, the bank com ptroller had to 
forbid fu rther deposit of these bonds as their p rices fell in 1860. As 
the bonds depreciated the banks w ere forced to add new secu rities.
By A pril 1861 th ree such levies had been made, and at that tim e 
th irteen  banks w ere unable to comply. The value of Wisconsin 
currency was fu rther hurt by the action of the Chicago bankers in 
A pril who refused to receive the notes of forty W isconsin banks. 
Milwaukee soon followed suit resulting in discrediting $1, 000, 000 of 
paper currency. Attempts by the B ankers's Association to stabilize 
the situation led to dropping eighteen additional banks and the d is­
crediting of another $1, 000, 000 of currency. For a tim e fu rther decline
11 Jam es, Chicago Banks, I, pp. 277-85; and Cole, E ra of the 
Civil War, pp. 361-62.
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was fo resta lled  by the action of the Banker’s Association which 
Supported seventy of the s ta te 's  banks. However, another levy to 
replace stocks that continued to depreciate found eighteen of these 
unable to respond of which ten were in a state of complete in ­
solvency. By m idsum m er the situation had so degenerated that 
Milwaukee became the scene of a bank rio t by German labo rers who
w ere paid in depreciated notes. F ree  banking in the Old Northwest
12had reached its nadir.
No one could argue that during these years the banking 
question again attained the prom inent spot in the political arena 
which it held in the 1840's. More fundamental and im portant issues 
form ed the m ain concern of the parties on the eve of the Civil War. 
Yet, the economic situation forced consideration of banking problems 
and the parties  revealed distinctly different attitudes on this question.
The Panic of 1857 and the subsequent depression produced 
renewed c ritic ism  of banks and a re itera tion  by the Democrats of a 
Jacksonian stand. This re tu rn  to the faith had perhaps m ore 
political than economic overtones. It began in the late fifties and 
gained momentum following the debacle of 1861. A sm all m inority of 
Republicans--the m ost prom inent of which was the old foe of banks, 
John W entworth--joined in the renewed attacks on banks; and, like 
the Whigs of the late  th irties , many became critics of the action of the
12 M erk, JSconomic H istory of Wisconsin, pp. 191-200.
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batiks.. Even the m ore m oderate Chicago Tribune said, in August,
1861,; "We wash our hands of the whole business* If the farm er will
sell a do lla r 's  worth of his produce for the pictures of any bank
whatsoever which does not redeem  its issues at some convenient
place in the State at p a r, he loses his share of his just earnings. . . all
13banks of issue are  a curse to the community. "
The main th rust against banks came again from  the Demo­
c ra ts . While they had won the presidency in 1856, it was c lear that 
in the Old Northwest the party  of Jackson was in danger of losing its 
m ajority  status. Enough votes were being drawn away by the new 
coalition to shift the scales in this traditional Democratic stronghold. 
The Decompfcon question and the economic policy of the Buchanan 
A dm inistration fu rther com plicated the problem s of the Dem ocrats.
It was hoped that a re tu rn  to the old issue could pull the feuding 
factions together and draw recent converts to Republicanism back to 
the fold. At the sam e tim e attem pts to pacify the South were m ixed 
with appeals to the conservative business in te res ts . The widely read 
New York H erald told its readers to forget "Nigger Agitation" and 
rally  the government to the re lief of business. Once the war came,
13 The Chicago Tribune, August 8, 1861. The Tribune, as will be 
seen in Chapter VIII, was in the vanguard of demands for a 
national banking system  and had little  use for the state banks.
Yet, on January 30, 1862, it called on the Illinois constitutional 
convention to construct a sound banking system  for the state 
"by which labor can avail itse lf of the imm ense assistance of 
accum ulated capital. "
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anti-bank agitation increased  and was tied with the highly emotional 
14’’peace" issue.
Unfortunately for the student of the period,the Democratic 
position was neither universally held nor without ambiguity and can 
best be described as a "cen tral tendency. ” The ambiguity of the 
position is c learly  revealed in Buchanan’s Message to Congress in 
late 1857. The P residen t opened that m essage with a lengthy d is­
cussion of the banking question. The passage fcegins, ends and is 
dominated by Jacksonian orthodoxy. His in terpretation  of the nature 
of economic ’’revulsions” had not been a ltered  in two decades.
It is apparent that our existing m isfortunes have 
proceeded solely from  our extravagant and 
vicious system  of paper currency and bank credits , 
exciting the people to wild speculations and 
gambling in stocks.
He also attacked wild speculations, paper inflated prices that varied
from  "true values, ” and extravagant im portations. There w ere also
intim ations of the neo-orthodoxy of Benton and Jam es Guthrie who
had advocated in the m id-fifties that Congress tax all of the state bank
notes out of existence in order to bring the currency of the country to
a true specie basis.
If experience shall prove it to be im possible to 
enjoy the facilities which w ell-regulated banks
14 The general reaction  to the Panic of 1857 is analyzed in Van Vleck, 
Panic of 1857, pp. 80-104, and Samuel .Rezneck, "The Influence 
of D epression Upon A m erican Opinion, 1857-1859# n The Journal 
of Economic H istory, II (May, 1942), pp. 1-23, the quotations 
from  the New York H erald a re  in Rezneck, p. 5.
265
might afford wichout at the same tiroe suffering 
the calam ities which the excesses  of the banks 
have hitherto im licted upon the country, it 
would then be far the le sse r  evil to deprive them  
altogether of the power to issue paper currency 
and confine them to the functions of banks of 
deposit and discount. 15
Yet, lo 57 was not 1837 and there were also tinges of heresy
in Buchanan*s m essage. He accepted "the existence of banks and
the circulation of bank paper. . .  /a-s/ so identified with the habits of
our people that they can not at this day fee suddenly abolished without
much immediate injury to the country. M He seem ed to condone specie
paying banks; and he even gave a very lim ited endorsement to stock
backed currency as "doubtless w is e . . .  / but/ no adequate security
against overissu es, . . /and./ it may be perverted to inflate the 
16
cu rren cy ."
The revival of anti-bank sentiment of which the Buchanan 
speech was a part, was injected into the politics of Ohio and Illinois 
in late 1857 as demands for control of state issu es by the federal 
government spread. Such demands were distinctly negative supporting 
Benton's suggestions of a tax on paper money that would bring a
15 Richardson, e d ., M essages and Papers of the Presidents, V, 
pp. 436-441, the quotations are from pp. 437 and 441.
16 Ibid ., pp. 441 and 438. Interestingly enough Buchanan also  
praised a policy of the Bank of England, that of keeping a special 
reserve of one-third of liab ilities (p. 438). Any favorable 
mention of the Bank of England twenty years earlier  would have 
cast in doubt the sincerity of Buchanan’s "Democracy. ,r
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return to an exclusively "constitutional currency. " This however
smacked of central authority and led many "radicals" in the Old
17Northwest to advocate state action.
Although such action was spoken of in Illinois, only in 
Ohio did the opposition to banks produce any tangible results. In 
1857 the Ohio Statesman again led the fight against banks and paper 
money and drew the traditional Jacksonian m oral lesson s from the 
panic. Referring to the law prohibiting the circulation of "foreign" 
notes under $10, the Statesman wrote, "While the law was in force, 
there was specie enough in use to answer every demand. But the 
Black Republicans repealed this law, and in le ss  than thirty days, 
the State was flooded with petty rags, many of them on banks the 
location of which it was im possible to trace out on any map yet 
published. " In line with the suggestions of Howell Cobb, Buchanan's 
Secretary of the Treasury, the Democrats called for a State sub­
treasury plan. The failure of the Ohio Trust and Life Insurance 
Company which had been a depository made this idea popular; and 
the state treasury scandal seem ed to give substance to Democratic 
connection of the free banking system  and financial instability. To 
com plicate the situation and add to the Democratic advantage, the 
Republicans were sponsoring a bill for extension of banking fac ilities. 
Both the bank question and its sponsors were defeated and the le g is -
17 Illinois State R egister, November 2, 1857; and Jones, "Anti­
bank and Anti-monopoly Movements in Illinois, " pp. 132-133.
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lature fe ll into the hands of the Democrats, although Chase managed 
to hold on to the Governor’s chair.
With the tacit agreem ent of Chase this legislature enacted 
a state sub-treasury law and displayed its anti-bank nature by 
reviving the severe tax m easures of the early fifties which had been 
declared unconstitutional. The following year they revived the old 
’’Crow Bar Law. " According to the Statesman the Democrats hoped 
in this way to seek a reversal of the earlier decisions. In the plat­
form the state sub-treasury and bank taxation were featured parts of
19the Democratic program.
The Indiana Democracy, which controlled the government in 
the H oosier State, and which had aided in establishing the free bank­
ing system , chose not to rock the boat with an anti-bank attack that 
might alienate som e of the conservative Whigs who had been drawn 
into their party. In 1859 Governor Willard praised both the free  
banking system  and the Bank of the State of Indiana as "highly bene­
ficial" to the interests of the state. But with a nod toward Jacksonian 
orthodoxy he qualified his rem arks:
If the rule could be uniform throughout the United
States, it would perhaps be better that no paper
18 Ohio Statesman, August-October, 1857; the quotation is from  
October 10, 1857; and Roseboom, Civil War Era, pp. 325-29.
19 Roseboom, Civil War Era, pp. 139-140; Huntington, "A History 
of Banking and Currency in Ohio, " pp. 462-63; and Ohio States- 
man, February 11 and 14, 1859, and May 27, 1859.
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currency was circulated. But, inasmuch as that 
uniformity is  practically im possible, I think 
Indiana has established as safe system s of bank­
ing as any other State in the Union, giving her 
people as high security for redemption of the 
notes of the banks as any other State. 20
During the campaign of 1860 the Democracy warned against 
views on banking and tariff of the ’’fanatical abolitionized, canting, 
hypocritical New England States. ” Following the political defeat 
and the com m ercial cr is is , Abram Hammond, who served out 
W illard’s term , attacked the free banking system  and called on the 
state to establish  a "sub-treasury system ” and deal only in specie. ^  
The m ost extensive revival of anti-bank thought took place 
in Illinois where these sentim ents culminated in the proposed con­
stitutional prohibition of banks in 1862.
The panic of 1857 caused demands in Illinois for the prohi­
bition of all banks or implementation of the Benton-Guthrie plan. 
However, such journals of "radical” Democracy as the Illinois State 
R egister refused to follow the centralizing tendencies of the latter 
plan, and the main thrust was in the direction of local prohibition.
20 Indiana Legislature. Documentary Journal, 1859, Part II,
Document 5.
21 Kenneth M. Stampp, Indiana Politics During the Civil War 
(Indianapolis, Indiana: Indiana H istorical Bureau, 1949), pp. 31- 
67; the quotation is from the New Albany Weekly Hedger, November 
28, I860, quoted in Stampp, p. 54; and Indiana .Legislature. 
Documentary Journal, I860, Part I, Document 3. This can be 
followed in the Indianapolis Daily State Sentinel from July, 1860
to March, 1861, but especia lly  October 17, 1860.
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The Republican opposition was by no means stabilized when the 
economic c r is is  o£ 1857 hit, and Illinois Democrats hoped to revive 
their declining popularity by reverting to orthodox positions on banks, 
tariffs, and corporations in order to take advantage of disunity among 
the Republicans- Hopefully, if they were forced to deal with these  
questions the dominant ex«Whig elem ent would force on the new 
party pro-tariff and bank views that would alienate the form er Demo­
crats in their ranks.
In this fight the Democrats received aid from one of the 
m ost outspoken opponents of banks, John Wentworth, who had gone 
over to the new party. He and a number of ex-D em ocrats w ere un­
happy with the dominance of form er Whigs in the new party and feared  
they might graft their econom ic views on the Republican platform. He 
wrote in the Daily Democrat in mid-1860:
We see  great efforts to turn this Republican party 
which is founded altogether on opposition to slavery, 
into a second edition of old blue-light federalism  and 
Whiggery. We see efforts made to lug high pro­
tective doctrines into it} to ring in a lot of old 
fo ss il know-nothings and old whigs into it by bribery  
of good fat officers, and influential positions, while 
old free so ilers  are left shivering out in the cold.
Bye and bye, we m ay expect to see efforts made to 
have a national bank plank added to the platform, and 
then the party w ill have emerged from its chrysalis  
condition into a full blown federal, whig party. If 
this is  the intention of som e of our so called Republicans 
they may count us out.
About six  months later im m ediately after the reform of the free banking
system  passed through the legislature, Wentworth complained, "Men
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who were sound on the banking question were rotten on the negro
question* and men who were sound on the negro position were
22rotten on the banking question. "
Wentworth’s attacks on the bankers increased with the 
cr is is  of 1860-61. In traditional Jacksonian rhetoric he called on the 
laboring c la sses  to "arouse" against the "Wild Cat aristocracy of 
Chicago. 15 While Wentworth led the way m ost other Democratic 
papers, including the two major party organs the Illinois State 
R egister and the Chicago Tim es took up the old Jacksonian stand. As
1861 wore on and the final collapse of the free banking system  was 
clear, this becam e a widely held position. The leading student of 
anti-bank thought in Illinois, Stanley Jones, has concluded that "by
1862 a m ajority of the Democratic party was again pledged to a program
to wipe out the banking system  of Illinois and to drive paper money
23of a ll kinds from the state. "
The Democrats got the opportunity to implement their views 
on the currency question in the constitutional convention which con­
vened in early 1862. The growth of the state had rendered the 1848 
document obsolete and in the election of 1860 the votes decided in
22 Fehrenbacher, Chicago Giant, pp. 188-95, the quotations are 
from the Chicago Daily Democrat, July 2, 1860 and the Chicago 
Post, February 20, 1861, quoted in Fehrenbacher, pp. 191*92 
and 193.
23 Jones, "Anti*.bank and Anti-monopoly Movements in Elinois, " 
pp. 161-176, the quotation is from p. 176.
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favor of calling convention with the northern sections of the state 
yielding the largest m ajorities. While in its origins this was a non­
partisan movement, by 1861 the Democrats saw the convention as an 
opportunity for reviving their party by building on discontent with 
the war and the economic cr is is . The Urbana Weekly Democrat 
advised its readers:
Unless we revive our party on issu es as far as 
regards state and local elections, it may be ex­
pected that we w ill have to w itness in silence the 
overthrow .. .  of Democratic principles.
Throughout the summer the Illinois State R egister made clear that 
a revival of "Democratic principles'* meant a return to orthodox 
Jacksonian dogma including a "constitutional currency. "
While the leading Republican papers agreed that there should 
be reform  to eliminate "Wild Cats, " they generally paid little attention 
to the election and called for the election of non-partisan candidates.
In a light turnout the Democrats won an overwhelming victory com ­
pletely controlling the convention. Forty-five of the candidates were 
Democrats and ten were Union Democrats who voted with the Demo­
crats on economic questions. Of the twenty Republicans, John Wentworth
24 O. M. Dickerson, "The Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1862, " 
University Studies: U niversity of Illinois, I, #9 (1905), pp. 3-6; 
the Urbana Weekly Democrat, August 24, 1861, quoted in Dickerson, 
p. 6; and Illinois State R egister, July 20, 27, August 13, 16,
October 3, and November 17, 1861.
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and Alexander Campbell were ardent opponents of banks. ^
With the aid of the Republican Wentworth, the Democrats 
wrote a thoroughly Jacksonian document which in its banking pro­
visions prohibited the creation of any banks in the state and provided 
for the com plete elimination of paper circulation. In this as other
questions the Democrats voted solidly as a party, and defended their
2bactions on thoroughly Jacksonian grounds.
25 Illinois State Journal, November 23, 1861; Dickerson, "The 
Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1862, ” pp. 7-9; Cole, Era of 
the Civil War, pp. 266-67; and Stanley L. Jones, "Agrarian 
Radicalism  in M inais' Constitutional Convention of 1862, " Journal 
of the Illinois State H istorical Society, XLVIII (Autumn, 1955), 
pp. 274-75; While Wentworth represented an old Jacksonian 
attitude toward banks, this is not the case with Campbell. He 
was an old Whig and from the sm all m inority of that party which 
favored a national currency and opposed the financial interests  
which robbed the workingman through charging interest. These 
men advocated a flexible, paper currency issued  by a national 
agency. Campbell's ideas are expressed  in his "Report on 
Treasury N otes” in Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the 
State of Illinois Convened at Springfield, January 7, 1862 (Spring­
field, Illinois: H. Danphier, Printer, 1862), pp. 181-187. Although 
there is no doubt that he opposed local banks (see vote in Ibid. ,
p. 355), he neither voted on the bank article in the constitution 
(see votes in Ibid., pp. 662-63, 938) nor signed the final document 
(see vote to accept in Ibid., pp. 1114-15).
26 Dickerson, "The Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1862, " 
pp. 15-17, 41-48; Cole, Era of the Civil War, pp. 268-69; New 
Constitution of the State of I llin o is .. .  With an Address to the 
People of Illinois (Springfield, Illinois: Charles Lanphier,
Printer, 1862), pp. 23, 27-28, 53-54; and Journal of the Constitu­
tional Convention.. . 1862, pp. 10, 143, 662-63, and 938. Went­
worth was on Committee on Banks and Corporations (Ibid., p. 45), 
and generally agreed with article. However, he did submit a 
m inority report arguing that issue should be submitted to the 
people and if they are in favor of banks a guarded free banking 
system  should be provided for (Ibid., pp. 144-146).
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The partisanship of the convention, in particular the 
apportionment arrangement, and the quasi-legislative functions it 
attempted to perform led to a bitter attack on the new constitution, by 
the Republicans. The Illinois State Journal which had earlier praised  
the delegates as "able" men, later described the convention as 
’’revolutionary” and "a m ere machine for resuscitating and re ­
organizing the Democratic party of the State. ” From this latter 
b asically  accurate appraisal, the Republicans moved to attacking it
as the "Copper Head Convention” and charging its m embers with 
27disloyalty.
Most of the attacks on the document took this tack, and 
em phasised the apportionment question. However, this was easily  
connected to economic questions. "Shall the manufacturing, agri­
cultural and com m ercial in terests of northern Illinois be put into 
Egyptian bondage?" asked the Aurora Beacon. The whole of the state’s 
economic progress seem ed to be challenged by the new document. The 
Chicago Fost stated the Republican position on the economic questions 
posed by the constitution:
We are a great com m ercial State. This Constitution 
fetters com m erce; cuts off the avenues of trade; 
blocks up the channels of communication with other 
states; discourages the investm ent of capital; drives
27 Cole, Era of the Civil War, pp. 269-70; Dickerson, "The Illinois 
Constitutional Convention of 1862, " pp. 48-52; and the Illinois 
State Journal, January 7, and 14, 1862.
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away manufacturing; stops internal improvements; 
paralyzes enterprise, turns away from us the tide 
o£ immigration, and scandalizes us before the 
world. 28
While this was hardly the case, the banking provisions were 
im practical and reactionary. Some Democratic papers recognized  
this, but m ost of them chose, as Jones w ell expresses it, to "play 
on new frustrations with old formulas. " In this Wentworth took the 
lead in the northern part of the state contributing artic les to the 
Chicago Tinaes and attacking the banking system  at Democratic m ass
m eetings. In the south, the Illinois State R egister defended the con-■*—  ' -• ■ — n ^ -r—
stitution as the product of a "People’s Convention, " and a bulwark in
defense of the people’s in terest against the intrusion of corporate
privilege. The Peoria Union argued;
Well it may be called the "poor man’s constitution, " 
for it px’Otects him against chartered monopolies and 
monied aristocracies, chartered privileges and 
special legislation, peculations and plundering; it 
Puts all men upon an equal footing .. .  By it the 
m echanic is secured for his labor, the poor man Ms 
hom estead and all their just .rights allowing no one 
special privileges to the exclusion of others, 29
28 Rlinois State Journal, March 27, 1862; the Havana Battle Axe in 
the Illinois State Journal, April 4, 1862; the Aurora Beacon,
April 24, 1862, in Cole, Era of the Civil War, p. 269; and Chicago 
Post in the Rlinois State Journal, June 16, 1862.
29 Dickerson, "The Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1862, " p, 17; 
Jones, "Anti-bank and Anti-monopoly Movements in Rlinois, ”
p# 177; Fehrenbacher, Chicago Giant, p. 195; Cole, Era of the 
Civil War, p. 70; the Illinois State R egister, May 8, 1862; and the 
Peoria Union in the Rlinois State Register, May 16, 1862.
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This was old Jacksonian fare, but it still had appeal. While 
the banking provision, which was voted on separately, was defeated, 
it was by a narrow margin. The voting pattern was not nearly so 
sectional as it had been earlier. In Cook county which had strongly 
been for free banking, businessm en, farm ers, and, laborers combined 
to vote against "Stumptail" currency. By 1862 the issue of Green­
backs by the federal government had com pletely altered the currency
30question.
In the four years after 1856 the Republicans gained strength 
but as the state elections of 1858 showed, they were s till a m inority  
party. They depended for the victories they had and what future 
victories they might obtain on the Democratic elem ent of their party.
Yet, during these years the old Whigs openly took control of the new 
party as can be seen by comparing the form er affiliations of the governors 
nominated in 1860 with those of 1856, when Republican Governors were 
all form er Dem ocrats. Four years later all the nominees w ere former 
Whigs, and their presidential candidate was a long-tim e Whig politi­
cian. In som e areas this meant a slightly more conservative outlook,
30 Dickerson, "The Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1862, "
pp. 23-24; Cole, Era of the Civil War, p. 271; Jones, "Agrarian 
Radicalism  in Illinois’ Constitutional Convention of 1862, " pp.
281-82, Although it is just a guess, the shifts in voting in 
traditionally anti-bank areas might be accounted for by the 
changes in growth fostered by the railroad which altered the 
pattern of population and wealth. See North, Economic Growth 
of the United States, pp. 135-155, especially  the maps on pp. 147 
and 149.
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and everywhere an open reversion to Whig economic ideas. In the 
lake d istricts and the northern parts of the Old Northwest, this 
position on economic questions served to draw a few Democrats, 
disgusted with Buchanan’s pro-southern economic policies and eager 
for government protection of their in terests, into the Republican fold. 
However, banking was s till a highly emotional issu e, and the new 
party had to handle it gingerly. Basically, they moved in the direction 
of reform  of the free banking system s which fit w ell in their general 
economic thinking. The cr is is  of 1860-61 forced them to act m ore 
vigorously and the position they assum ed was not unlike that of the 
Whigs during the post-Jackson economic c r is is . Their main goals 
seem  to have been a safe currency and adequate credit. Their first  
attempts were to try to secure these through a reform  of the free  
banking system s.
Immediately following the Panic of 1857 Ohio’s governor 
Chase called upon a Democratic legislature to reform the free bank­
ing system  in order Mto secure the interests of the m asses of the 
people. ” He praised the general working of the system  but believed  
that specie reserve requirem ents should be raised, the rates of 
secu rities to circulation should be increased, and only Ohio and 
United States bonds should be accepted as collateral. These reform s 
seem ed dictated by the w estern experience with free banking and were 
typical of the direction in which Republican thought was moving. Each
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of these would have been a constructive alteration in the law* but
none was enacted by the succeeding Democratic leg islatures. 31
W isconsin's Republican governor* Alexander Randall was
somewhat m ore successfu l in obtaining his suggested reform s. In
1858 he complained of the lax requirements concerning paid in
capital and the establishm ent of banks in often remote and inaccessib le
p laces. Since banks located in large cities were apt to have their
notes presented constantly for redemption, the major cities often
found their bank facilities languishing while the number of banks in
general was on the r ise . In 1860 Eau Claire, Wisconsin, isolated
in the lumber region, had banks with a total circulation of $536, 764.
At the sam e tim e the circulation of Milwaukee banks was only $86, 521.
The legislature acted that year in a half-hearted manner to remedy
the latter problem by forbidding banks in towns with fewer than two
32hundred inhabitants.
In I860 the governor again complained about the problem of 
redemption and the bank com ptroller introduced the problem of the 
quality of secu rities on which the currency was based. Finally, under 
the prodding of the secess io n  cr is is , W isconsin's Republican le g is ­
lature passed an adequate bank reform  law in April, 1861. This new
D ocum ents.. .  of the State of Ohio, 1857, Document 8. Chase also  
called  for a Democratic reform , the elimination of sm all notes.
32 Merk, Economic History of W isconsin, pp. 188-90.
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law attempted to solve the problems that all free banking system s
faced by lim iting securities to those of W isconsin and the United
States insisting on a bona fide cash capital of $15, 000, limiting note
issue to three tim es the paid in capital, and requiring every bank to
33maintain a central redemption office in Milwaukee or Madison.
A sim ilar pattern of reform  evolved in Illinois. The reform  
of 1857 had made the free banking law in that state one of the best, 
but there were s till m ajor flaws in the system . The slump of 1857 
revealed that som e attention should be paid to the quality of bonds on 
which the currency was based. While the earlier reform tried to 
elim inate banks in inaccessib le places, nearly all of the banks 
created in the expansion after 1857 were in sm all towns and none was 
established in Chicago. Finally, the specie reserves of Illinois 
banks were lower than any others in the country. As a consequence 
Illinois currency circulated at a discount outside the state. In 1859 
Governor Bis se ll praised the system , but pointed to som e of these 
problems and suggested the legislature consider reforming the system . 
The only specific recommendation he made was that some central 
redemption center be established. The Bank Com m issioners further 
asked that Illinois bonds be given in preference, and that their power 
to enforce sm all note provisions be increased. The legislature which
33 Ib id ., p. 209.
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was dominated by Democrats refused to act on these proposals. ^  
P ressure to reform  the system  came from the Chicago 
Tribune early in 1860 before the secession  cr is is  oecured. Chicago 
had only one com m ercial bank, and the paper felt reform  was 
n ecessary  to obtain satisfactory currency. As bond prices slackened 
and the threat of secessio n  increased, the Tribune’s demands, and 
the demands of Chicago's business leaders for reform  increased.
John Wood, a staunch Republican who served out B iss e ll's  term  
called for reform  in early 1861. He suggested a lim itation of security  
to stocks of Illinois and the United States. In this way he believed  
the legislature could best carry out the system  favored by the people.
The elections of 1860 resulted in a resounding Republican 
triumph that carried  Richard Yates to the governorship with a 
solid ly Republican legislature to support him. While the banking 
c r is is  was not the m ost important problem before the new governor, 
he faced it squarely and called vigorously for reform  of the system . 
He saw it as a "troublesome question, " and showed a general disgust 
for "speculators, stock brokers, and panic m akers. " In general, 
he favored the free banking system  which had performed well; and he
34 Jam es, Chicago Banks, I, p. 272-74; Illinois Governor, 1857- 
1860; and Dowrie, "The Development of Banking in Illinois, " 
pp. 150-53, 158-60.
35 Jam es, Chicago Banks, I, pp. 274-75; P ierce, History of 
Chicago, II, pp. 127-129; and Elinois Governor, 1860-61.
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cautioned against radical change that would do m ore harm than good. 
However, he made five specific suggestions: stabilization of the 
system  through a central redemption agency; limitation of security  
to the stocks of Illinois and the United States; quarterly or sem i­
annual examinations of the quality of securities; tighter restrictions  
on transfers and rem ovals of bonds; and explicit personal liability.
The legislature which had been petitioned to reform the 
free banking system  acted reasonably quickly on the governor’s 
request. An old Whig advocate of free banking, Mr. Hurlbut, from  
strongly Republican Boone county, introduced the bill and wrote a 
special report to the legislature which, echoed Y ates’ suggestions.
The result was an excellent b ill which m et little  opposition in either 
house. It lim ited securities to those of Illinois or the United States. 
Redemption centers were established in Springfield and Chicago.
The b ill lim ited  circulation to three tim es capital, and gave the 
Auditor further power to check the actual paid in capital. Finally, no 
bank was to be established in a town of le ss  than one thousand inhabi­
tants. The only major reform not included concerned a minimum on 
specie reserv es. Unfortunately reform in Illinois came too late, and 
the banking situation deteriorated before the reform s could be
36 Cole, Era of the Civil War, p. 200; and Illinois le g is la tu r e . 
House Journal, 1861, pp. 84-103.
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37implemented.
The cr is is  of 1860-61 had made some sort of banking reform  
n ecessary  and not all Republicans were convinced that reform of 
free banking would be adequate. At the same time that these re ­
form s were being implemented other alternatives were being con­
sidered. During the c r is is  of 1860-61, while the free banking system s  
of Indiana, Illinois and W isconsin were crumbling, the Rank of the 
State of Indiana stood solidly as an example of sound, conservative 
banking. This example was not lost on the other states of the Old 
Northwest.
Ohio’s State Rank had shown itse lf to be strong during the 
c r is is , and was one of the la st banks to suspend specie payments. 
Efforts had been made in the m id-fifties to increase the capital of 
the State Bank and extend its corporate life. In January, 1861, 
Republican Governor William Dennison praised the State Bank and 
renewed suggestions that its capital should be increased and its 
charter--w hich was to expire in 1865--be renewed. Banking capital 
in the state, he believed, was insufficient; and "so long as the supply 
of circulating notes issued by our banks, is insufficient for the trans­
action of business of the State, it w i l l . . .be in vain to attempt, by
37 Illinois Legislature. House Journal, 1861, pp. 115, 371, 473-79* 
“and 536; Illinois Legislature. Senate Journal, 1861, p. 383; and 
Dowrie, "Development of Banking in Illinois, ” pp. 164-65. The 
vote was 21-4 in the Senate and 59-12 in the House.
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leg isla tive enactment, to expel the issu es of foreign banks. 11 The
following year Dennison again brought the State Bank before the
legislature. The cr is is  had shown the weakness of free banking and
the use of state bonds as security for note issue. To his mind the
Ohio system , which provided that branches of the State Bank be
mutually liable for all issu es  and accept the notes of all other
branches at par, had proved the best way to secure the value of
paper currency. However, Dennison was leaving office, and the new
governor, David Tod, the old anti-bank Jacksonian, counseled the
legislature to wait on the question until the federal government had
38acted on Chase’s suggestions for a national banking system .
In Michigan, desperation as much as anything e lse  led to 
the attempt to establish  a State Bank. The free banking law had not 
succeeded in the hoped for expansion of credit and currency. Believing 
that the liability  provisions established by the constitution held back 
banking development, the .1859 Republican legislature proposed an 
amendment to the Constitution lim iting liability to the extent of the 
individual’s stock holding which was accepted by the voters in the 
election of 1860. Although the Republicans continued to try to reform  
the free banking system  to assure a safe abundant currency, they 
did not lim it them selves to any single method in achieving this goal.
38 .Documents.. .  of the State of Ohio, 1860, Part I, Document 39; 
and Documents. 7. of the State of Ohio, 1861, Part I, Documents 
26 and 35*
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The onset of the war dampened the impact of these changes, and
early in 1861 a movement to relieve the state's financial problems
through the establishm ent of a State Bank sim ilar to those in Indiana
and Ohio was begun by the Detroit Daily Advertiser* This required
an alteration in the constitution which lim ited the legislature to the
creation of banks by general laws. In the Senate, the Committee
on Banks and Incorporations reported favorably on the establishm ent
of a State Bank and the legislature asked the people to amend the
constitution in order to make this possible in the election of 1862.
While this was passed, a State Bank never became a reality because
39of the creation of the national banking system .
The same session  of the Illinois legislature which reformed
the free banking law in 1861 also created the Union Bank of Illinois
which was to be a State Bank of thirty branches with a total capital of
$10, 000, 000, Only in the Senate did this receive much opposition.
There the opposition was predominately from Democrats some of whom
40
had voted for reform  of the free banking system .
39 Gantz, "A History of Banking Legislation, " pp. 91-92; Fuller, 
e d ., M essages, II, pp. 403 and 430-31; Detroit Daily A dvertiser, 
February 7 and 8, 1861; and Michigan Legislature. Senate Docu­
m ents Accompanying Journal, 1861, Documents 8 and 18.
40 Dowrie, "Development of Banking in Illinois, " pp. 165-66; Illinois 
L egislature, House Journal, 1861, p. 543; and Illinois Legislature. 
Senate Journal, 1861, p. 478. The vote was 15-9 in the Senate 
and 58-7 in the House.
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According to the Illinois constitution the b ill for the Union 
Bank of Illinois had to be ratified by the people at the November,
1861, election. By that time the complete collapse of the free banking 
system  had increased anti-bank feeling. At the same time the 
constitutional convention was about to m eet. Under these conditions 
the Union Bank b ill was defeated by a large majority*
While a State Bank, as such, was not established in Wiscon­
sin  the government of that state became thoroughly enmeshed with 
its banking system  after the c r is is  of 1860-61. In the summer of 1861 
the W isconsin banking system  was in a chaotic state. The construc­
tive reform  of the free banking system  passed by the Republican 
legislature in April would not go into effect until it was acted upon 
by the voters in the November election. It seem ed like the Illinois 
reform: too little , too late. The cr is is  had revived sagging anti­
bank feeling. M ass anti-bank m eetings were held and agitation for 
the repeal of the free banking law increased. The situation was 
com plicated by the state’s inability to float a war loan in the New York 
money market* The congruence of the two problems suggested a 
single solution for both. In mid-May Alexander M itchell, a Milwaukee 
financier, proposed just such a solution to Governor Randall. Over 
the opposition of the Democrats, arrangements were made between 
the state and the bankers. The bankers would purchase $800, 000 of 
W isconsin bonds and deposit these with the com ptroller to take the
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place of the depreciated bonds which he held. The bankers were 
also to work to keep W isconsin money at par and redeem the notes 
of a number of discredited banks. This connection with the state, 
the reform of the free banking law which was accepted by the people 
at the election in 1881, and the responsible action of the Wisconsin 
Bankers A ssociation combined to give the state a sound banking 
system  throughout the war years.
By 1862 all of the states in the Old Northwest were troubled, 
in varying degrees, by inadequate credit facilities and a fluctuating, 
unstable currency. Yvrisconsin  had moved a long way toward solving  
her problems, and the State Banks in Indiana and Ohio were basically  
sound insitutions, but the situation in Illinois and Michigan was 
chaotic.
The period from 1857 through the cr is is  of 1861 saw a 
general tendency on the part of the Democrats to revert to the old 
Jacksonian formula of ano banks and a "Constitutional currency. ”
The Republicans w ere responsible for the alteration of the free bank­
ing laws lim iting banks to towns of a certain size , tightening capital 
requirem ents, restricting the quality of securities used, and insisting  
on central redemption centers in order to avoid the excesses  of the 
"wildcats. " Experience had taught that these lim itations on the freedom
41 Ivierk, Economic History of W isconsin, pp. 200-211.
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of action might be necessary  in order to insure security under an
open system . The Republicans* basically, were searching for ways
to provide a sound and adequate currency and to expand the supply
of money and credit; and they were not tied wholly to the free bank-
ing idea. The sam e Republican legislatures that attempted to reform
the free banking laws often encouraged the establishment of State
Banks sim ilar to that of Indiana. There is no good reason to believe
that m ost Republicans differed from Governor Dennison of Ohio who
told the le g is la tu r e  in 1861;
The subjects of banking and currency, address 
them selves with equal force and dii-ectness to the 
people of the State. Whatever theories we may 
entertain on these subjects; whatever ingenious 
and beautiful visions of a people without banks 
and gold and silver their only currency, the 
political realities are before us: —We have 
banks; we have paper money. 42
The real question was what system  would best provide 
adequate credit and a sound secure currency. In the face of the 
experience with depreciating stocks in the cr is is  of 1860-61 one 
might wonder not that proposals to follow the successfu l model of 
Indiana were entertained, but that the idea of free banking held on 
so tenaciously and reform was attempted in the face of the Demo­
cratic demand for complete abolition of the system s.
42 Documents. . « of the State of Ohio, 1860, Dart I, Document 39, 
p. 548.
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B asically  the attitudes on the banking system s shown by 
the two contesting parties during these years represent a continu­
ation of views formed in the party struggles following the destruction  
of the Bank of the United States. As such, these were differences 
about state policy in the absence of federal action.
The Democrats in 1862 held the same ground they had 
occupied twenty years earlier fighting for "hard money, H sim ple 
government, and constitutional purity. They stood solidly against 
centralism ; and even at the state level, feared positive government 
action. Growing out of the Yv?hig tradition, the Republicans were 
committed to securing an adequate and sound currency. They feared  
neither banks nor government activity and were willing to use both 
to secure their ends.
For over two decades the money question had been a local 
issu e . The Civil War changed this, and elevated it once again to 
the national sta g e . The violence of the debates and the way it had 
becom e woven into the fabric of party conflict dictated that the old 
arguments and attitudes would be carried into the new arena.
CHAPTER VIII
THE WEST AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF FREE BANKING
The Civil War made federal action on the money question 
necessary . On the one hand secession  precipitated an economic 
c r is is  which severly  undermined the existing system . On the other 
hand, the expenses of war caused a financial cr is is  within the 
government itself. In 1862 and 1863, the Thirty Seventh Congress 
authorized the issu e  of the legal tender notes called Greenbacks 
and took the fir st  step toward the establishment of the national 
banking system . W estern Republicans played key roles in the enact­
m ent of this legislation; and both the Greenbacks and the national 
banking system  received their solid support. In contrast, the 
w estern Dem ocracy unanimously opposed both m easures. These 
Democrats continued to mouth Jacksonian rhetoric and offer little  
in the way of constructive answers to the problems facing the govern­
ment and the economy. The Republicans showed a willingness to 
employ the government in a positive fashion to solve these problems.
The Greenbacks were an em ergency m easure, but the national 
banking system  was conceived as a fundamental reform  of the 
nation's currency system . It was built on the model of the free  
banking system s which had been erected in New York and the w estern  
states, and embodied the types of restrictions which w esterners had 
found n ecessary  in their experience with free banking at the state 
level. In order to implement this system , Secretary Chase, the 
w estern Republicans, and their a llies had to overcom e the opposition 
of the eastern  bankers as w ell as that of the w estern Democrats.
When the new Lincoln administration assum ed office in 1861, 
it faced not only a rebellion, but also a hopelessly garbled financial 
situation. Secession  had disrupted the interregional balance of trade 
and had precipitated a wave of com m ercial failures in the East which 
assum ed greater proportions than the Panic of 1857. Over $300, 000, 000 
owed by the people of the South to Northern merchants was a total lo ss .
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In the West the currency based on the bonds of southern states 
depreciated rapidly, leaving the whole area of the Old Northwest 
with hardly any means of exchange. In addition government credit 
was in such a shaky state that Buchanan's la st Secretary of the 
Treasury was forced to negotiate $15, 000, 000 in loans at the rates of 
10% and 12%.1
The magnitude of these problems dictated a radical shift 
in the nation's financial policy. Since the time of Jackson, currency 
and banking m atters had been decentralized and the powers of the 
federal government lim ited. Faced with the n ecessities  of war a 
nationalist adm inistration reversed  this policy. With the passage of 
the legal tender acts and the establishm ent of the national banking 
system , the process of nationalization was extended to the nation's 
currency.
The Old Northwest played a significant role in this leg is la ­
tion and one that can be m isunderstood if the debates of the post war 
decades are read back into the wartime situation. The conflict over 
this legislation  is  much clearer if viewed as culmination of the 
monetary debate begun by Jackson's veto of the Bank of the United 
States.
1 Dunbar, "The C risis of I860;'1 Em erson 0 . Fite, Social and
Industrial Conditions in the North During the Civil War (New York: 
Frederick Ungar Publishing C o., 1963 ed. ), pp. 105-14.
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The new Secretary of the Treasury, m ore responsible than
any other man for these alterations, was a w esterner, Salmon P.
Chase. He was from the Democratic element of the Republican
party and appointed to the Cabinet for political reasons. He had
little  experience in financial m atters and was hesitant to take the
job because he had been chosen as Senator from Ohio. When he
decided to accept the Cabinet post, he wrote to Governor Denison:
. . .  the President has thought fit to call me to another 
sphere of duty, m ore laborious m ore arduous and 
fuller far of perplexing responsib ilities. I sought 
to avoid it, and would gladly now decline it if I 
might. I find it im possible to do so, however, 
without seem ing to shrink from cares and labors 
for the common good, which cannot be honorably 
shunned. 2
Chase, like m ost men in 1861, underestimated the cost and
length of the war. At fir st he hoped that an increase in the tariff
and an issu e of Treasury notes could finance suppression of the
rebellion. In 1860 he wrote to Henry Wilson: "It is clear that some
m easure m ust be adopted to revive the sinking credit of the nation;
and this b ill /the M orill Tariff/ w ill certainly contribute to that result.
A Treasury note b ill without a Tariff b ill is a dangerous experiment.
3
The two together may answer a good purpose. "
2 Chase to William Denison, March 6, 1861, reprinted in J. W. 
Schuckers, The Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland 
C h ase .. . (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1874), pp. 207-208.
3 Chase to Henry Wilson, December 13, 1860, reprinted in "Diary and 
Correspondence of Salmon P. Chase, " pp. 293-95.
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The M orill b ill was passed and included an authorization 
for the Secretary of the Treasury to issue $10, 000, 000 in bonds and 
Treasury notes. When revenues lagged behind Chase's expectations, 
he made use of this power and an earlier authorization to borrow  
the n ecessary  money to finance the war. In July, Chase requested 
the power to borrow an additional $240, 000, 000 to cover the in creas­
ing expenses of the war. He s till seem ed to believe that tai'iff 
revenues would increase, and he was hesitant to institute an adequate
program of taxation because of the "temporarily deranged" economic 
4conditions.
In July and August, Congress authorized the Secretary to 
borrow, through the use of various kinds of secu rities, $250, 000, 000. 
The largest portion of this was in the form of Treasury notes which 
were sold with the aid of the banks of Boston, New York, and Phila­
delphia. However, as the year continued revenues lagged and 
expenses rapidly increased. At the same tim e, the currency situ ­
ation in the West worsened. It was clear to Chase that som e more
4 Senate Executive Documents, 37th Congress, 1st Session, No. 2. 
This is sum m arized briefly in Robert P. Sharkey, Money, C lass, 
and Party: An Economic Study of the Civil War and Reconstruc­
tion (Baltim ore: The Johns Hopkins P ress , 1959), pp. 16—20; 
and Edward C. Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age, Vol. VI of 
The Economic H istory of the United States, e d ., Henry David, 
et. al. (10 v o ls . , New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1945--), 
pp. 13-15; and in somewhat m ore detail in W esley C. M itchell,
A History of the Greenbacks with Special Reference to the 
Economic Consequence of Their Issue (Chicago: University of 
Chicago P ress, 1903), pp. 3-43.
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perm anent reform  of the currency was necessary . ^
During the 1840’s two plans for a national currency had 
appeared which w ere discussed at that time and then revived after 
the Panic of 1857. Both were penned by Whigs, and received, their 
g rea tes t support in that party.
The plan which s tir re d  the m ost in te res t was that proposed 
by M illard  F illm ore in his widely read repo rt as New York State 
Com ptroller in which he suggested that if Congress would authorize 
the state bank notes ''secu red  by the stocks of the United States to be 
received  for public dues to the national treasu ry , this would give 
such notes a universal credit, coextensive with the United States, 
and leave nothing fu rther desired  in the shape of a national currency. "
In essence this would be a national free  banking scheme based on the 
existing state  banks, but W estern Democrats looked on it  as a "Fed­
e ra lis t  schem e.
Edward Kellogg advanced a m ore radical plan which p ro ­
posed a kind of national land bank in which the government established
5 The handling of these loans is trea ted  in detail in Redlich,
A m erican Banking, II, pp. 85-95.
6 Frank H. Severance, e d ., "M illard F illm ore Papers, Volume One, " 
Publications of the Buffalo H istorical Society, X (1907), p. 282; 
Illinois State R egister, October 30, 1849. The relation  between
the F illm ore rep o rt and the national banking system  is given in 
g rea tes t detail in Redlich, A m erican Banking, II, pp. 101-102.
On the reception of this plan in Illinois, Jones, "Anti-Bank and 
Anti-Monopoly Movements in Elinois, " pp. 80-81.
293
branches of a national institution in each state to lend government 
created  legal tender on rea l estate m ortgages. The details of 
Kellogg’s plan a re  less im portant than his insistance on the idea 
that the in te res t charged by bankers and money lenders robbed labor
of its product. He contended that this could be alleviated by a
* 7national currency issued on the cred it of the nation.
Kellogg did not receive the hearing accorded to Fillm ore, 
although an editorial in the Racine Wisconsin Advocate probably 
rep resen ts  the view of contem porary Democrats. The a rtic le  
described Kellogg’s C urrency: The Evil and the Remedy as an 
example of the "currency tinkering /w hich/ seem s to be the besetting 
m ania of a portion of the people of this country. . . .  " His plan was 
a wild idea which would do "injustice somewhere and in the end 
everywhere. " "To us it seem s evident that no panacea will ever 
again find favor in this country. The precious m etals m ust sooner 
or la te r  become the currency  and exchanges be made by m ercantile  
en te rp rise  and depended upon m ercantile credit for the cred it of
7 The m ost complete presentation of Kellogg’s ideas is Edward 
Kellogg, A New M onetary System, e d ., M ary Kellogg Putnam 
(New York: Rudd and Carleton, 1861) which is a la te r edition 
of his .Labor and Other Capital which f ir s t  appeared in 1849.
His plan is discussed in reference to post war agitation in: 
C hester Me A. Deatler, A m erican Radicalism , 1865-1901 (New 
York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1963), pp. 50-77; Irwin Unger,
The Greenback E ra: A Social and Political H istory of A m erican 
Finance, 1365-1879 (Princeton, New Je rsey : Princeton Univer­
sity  P re ss , 1964), pp. 95-97; and Sharkey, Money, C lass, and 
Party , pp. 187 -91.
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paper. " The a rtic le  repeated the standard Democratic argum ent
that usury laws w ere wrong in principle. "We still think that if the
currency  w ere once regulated by not being regulated at all, the
protection against usury would be much less needed, if it were 
8needed at all. "
As governor of Ohio, Chase had asked Congress to regu­
late the currency, but he had not form ulated any distinct plan.
Rather he worked to reform, the free  banking system  in his own state. 
He was m ainly opposed to bank monopolies and supported a con­
vertib le  currency, but he was n o t--as  usually no ted--a  radical
9opponent of all paper money.
Racine Advocate, July 21, 18 
Movement for Statehood, pp 
Godek Gardwell /Kellogg?,
6, reprin ted  in Quaife, e d ., The 
286-89# the book under review was 
Currency; The Evil and the Remedy
(New York: 1844). Although the Advocate certain ly  rep resen ts 
a position in line with standard Democratic orthodoxy, some 
Dem ocrats m ay have been in te rested  in this plan. See: a le tte r 
from  Don Eaton to Augustus C. French, January, 1831, in the 
F rench MSS, which requests French to sign a petition s im ila r 
to those circulating in other w estern  states to have Congress 
estab lish  a national paper currency based on the cred it of the 
United States. Eaton's political affiliation rem ains a m ystery  
to me and from  in ternal evidence he could be either a Whig or a 
Democrat. Interestingly, Eaton re fe rs  for authority not to 
Kellogg but "Alison the historian . " This is a reference to 
Archibald Alison, the Scottish h isto rian  of the French Revolution, 
whom Unger connects with the ideas of Henry Carey (The G reen­
back E ra, p. 51, ftn. 42).
9 Documents. . . of the State of Ohio, 1855-56, Document 4. See 
above Chapter VI. He was hardly a "prim itive bullionist Demo­
cra t"  as Unger describes him in The Greenback E ra, p. 14.
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In 1861 Chase received suggestions recommending both 
these plans. After Kellogg died in 1858, Alexander Campbell, the 
Whig-Republican mayor of Ea Salle, Illinois, took up the Kellogg 
plan with some important modifications. He suggested to Chase in 
June that the government issue noninterest-bearing Treasury notes 
m denominations from  $5 to $500 to replace the state bank currency 
which had degenerated to ’’w orthless trash. " Other W esterners 
appraised Chase of the n ecessity  of some currency in that area. 
W isconsin Senator James Doolittle proposed that all bank notes 
under $20 be taxed out of existence and replaced by Treasury notes. 
Joseph Medill, whose Chicago Tribune strongly favored a national
1 Q
bank currency, offered a sim ilar solution.
Chase seem s to have been more im pressed by a plan sub­
m itted to him in August by Orlando B. Potter. E ssentially a revival 
of the F illm ore suggestion, it would:
Allow the banks, and bankers duly authorized in 
the loyal states, to secure their b ills by deposit­
ing with a superintendent appointed by the Govern-
10 Andrew McFarland Davis, The Origin of the National Banking
System  (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910) pp. 44-51, 
gives sum m aries of numerous letters in the Chase papers. On 
Campbell’s influence, see: Sharkey, Money, Glass, and Party, 
pp. 191-95; Destler, Am erican Radicalism, pp. 8-9, 60, 61, 76. 
Unger, The Greenback Era, pp. 97-101. For his ideas at this 
time see: Jouxuial of the Constitutional Convention of the State 
of Illinois... . 1862, pp. 51, 181-187. While he clearly  opposed 
Chase's suggestion of a national banking system , his main interest 
was to defend the issue of legal tenders as a better method of 
financing the war than the Gallitin plan put forth by the bankers 
of Boston, New York and Philadelphia.
296
ment Unite dState8 stocks at their par value in the 
same way that the hanks and bankers in New York 
secure their circulation by depositing New York 
State and United States stock with the State, thus 
making the stocks of the United States a basis of 
banking on which alone a national circulation can 
be secured. 11
Chase’s annual report, issued December 9» 1861 considered
the entire problem at length. After reporting his negotiations with
the bankers concerning the loans and a dism al review of the revenues
and expenses of the government, the Secretary outlined the problems
of the currency. He called on Congress to a ssert its authority in
this area to rationalize the chaotic situation of m ore than 1600 banks
chartered under a variety of inconsistent state laws.
Under such a system , or rather lack of system , 
great fluctuations, and heavy lo sses  in discounts and 
exchanges, are inevitable; and not infrequently 
through failures of the issuing institutions, con­
siderable portions of the circulation become 
suddenly worthless in the hands of the people. The 
recent experience of several States in the valley of 
the M ississipp i painfully illustrates the justice of these 
observations; and enforces the m ost cogent practi­
cal arguments the duty of protecting com m erce and 
industry against recurrence of such disorders. 12
He offered two plans for the consideration of the Congress.
The fir st followed Campbell’s suggestion to withdraw the bank issu es
11 O. B. Potter to Chase, August 19* 1861, reprinted in Davis, 
Origin of the National Banking System, pp. 45-48.
12 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of Finances 
for the Year Ending June 30, 1861 ('Washington: 1861), pp. 7-29, 
the quotation is from pp. 17-18.
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of the nation and replace them with Treasury notes. A tax on bank
notes would insure their withdrawal. The people would have the
advantage of a uniform national currency and the government would
have a loan without the burden of interest. Chase believed that is
such currency could be kept in line with the ’’real needs of the
people” and at par with specie this would be a good plan. However,
he feared inflation and a depreciating currency; and to his mind,
’’these possible d isa s te r s .. . far outweigh the probable benefits of 
13the plan. ”
The Secretary much preferred a second plan suggested by 
Potter. The circulation of notes would be placed under a common 
authority which would hold United State’s stocks as security against 
notes issued. This plan would make use of the already existing  
State banks, which would also be required to hold specie reserves  
adequate for prompt redemption of their issu e. In this way the 
people could be given a uniform national currency effectively sa fe ­
guarded against depreciation and lo ss  to the noteholder. This method 
would also  help facilitate government loans, and aid the general 
business conditions by lowering in terest charges "without risking 
the perils of a great money monopoly. ” Chase reminded his readers
that the plan was one that had been tested in New York and other
14states ’’and has been found practical and useful. "
13 Ibid ., p. 18.
14 Ibid., p. 19.
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Designed to strengthen the Union by increasing the common
interest in its preservation, this plan had nationalistic overtones.
It was m ore than an em ergency war m easure. Chase also argued
that it would aid the war effort, but he made it clear that he was
advocating a basic reform  of the entire money and banking structure
of the nation m such a way as to combine safe circulation and con*
15vem ence.
The House referred Chase's report to a subcommittee of the 
Ways and Means Committee under the direction of Buffalo banker 
Elb ridge Gerry Spaulding. When he discovered that Chase had not 
drawn up a b ill, Spaulding drafted one based on the New York Free  
Banking L»aw. While writing the bill he "came to the conclusion, 
that it could not be passed and made available quick enough to m eet 
the c r is is  pressing upon the Government for money to sustain the 
Army and the Navy. " As a consequence he added to the bank bill a 
section  providing for the "issuing /o f /  legal tender notes direct 
from the Treasury while the bank bill was put in operation throughout 
the country. " Thus, as originally conceived the "Greenbacks" and 
the national bank notes w ere to be complementary with the legal 
tenders providing for immediate n ecessities  and the basic reform  to
15 Ib id ., pp. 13-19; Chase to Jesse  Baldwin, May 18, 1864, r e ­
printed in Robert B. Warden, An Account of the Private .Life 
and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase (Cincinnati, Ohio: 
W ilstack, Baldwin and C o ., 1874), pp. 409-10.
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be in tbe form  of an altered banking system . ^
The economic situation changed drastically in late December 
and forced an alteration of these plans. During the summer and fall 
the banks of the major seaboard c ities had acted in essence as 
underwriters for $150, 000, 000 in government loans. They had 
hoped that Chase would make use of an alteration in the Sub-Treasury 
Act to use them as government depositories, but the Secretary chose 
to construe this act rigidly and demand specie from the banks. While 
this was probably a blunder, the flow of specie was sufficient to 
enable the banks to handle the three payments to the government. How­
ever, this cycle of borrowing depended on continued confidence in the 
government. This confidence was shaken in December by the Secre­
tary’s gloomy report which showed revenues lagging behind his July 
estim ates and expenditures increasing at a m ore rapid pace. At 
about the same time the Trent Affair threatened to erupt into a war 
with Britain and specie went into hiding. With their reserves falling 
precipitously, the Hew York banks decided to suspend specie pay­
m ents on December 28. The situation was grim. As Spaulding put it:
No m ore gold could be loaned to the Government, 
except in sm all and wholly inadequate amounts* 
because it was not to be had. State bank b ills  
could still be obtained, but the banks having su s­
pended specie payments, this currency was
16 E. G. Spaulding* H istory of the Legal Tender Paper Money 
la sued During the Great Rebellion . Being a Doan Without 
Interest and, a National Currency (Buffalo, New York: Express 
Printing Company, 1869), pp. 1-12.
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depreciated, and had only a local character 
and credit*-not being much known out of the 
Mates where the banks were located. Hesitancy 
and delay, with the expenses of the war running 
at an average of $2, 000, 000 per day, would be 
fatal. 17
Since Spaulding had been warned that the bank b ill would
m eet with opposition he made the legal tender section into a separate
b ill to answer the needs of the cr is is . With the only alternative
being a plan advocated by James Oallatin and supported by the leading
bankers of New York, Boston and Philadelphia which did not provide
for any kind of national banking system . Chase reluctantly backed
18the legal tender m easure.
While prominent roles w ere played by Spaulding and Samuel 
Hooper of M assachusetts, Congressmen from the Old Northwest 
took an active part in the debate. Among the w esterners who spoke 
in the debate there was a division along party lines with Democrats 
bitterly opposing the b ill and Republicans generally advocating its
17 Ibid.,} p. 14. Concerning Chase's decision to demand specie, 
Redlich (pp. 92-93) tends to defend the Secretary, while he is  
condemned by Bray Hammond in Banks and P olitics, pp. 720-721, 
and "The North’s Empty Purse, 1861-1862, " American H istorical 
Review, LXVII (October, 1961), pp. 1-18. Sharkey (pp. 21-23)
is c loser  to Redlich than Hammond.
18 Spaulding, H istory of the Legal Tender Paper Money, 12-13,
18-21, 27. Among the several letters reprinted herein is  one 
from  Chase to Spaulding, January 22, 1862 expressing his view s. 
See also  Chase to W. C. Bryant, February 4, 1862, reprinted
in Warden, Life of Chase; and the Report of the Secretary of the 
Treasury on the State of Finances for the Year Ending June 30, 
1862 (Washington: 1863), p. 8.
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passage.
Although eastern Republicans like Roscoe Conkling and 
Justin M orrill opposed the bill, the main opposition came from  
those doyens of the w estern ‘‘Progressive" Democracy, Clement 
Vallandigham and George Hunt Pendleton. They made standard 
"hard money" arguments based on a strict construction of the Con­
stitution. Pendleton argued it would impair the obligation of con­
tracts. Vallandigham was willing to support an issue of Treasury 
notes, but denied "the right of the Federal Government to provide a 
paper currency intended prim arily to circulate as m oney.. . . "  
E ssentially  he would resort to Treasury notes, sanctioned by Jackson­
ian experience, but opposed the legal tender provision which would 
"banish gold and silver from circulation. " If this were accepted,
"there would be no end to the legion of paper devils which shall pour
19forth from the loins of the Secretary. "
In the House three western Republicans spoke against the 
bill showing fears of its constitutionality and the danger of an incon­
vertible currency. However, the main body of w estern Republicans 
who spoke advocated the b ill’s passage. John Bingham of Ohio,
W illiam Kellogg of Illinois, Harrison Blake of Ohio, and Samuel 
Shellabarger of Ohio all spoke in favor of the bill. The debate in the
19 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 630-31 
(M orrill), 633-36 (Conkling), 614-15 and Appendix 42-46  
(Vallandigham); and 549-51 (Pendleton).
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Senate was dominated by w esterners led by John Sherman; and to a
20man the Republicans urged passage of the legal tender provision.
The basic argument presented was that of necessity.
Sherman told his fellow Senators, HI am authorized--nay required--
to vote for all laws necessary  and proper for executing these high
powers (to uphold the Government/. . .  This is  not the time when
I would lim it those powers. Rather than yield to revolutionary force,
21I would use revolutionary force. "
Aside from the argument from n ecessity  there was expressed
a great deal of anti-bank sentiment in these speeches. Bingham
protested that!
I cannot keep silent when I see efforts made. . .  
to lay the power of the American people to control 
their cu rren cy--a  power essential to their 
in terests--a t the feet of brokers and of city 
bankers, who have not a title of authority, save 
by the assent or forbearance of the people, to 
deal in their paper issued as money.
I am here today to a ssert the rightful 
authority of the Am erican people, as a nationality, 
sovereignty, under and by virtue of their Consti­
tution.
The Speaker, Kellogg, attacked those who would send six  hundred 
thousand young men to war and then say "the great interests of capital,
20 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 663-665 
(Horton, Ohio), 684-85 (Riddle, Ohio), 691 (Hovejoy, Illinois), 
636-40 (Bingham), 679-81 (Kellogg), 685-86 (Blake), 690 (Sheila 
barger), 771-75 (Sherman), 774 (Chandler, Michigan), 796-97 
(Howard, Michigan), Appendix, 51-56 (Howe, Wisconsin), and 
Appendix, 56-58 (Doolittle, Wisconsin).
21 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 775.
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of currency, m ust not be touched. 51 "We are not legislating for
the m oney-shavers who oppose this bill, n argued Harrison Blake,
o o
"but for the people, the sold iers, and the laboring c la sses . ’*
With the aid of Chase's endorsement, the bill was finally
brought to a vote, and the crucial legal tender provision narrowly
passed the Senate, 22-17. In the House this was passed by a wider
m argin, 95-55. The b ill in its final form gained the votes of ninety-
23three representatives and thirty senators.
An analysis of the b ill on a national level shows m ost Demo­
crats voting against it, with m ost Republicans favoring it although a 
sizeable segment of the party joined the opposition. The votes of 
the congressm en of the Old Northwest show a greater unanimity.
In the Senate, the only Democrat from this area, Jesse Bright of 
Indiana did not vote, nor did the two Republican Senators from Illinois. 
The other seven Republican Senators all voted for the bill. The 
House vote is even m ore revealing. Of the thirteen Democrats from  
the Old Northwest who voted, everyone opposed the legal tender act, 
while among the Republicans from this area tw enty-six favored the
22 Ibid ., pp. 636, 679, and 686.
23 Ibid., pp. 695, 800.
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bill and three opposed it* ^
“While Chase was forced to ask for an additional issue of 
legal tenders, he had not given up on his plan for permanent bank­
ing reform . It seem s that, while they supported Chase’s demands, 
m ost w estern Republicans continued to look toward a fundamental 
change in the banking structure. Most of them probably agreed with 
Samuel Hooper who, urging passage of the f ir st  legal tender act, 
admitted "the proper inauguration of the new banking sch em e.. .  will 
require tim e. " Certainly in the minds of men like Sherman and 
Zachariah Chandler of Michigan the legal tenders w ere a stop-gap  
m easure until real reform  could be completed.
Throughout the debate on legal tenders Chase continued to 
urge action on a banking system . He was upset that his a llies were 
not pushing hard enough for it. He wrote to Spaulding that he attached 
much m ore importance to "the Banking as a m easure of re lie f” than
24 There was no change among w estern senators on the two votes.
The House figures are on the final vote. Riddle who spoke 
against the b ill voted for it on the final vote. An Indiana Demo­
crat, Knapp, voted for retaining the legal tender provision and 
against the bill. Sharkey (p. 42) seem s to have m iscounted the 
western votes in his analysis.
25 Spaulding, H istory of the Legal Tender Paper Money, pp. 154-63; 
Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 617; John 
Sherman, R ecollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate and 
Cabinet (New York: The Werner Company, 1895), I, pp. 282-85; 
Wilmer C. H arris, Public Life of Zachariah Chandler, 1851-1875 
(Lansing, Michigan: The Michigan H istorical Commission, 1917), 
p. 71. Sherman voted against the increase in Greenbacks.
Chandler spoke against it, but ended up voting for it. Both actively  
championed the national banking system .
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did the New Yorker. Later in the year he recorded in his diary his 
unhappiness with the use of legal tenders and the seeming refusal 
of "the President and his counsellors" to contemplate reform, in 
October he explained to John Bigelow in Paris the advantages*:of his 
plan:
/The adoption/ of this system  will furnish all the 
money that is  needed at reasonable rates* and in­
sure an early return to specie payments without 
and serious business convulsion. Even should the 
war be unhappily protracted beyond the current 
financial year* the adoption of this system* by 
uniting the capital of the country with the credit 
of the government, w ill probably avert'- great 
disasters otherwise to be apprehended. 26
Hooper had introduced a banking b ill in 1862, but it was tied
up in com m ittee by Thaddeus Stevens. Chase saw this as a sign that,
”A m ajority of both House and Senate Financial Committees were
incredulous or hostile, ” but he was encouraged by the support of
27Hooper and Robert J. Walker, the ex-Secretary of the Treasury.
In December, Chase received the support of the nation’s 
m ost powerful w estern Republican, the President. Lincoln praised  
the legal tender acts for answering "the long-felt want of an uniform
26 Chase to Spaulding, January 30, 1862, reprinted in Spaulding, 
H istory of the Legal Tender Paper Money* p. 46; "Diary and 
Correspondence of Salmon P. Chase* " p. 76; and Chase to 
Bigelow, October 7, 1862* reprinted in Warden, Life of Chase, 
pp. 501-504.
27 Davis, Origin of the National Banking System* pp. 56-57;
Chase to Trowbridge, reprinted in Schuckers, Life of Chase*
p. 292.
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circulating medium, saving thereby to the people im m ense sums
in discounts and exchanges. 11 However, he doubted that such a
currency could “be permanently, usefully, and safely maintained. “
To secure “the great advantages of a safe and uniform, currency, "
he suggested ’’the organization of banking associations under a
general act of Congress, w ell guarded in its provisions. “ Such a
system  would offer numerous advantages to the government and
28“protect labor against the evils of a vicious currency. "
Several days later Chase reviewed the financial legislation
of 1862 and again suggested a national banking system . It was his
belief that the suspension of specie payments created an em ergency
situation that left the government a choice between state bank currency
and legal tenders. He preferred the national currency and on the
whole thought it had performed w ell. He worried about inflation
which he ascribed to the increase of state bank issued, and he
proposed a m oderate tax on these notes. He also feared that the
legal tenders would become the permanent currency of the nation
and to avoid this he urged a national banking system  to establish
"one sound uniform circulation, of equal values throughout the
country, upon the foundation of national credit with private capital. "
He also assured the leg isla tors that his was not a “m ere paper money
29schem e, “ and it would facilitate the return to specie payments.
28 Richardson, e d ., M essages and Papers of the Presidents, VI, 
pp. 129-30*
29 Report of the Secretary of the T reasu ry .. .  1862, pp. 1-30.
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Although Stevens s till was hostile toward the Hooper bill,
he reported it out of com mittee. When it hit rough sledding in the
House, the initiative on the banking bill shifted to the Senate. On
January 7, Chase appealed to the Finance Committee of the Senate:
No m easure, in my judgement, w ill m eet the 
n ecessities  of the occasion, and prove adequate 
to the provision of the great sums required for 
the suppression of the rebellion, which does not 
include a firm  support to public credit through 
the establishm ent of a uniform national circula- 
tion, secured by bonds of the United States. 30
Ten days later Lincoln sent a special m essage to Congress
urging a tax on state bank circulation in order to curb inflation,
and the establishm ent of a uniform currency through a national bank- 
31mg system .
The man who took charge of the b ill in the Senate, and to 
whom "more than any other person Mr. Chase owed successfu l 
passage of the bill" was John Sherman. Chase sent Henry Cooke, 
Jay’s brother, to influence Sherman to take up the bill. There 
seem s little  reason to doubt that since his entrance into Congress 
Sherman had desired a reform  of the currency system . However, he 
wanted to alter Chase’s plan by "restricting the charter (which at
30 Chase to Fessenden, January 7, 1863, reprinted in Spaulding, 
H istory of the Legal Tender Paper Money, p. 182.
31 Richardson, e d ., M essages and Papers of the Presidents, VI 
pp. 149-50.
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present is perpetual) to twenty years, /and/ to prevent inflation
1J®YJ lim iting the amount of circulation to be issued and apportion it
32among the States. "
On January 26 he introduced the plan with modifications and
stoutly defended it with a "powerful and effective" speech, Sherman
presented arguments detailing the advantages to the government and
the people. On the fir st count he echoed Chase that the b ill would
furnish a unifoi*m currency, create a market for bonds, furnish
depositories for public funds, and supply a means for payment of
public dues. With much m ore vigor than the Secretary, Sherman
extolled the nationalistic aspects of the plan. Some years later he
wrote, "The policy of this country ought to be to make everything
national as far as possible. If we were dependent upon the United
States for a currency and a medium of exchange, we would have a
broader m ore prosperous nationality. " The want of such nationality
33was responsible for the rebellion.
32 Davis, Origin of the National Banking System, pp. 75-81. The 
letters which Davis quotes from Henry Cooke to Jay Cooke, 
January 23 and February 12, 1863, are reprinted in E llis Paxson  
Oberhoitzer, Jay Cooke, Financier of the Civil War (Philadel- 
phia; George W. Jacobs and Company, 1907), I, pp. 332-33. 
Sherman’s actions in 1862 give no reason to discount his explana­
tion in Sherman, R ecollections, I, p* 284.
33 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, pp. 504, 
820-26, 840-46, 874-77; Sherman, R ecollections, I, 298.
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Sherman directed the other half of Ms argument toward the 
advantages of a national currency over state bank issu es. JLlke 
Chase he decried the system  of 1, 642 banks chartered by twenty- 
eight different states whose "laws were as d iv erse .. .  as the human 
countenance. " This m ultiplicity of banks made a national currency 
im possible. He called for a common regulator to control them and 
harmonize their actions in order to secure a sound currency to all 
areas of the country. He also made some distinctly w estern com ­
plaints about the New England currency in that section and the lo ss  
"of exchange from  w est to east on local currency* " These argu­
m ents, along with the idea that the new currency would be le ss  
easily  counterfeited, appealed to w esterners, but were le ss  readily 
accepted in the eastern and middle states "where their banking system  
had been so improved that bank failures were rare, and bank b ills  
w ere protected by mutual guarantees. " Chandler supported Sherman, 
appealing to w estern needs;
In my judgement very little demand w ill arise  
in the eastern States for this circulating medium.
It w ill be different in the Vvrest. In the West, our 
circulation having been destroyed virtually, as it 
was based upon southern bonds, at the com m ence­
m ent of the war, there w ill be some demand.
The bill, he believed, would provide a better currency with better
security  than local banks. James Doolittle of W isconsin added that
the system  would have none of the objections of earlier national banks
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i . . .  3 4because it did not create a monopoly.
In these debates fewer people spoke than the year before, 
and two w estern Republicans who had voted for the legal tenders 
joined Justin M orrill and Jacob Collamer the leading .Republican 
opponents of the b ill. John Gurley of Illinois defended the Green­
backs and cautioned against further experimentation particularly  
with a type of banking that had failed in the w est "most disastrously  
/ fo r /  all c la sses . " Richard Harrison of Ohio joined in these fears
35that the new system  would be a recreation of the w estern "wildcats. "
In the debate on the legal tenders Vallandigham had attacked
Chase’s proposal for a national banking system  as a "magnificent
National Paper Mill. " While only one w estern Democrat spoke in
the debate on the national banking act, he echoed Vallandigham and
predicted, that "like all great paper money schem es, it is fraught 
3 6with many ev iis. "
The vote on Sherman’s bill, which was very close in both 
houses showed the b ill to be a Republican m easure, but with a sizeable
34 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, pp. 840-46  
(Sherman), 877 (Chandler), and 881-82 (Doolittle).
35 Ibid ., pp. 296-97 (M orrill), 869-74 (Collamer), 341-42 
(Gurley), 1117 (Harrison).
36 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, Appendix,
p. 43; Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, p. 1143, 
em phasis in the original.
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number of that party joining the Democrats in opposing the bill.
However, the party division among w esterners was much clearer
than the debate would indicate. Hyman Trumbull, who also opposed
the legal tenders, was the only w estern Republican to vote against
Sherman*3 bill. In the House all thirteen w estern Democrats opposed
the bill, and Daniel Voorhees who was absent noted he would have
voted with them. Twenty-three of twenty-seven western Republicans 
37voted lor the bill.
In line with the prediction of Chandler, the West showed a 
greater tendency to join the new system  during its fir st year. In 
the fir st report of the Comptroller of the Currency seventy-three  
of the one hundred and thirty-four banks in the new system  were 
located in the Old Northwest. Ohio with thirty-eight such banks had 
alm ost twice as many as any other state in the Union. The comp­
troller, Indiana banker Hugh McCulloch who later became Secretary  
of the Treasury, commented:
The rapidity with which national banks are being 
organized in the w estern states, and the high
37 Ibid ., pp. 897, 1148. Trumbull didn’t vote on the fir st legal
tender act, but voted against the second. Either his Jacksonian 
background or increased pressure from Illinois Democrats who 
had just replaced Orville H. Browning with Democrat William
A. Richardson m ust have influenced him. Unfortunately his 
la test biographer (Krug, Lyman Trumbull) doesn’t deal with his 
attitudes on the financing of the war.
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character of m ost of the stockholders thereof, 
indicate the popularity of the system  in that 
part of the Union. 38
Certainly this popularity is not hard to explain, The free
banking system s of Illinois and Indiana were discredited, and the
charter of the Ohio State Bank was about to expire. The sm all
number of new banks in W isconsin and Michigan can be explained
by the new state system  in the form er and a conflict concerning
legal in terest requirem ents in the latter. In the Comptroller’s
report of 1864 there were one hundred and eighty-four national banks
39in this area, and Michigan and Wisconsin each had fifteen.
At the end of 1863 Chase, Lincoln, and McCulloch all 
praised the new system , but the opposition from eastern bankers 
kept it from fulfilling expectations. McCulloch, who had gone to 
Washington as a state banker to oppose the system , became convinced 
that a national currency was an absolute n ecessity  and accepted  
Chase's appointment as com ptroller. In his fir st report he suggested  
a revision  of the law to make the banks as w ell as the currency 
truly national. Chase incorporated his suggestions into his report 
and a new national banking act was passed by Congress June 3, 1864.
38 "Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, H in Report of the 
Secretary of the T reasu ry .. .  1863, pp. 49-61.
39 Rediich, Am erican Banking, H, p. 108; Merk, Economic History 
of W isconsin, pp. 213-214; "Report of the Comptroller of the 
Currency /Novem ber 25, 1864/11 in Report of the Secretary of 
the T rea su ry .. .  1864, pp. 46-55.
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This added a large numbei’ of new banks to the system , but It was
not until the prohibitive tax on state bank notes, long urged by
w esterners, was passed in March, 1865, that the new national bank
notes along with the Greenbacks gave the United States a totally  
40national currency.
Although there was hesitancy in some areas, the w estern  
Republicans solidly supported the currency legislation of the 
Civil War years. Aside from the nearly unanimous action of Repub** 
lican congressm en from this area, the leading party organs such 
as the Chicago Tribune and the Detroit Daily Advertiser, advocated 
and encouraged Chase’s policies. In 1862 the legal tenders were 
defended, and a year later, when the fir st national banking bill was 
passed, it received  enthusiastic support. Although a tax on state 
bank notes was not enacted until 1865, this policy had been con­
stantly agitated both in and out of Congress by w estern Republicans. 
Everywhere the Republican press praised the legislation that was
40 Report of the Secretary of the T reasu ry ., .  1863, pp. 1-27?
Richardson, e d ., M essages and Papers of the Presidents, VI, 
p. 183; ’’Report of the Comptroller of the Currency AHovember 
28, 1863/*'; McCulloch, Men and M easures of a Half Century, 
pp. 163-70; Davis, Origins of the National Banking System, 
pp. 88-104.
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the basis for "the universal prosperity o£ all c la sses .
These policies were in line with western economic needs, 
particularly the desire for a sound uniform currency. Since the 
destruction of the Bank of the United States, the Whigs and Republi­
cans had maintained the goal of a sound currency adequate to business 
needs. The nationalisation of the currency finally allowed them, at 
lea st m omentarily, to achieve that goal. In the end they fought 
against the state bankers who they so often supported and who formed 
a powerful lobby against the national banking system . Both the 
legal tender acts and the national banking acts were m oves to 
reassert some degree of national control over the currency of the
42country, and they represented a new era of economic nationalism.
In line with their arguments of three decades the Demo­
crats of the West stood solidly against such "centralizing" tendencies 
and monetary h eresies. Even before the fir st legal tender b ill was 
enacted the Chicago Tim es charged that the Republicans were failing
41 Ibid ., pp. 17-18, 25-26, 44-53, 63-66, 69-70, 98] James,
Chicago Banks, I, pp. 307, 315, 329, 338-367] Joanna Elizabeth 
Schneider, "The Reaction of Michigan Republicans To Civil 
War Financial Legislation, " (Unpublished M. A. Thesis, Wayne 
State University, Detroit, 1963), pp. 55-71; the Chicago Tribune, 
January 2 and February 8, 1862, and February 7 and 13, 1863; 
Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 9, 1864.
42 Illinois Governor, 1861-1865 (for Yates* m essage of January 5, 
1863); McCulloch, Men and M easures of Haif a, Century,
pp. 167-70; Detroit Advertiser and Tribune, January 10, 1863; 
Sherman, R ecollections, I, pp. 289-90, 298*300.
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in their single duty to preserve the credit of the nation. The same
paper predicted "that they w ill substantially fail in the performance
of this duty* and that they w ill aggravate the failure by legislation
which w ill be as wicked as / i t  i s /  injurious. ” Subsequently, as
each new m easure was enacted, Democratic organs like the
Indianapolis State Sentinel, the Detroit Free P r e ss , and Samuel
Medaryfs The C risis detailed its wickedness and prophesied irrepa-
43rable injury to the republic.
Although eventually many w estern Democrats would stand 
for nGod and Pendleton’s p lan ,,T the original issu es of Greenbacks 
were m et with Democratic hostility. The Detroit Free P ress  
attacked them as w orse than the Mw ild-catn currency, and predicted  
that they would "embarrass /IJhe government and . . .  beggar the 
people. " The Indianapolis State Sentinel attacked the legal tenders 
as !,An Irredeemable Paper Currency--The High Road to Financial 
Ruin. ” Aside from the usual arguments that irredeem able paper 
would bring a wave of speculation followed by a depression, the 
Sentinel charged that creditors would be unjustly injured. Democratic 
Judge Samuel S . Perkins ruled that legal tender legislation  should
43 Chicago Tim es, in the Indianapolis State Sentinel, January 11,
1862; Stampp, Indiana Politics During the Civil War, pp. 189-91, 
266-68; Thornbrough, Indiana in the Civil War Fra, pp. 194-96; 
Frank L. Klement* The Copperheads in the Middle West 
(Chicago; U niversity of Chicago P ress , I960), pp. 73, 83-84.
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be invalidated because it ’'operated as a fraud on the public creditors” 
and amounted to confiscation of private property without com pensa­
tion* Such a paper money system  stood in contrast to all the
Jacksonian Democrats had struggled for in the past two decades* ^
However, if the legal tenders seem ed a departure from the 
tested  ways of sound finance the national banking system  became 
”a symbol of the com plete abandonment of Democratic doctrines* ”
The Cincinnati Enquirer told its readers:
The enormity of this b ill is  sufficient to make 
General Jackson who killed the old Bank of the 
United States, turn in his co ffin .. .  the design is 
to destroy the fixed institutions of the States,
and build up a central moneyed despotism* 45
The new system  was nothing m ore than a return of the old
’’money monopoly” and would give r ise  to an aristocracy ten tim es
w orse than the ’’slavocracy” which would ’’domineer over white men. ”
Particularly Medary em phasized the argument that the ’’monstrous
Bank B ill” subverted the interests of the w estern farm er to those of
44 The Detroit Free P ress , January 11, 1862, Indianapolis State 
Sentinel, January 30, 1862; Perkins is  quoted in Thornbrough, 
Indiana in the Civil War Era, p. 195* The Detroit Free P ress , 
February 8, 1862, did in sist that the legal tender clause was 
necessary to keep the county from being "surrendered, bound 
hand and foot, to the money speculators. "
45 Stampp, Indiana P o liticb During the Civil War, p* 190; Cincinnati 
Daily Enquirer, February 24, 1863, quoted in Klement, Copper­
heads in the Middle West, p* 84.
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the eastern capitalist. To Democrats who had cut their political 
teeth on the opposition to the '* Biddle centralizers" this new national­
ism  of monetary affairs clearly  undermined the purity of the Con­
stitution. In 1865 the Indianapolis State Sentinel expressed doubt
that "the old standard orthodoxy*1 of the Constitution could ever be
4 6regained.
The Civil War brought to a close the debate over banking 
begun in the wake of the Panic of 1837. The n ecessities  of war had 
forced the Republicans to innovate on a wide scale in m atters of 
finance. To solve the pressing needs of the government the Green­
backs w ere issued  as an em ergency m easure in 1862. The following 
year the national banking system  was created on the model of the 
free banking system s of the states and embodying restrictions which 
the lesson s of experience dictated. While these changes bore a 
distinct relation to the past, the institutional structures which grew 
out of the war ushered in a new era of monetary debate in the Old North­
w est and the nation as a whole. The old issu es concerning state bank­
ing which had occupied the political arena for thirty years w ere no 
longer relevant, and the concepts and cliches used by the parties had 
to be transform ed to deal with new economic and political situations.
46 The Indianapolis State Sentinel, October 27, 1863, and May 12,
1865; The C ris is , March 4 and 18, 1863, and July 6, 1864; the 
Detroit F ree P ress , January 11, 14, and 17, 1863; the Milwaukee 
Daily News, in the~lndianapolis State Sentinel, April 29* 1863.
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APPENDIX A 
Voting in the 1850*3
The b elief that the Democrats formed a numerous and 
dynamic elem ent of the Republican party in the 1850’s is defended 
by W illiam O. Lynch in his article, "The Convergence of Lincoln 
and Douglas* " in which he made a pioneering attempt to m easure the 
number of ex*»Democrats and ex-W higs in the new party* He uses  
only the elections of 1852 and 1856 and makes no effort to divide up 
the "Free Soil" vote of 1852 into ex-W higs and ex-D em ocrats. I 
have used the sam e method which Lynch employed but over a longer 
period. I have assum ed that the total Liberty vote came from the 
Whigs, the total Am erican vote came from  ex-W higs, and the total 
Breckinridge vote came from Democrats.
The Old Northwest
1844 1848 1852
Dem.
W-R
Other
306, 029 
293,073  
17,239
49%
47%
4%
330, 998 
299, 503 
SO, 190
46. 5% 
42% 
11. 5%
418, 579 
353,073  
64, 422
616, 341 710, 691 836, 074
1856 1860
Dem.
W-R
Other
500, 054 
515, 889 
90, 361
45% 
46* 6% 
8. 4%
593, 085 
717, 473 
27,726  
24, 068
43. 5% 
52. 6% 
2.1% 
1. 8%
1,106, 304 1,362, 352
8%
319
The statements about the economic elite are drawn from a 
com parison of the total vote of Wayne County, Michigan, using the 
above assumptions and Lynch’s method, and the data given by 
Alexandra McCoy in her dissertation.
Wayne County, Michigan 
1844 1848 1852
Dem. 2,736 52% 3, 305 52.7% 4, 680 55.3%
W-R 2, 346 44. 4% 2, 540 40. 5% 3* 402 40.2%
Other 192 2. 6% 421 6. 8% 368 4. 5%
5, 247 6, 266 8,450
1856 1860
Dem. 5,777 52. 4% 6, 701 47%
W-R 5, 250 46. 8% 7, 325 51.3%
Other 205 . 8% 102 . 8%
139 « 9 %
11,23a 14,267
The jSconomic JSlite of Wayne County
1844 I860
Dem. 28 29% 48 35. 5%
W-R 60 62% 58 43%
Other 5- 5% 4 ■ 3%
No f 4 4% 25 18. 5%
9T 135
The general figures for the elections come from Burnham, 
Presidential Ballots. Those for the section as a whole are on p. 248 
and those for Wayne County are on p. 532.
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A Bibliographical Note
In recen t years there has been a great deal of in te res t in 
the political aspects of m onetary questions and a number of excellent 
books have appeared. The older classic  studies of Ralph C atterall 
on the Second Bank of the United States and Wesley Mitchell on the 
Greenbacks have been supplemented by the works of W alter Smith, 
A rthur Schlesinger, J r . , Thomas Govan, Robert Sharkey, and 
Irwin Unger. Smith has unwound the complicated economic affairs 
of the Bank. Schlesinger has presented the Democratic view of 
that institution? and Govan has ably defended Nicholas Biddle. Sharkey 
and Unger, although they differ slightly, have brought a fresh  p e r­
spective to the financing of the Civil War and the m onetary problem s 
which followed it  which completely rev ises the traditional views 
defended by Howard Beale and Mathew Josephson. Two excellent 
studies of banking by Bray Hammond and F ritz  Redlich have added 
im m easurably to our understanding of Am erican m onetary history 
in the nineteenth century. However, these m ainly concentrate on the 
Bank War and the post Civil War period leaving the in terim  relatively 
untouched. Thus, there is a gap in banking history  of about twenty- 
five years.
The decentralized nature of the problem  in these years has 
made it difficult to study and has rendered generalizations dangerous* 
Most h isto rians have unfortunately used in terpretative fram es derived
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from  either the Jacksonian struggle with the Bank or the so called 
"A grarian Crusade" of the late nineteenth century to structure their 
analyses.
Our understanding of the reaction to m onetary questions in 
the states is weak even for the years in which national policy is 
well covered. This weakness shows up clearly  in the period when 
the national government was quiescent. The best studies of the 
political aspects of banking in a state a re  those on free banking in 
New York by Redlich, Hammond, and Lee Benson in his book on 
New York politics. Allusion is made to the extension of free banking 
into the west, but only Michigan receives much attention. Here 
nearly  every author leans heavily on the nineteenth century a rtic les 
by Thomas Cooley and Alpheus Felch. Individual states a re  trea ted  
in the older studies by William Graham Sumner and John Jay Knox, 
and in the com prehensive little  book by Leonard Helderman. Unfortu­
nately, Sumner and Knox are  both unreliable and ra ther apolitical; 
and Helderm an, while reliable, is very sketchy. Much m ore detail 
is given in the studies of state banking by Logan Esarey, C. C. 
Huntington, George Dowrie, M aurice Ross, and F. Cyril Jam es.
The book on Chicago banks is a model study relating local questions 
to the la rg e r  national and international situation. William Harding’s 
old essay  on the State Bank of Indiana is also excellent. The other 
state studies, while useful, tend to be pedestrian  and to p ress events
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into in terpretations derived from  national politics. The confusion 
this causes is seen c learly  in R oss’s d issertation.
These state studies form  the basis for political h istories 
of the states and h isto ries of the region. The studies of F rancis 
W eisenburger, Eugene Roseboom, Alfred Holt, Theodore Pease 
and Charles Cole a re  all helpful in placing m onetary problem s in 
the proper political context and add to the above state banking 
studies. The region is excellently trea ted  by F rederick  Jackson 
T urner and R. Carlyle Buley, but both books a re  weak on m onetary 
questions. The best attem pts at synthesis a re  the chapter in George 
Rogers T ay lo r's  economic h istory  of the period and Hammond's 
a rtic le  on w estern  banking which lays down an outline for the study 
of the question at variance with the view developed in this study.
One of the best studies of banking in the Old Northwest or any section 
is C arte r Golembe's d issertation, but it covers only the period from 
1830 to 1844 and concerns m ainly the functions of banks. It serves 
to dispel a g rea t number of illusions and provided this study with 
some of its basic assum ptions.
One final book that should be mentioned is Marvin M eyers' 
study of Jacksonian thought. It is not a study of banking, but clearly  
deliniates the symbolic nature of the m onetary issue and thus effected 
this study m easurably.
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